Key insights:

• • • Prediction markets sit in a regulatory gray zone 鈥� Prediction markets鈥� economic function often looks much closer to gambling than traditional finance.

    • That ambiguity creates an AML blind spot 鈥� This blind spot allows potentially weaker controls around KYC, source of funds, sanctions screening, and suspicious activity reporting.

    • Banks and payment processors should focus on actual risk, not labels 鈥� Reputational, legal, and financial crime risk exposure can arise long before regulators clarify the rules.

Prediction markets have grown into a multi-billion-dollar ecosystem, offering the ability to enter into a contract to predict the outcomes on everything from elections and sports games to economic data and weather events. Yet as these platforms expand, they operate in a regulatory gray zone that raises serious questions for banks, payment processors, and compliance professionals.

Yet, the classification question that regulators and financial institutions continue to debate is not merely academic. It determines whether prediction market platforms will face the same anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) obligations as casinos and sportsbook venues, or whether prediction markets can continue to operate with minimal compliance oversight. This distinction has real consequences for the financial system.

鈥淧rediction markets are not just a classification problem, they represent a structural gap in how financial crime risk is currently understood and managed,鈥� says James Lephew, Founder & CEO of , a Charlotte-based consulting firm that serves major gambling operators and financial institutions globally.

Clarification is required in classifying this sector

Prediction markets occupy an ambiguous middle ground. Market operators position their platforms as financial derivatives or forecasting tools rather than gambling venues, emphasizing price discovery and statistical analysis over chance-based wagering. A contract on the outcome of a presidential election or a sports event, they argue, reflects crowd-sourced probability estimates grounded in information aggregation, not gambling luck.

Yet the fundamental mechanics raise legitimate questions. A user who buys a contract predicting that a candidate will lose an election is, in economic terms, wagering money on an uncertain outcome. The distinction between betting on a football game and trading a contract on the outcome of that same game becomes difficult to defend from a regulatory standpoint 鈥� and this classification matters enormously.

The distinction between betting on a football game and trading a contract on the outcome of that same game becomes difficult to defend from a regulatory standpoint 鈥� and this classification matters enormously.

If prediction markets are treated as gaming operations, they trigger Title 31 obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act, including currency transaction reporting, suspicious activity reporting (SAR) requirements, and comprehensive KYC procedures. If on the other hand, prediction markets are classified more akin to financial markets, these requirements may not apply. Currently, many prediction market platforms claim financial market status, allowing them to operate outside gaming regulations and with potentially weaker AML controls.

There is a compliance gap

Without clear regulatory classification, prediction markets create a significant AML blind spot. Casinos must report cash transactions exceeding $10,000, conduct source-of-funds reviews, and maintain detailed customer profiles. Sportsbooks face licensing requirements, geolocation checks, and responsible-gaming safeguards. Prediction market platforms, by contrast, often operate with minimal reporting obligations.

This gap introduces concrete risks. Digital wallets and cryptocurrency channels can obscure the source of funds. Structuring and layering of sources become easier without robust verification, further clouding who exactly playing in these markets. Collusive trading through multiple accounts allows value transfer that may go undetected. And VPN use and foreign payment channels can enable sanctions evasion.

Further, without mandatory SAR reporting, suspicious patterns tied to money laundering, terrorist financing, or market manipulation may never reach law enforcement.

“What we’re seeing is an AML blind spot,鈥� says Lephew. 鈥淧latforms enabling financial flows with characteristics of gambling, but without the controls that regulators would normally expect.” Until classification catches up with the technology, he adds, this blind spot remains open 鈥� and exploitable.

Why this matters for banks and processors

Banks and payment processors that support prediction market platforms may carry significant reputational and legal risk if they haven’t conducted thorough due diligence 鈥� and they cannot rely on a platform’s self-classification as a financial market or forecasting tool. Nevada and other jurisdictions are actively examining whether these platforms constitute gambling, echoing concerns from the American Gaming Association that products carrying similar economic risks deserve similar regulatory treatment.

If a product allows participants to wager on uncertain outcomes and creates risk that is substantially similar to gambling, it should face AML and customer identification requirements proportionate to that risk.

“Risk must be assessed based on how the product actually behaves, not how it is marketed,” Lephew explains. And that means evaluating whether a platform applies robust KYC procedures, verifies the source of deposits and beneficial ownership, screens against sanctions lists, reports SARs to the government, prohibits contracts on high-risk events such as assassinations or terrorism, and uses geolocation controls to block users in restrictive jurisdictions. Those answers matter far more than whatever label the platform chooses, Lephew says.

The path forward

Regulators have several options. One approach applies gaming regulations uniformly, treating all prediction markets with economic characteristics similar to gambling as gaming operations subject to Title 31. A second approach creates explicit financial market classification with statutory AML obligations and enhanced scrutiny of high-risk contracts. A third option adopts a tiered or risk-based framework, classifying contracts on lower-risk events such as economic data or weather under financial market rules, while sports and election markets could face enhanced scrutiny. Violent outcome markets would be prohibited entirely.

Regardless of which path regulators choose, the principle should be the same: Classification should follow economic function. If a product allows participants to wager on uncertain outcomes and creates risk that is substantially similar to gambling, it should face AML and customer identification requirements proportionate to that risk.

Financial institutions should not wait for regulatory clarity. They should apply rigorous due diligence now, treating prediction markets with a heightened level of scrutiny appropriate to their actual risk profile rather than their claimed legal status.

The goal is not to eliminate prediction markets, but to ensure they operate within a framework that prevents money laundering, terrorist financing, and market abuse. “If it looks like gambling, behaves like gambling, and carries the same financial crime risk, it should be regulated accordingly,鈥� Lephew notes. 鈥淎nything less creates systemic exposure.”

You can find out more about the challenges financial institutions face in their anti-money laundering efforts here

Key insights:

• • • AI as a force multiplier 鈥� Advanced analytics now reveal financial and behavioral anomalies that traditional monitoring systems routinely miss, giving executives a clearer view of emerging risks.

    • Geospatial and digital intelligence converge 鈥� Intelligent networks like OSINT, ADINT, and location-based data expose hidden networks and movement patterns, improving the detection of money laundering, trafficking, and smuggling operations.

    • Enterprise risk strategies must evolve 鈥� Organizations that integrate AI-driven intelligence across compliance, security, and operations can respond faster, reduce blind spots, and operate with greater resilience during high-risk events.

Illicit financial activity has always evolved faster than the systems designed to stop it. And today, the speed and sophistication of criminal networks are accelerating in ways that traditional compliance processes can no longer match. Major international events, such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, bring millions of visitors, heightened commercial activity, and a surge in cross鈥慴order movement, all creating fertile ground for exploitation.

AI as an intelligence multiplier

In this environment, financial institutions are on the front lines of detection and mitigation, and corporations must strengthen their ability to detect hidden risks. AI 鈥� particularly when combined with digital intelligence sources, behavioral analytics, and geo-referenced data 鈥� has emerged as the most powerful accelerator of that transformation.

Among all of this high-volume activity, AI is redefining how institutions detect early-stage indicators of illicit activity. Instead of relying solely on manual reviews or rule-based monitoring, organizations are increasingly deploying systems capable of analyzing vast volumes of structured and unstructured data at once. Three capabilities are shaping this new frontier:

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) 鈥� Criminal activity, even when intentionally concealed, tends to leave trace signals online. OSINT tools can examine social platforms, online marketplaces, media sources, forums, and digital discussion channels to uncover suspicious behavioral patterns, potential recruitment or exploitation signals, inconsistencies between official identification and online presence, or clusters of accounts linked by shared attributes. For many executives, OSINT has become an indispensable layer of enhanced due diligence, risk scoring, and early threat detection long before suspicious activity appears in financial records.

Advertising intelligence (ADINT) 鈥� ADINT focuses on metadata produced by mobile applications and digital advertising ecosystems. While it does not expose personal identifiers, it reveals mobility patterns, device behavior, and clustering anomalies. This type of intelligence becomes particularly powerful during large-scale events because of the ability to monitor the movement of devices across high-risk corridors, identify unusual concentrations of activity near event venues or border regions, or detect digital behavior consistent with organized criminal logistics. ADINT introduces a geographic and behavioral dimension to risk that enables institutions to understand not only who a customer appears to be, but where they go, how they behave, and whether those patterns align with legitimate economic activity.

AI-enhanced investigations 鈥� Modern platforms now merge financial data with OSINT and ADINT inputs and then apply descriptive and generative AI (GenAI) to draw connections that would be impossible to detect manually. These systems can classify digital communications by sentiment or intent, identify unusual financial behavior within seconds, convert large datasets into actionable intelligence summaries, translate and interpret foreign-language content, and map networks through recurring metadata or visual similarity. For decision-makers and organizational stakeholders, this shift represents a dramatic reduction in blind spots and a faster escalation pathway when emerging threats surface.

Why financial institutions and corporations must lead

Human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and money laundering cannot function at scale without the financial system. Even when exploitation occurs offline, profits eventually make their way into the formal economy through remittances, structured cash movements, shell companies, digital wallets, recruitment payments, or short-term rental arrangements.

AI enhanced investigations can help institutions identify subtle but meaningful indicators, such as coached or inconsistent customer responses, accounts linked through shared devices or addresses, rapid deposits followed by immediate withdrawals, purchases that do not correspond to a customer鈥檚 risk profile, payments directed to unverifiable recruiters, unusual patterns of short-term housing across multiple individuals, or transaction flows that follow established exploitation routes.

Illicit financial activity has always evolved faster than the systems designed to stop it. And today, the speed and sophistication of criminal networks are accelerating in ways that traditional compliance processes can no longer match.

All this information already exists inside institutional data today; AI simply makes it visible and usable much more easily and quickly.

While financial institutions are central in detecting illicit finance, companies across multiple sectors face heightened exposure during large events. Hospitality, logistics, transportation, construction, real estate, and digital services all see risk intensifying as demand surges and oversight becomes more complex.

Those senior leaders who responsible for operational continuity should integrate AI-powered monitoring into their internal controls. This can help detect unusual workforce recruitment patterns, unexpected badge or access activity, subcontractor behavior that conflicts with declared operations, repeated presence in high-risk zones, or digital communications that hint at coercive or exploitative conduct.

In the fight against illicit finance, technology is no longer optional. Indeed, it is our most powerful ally.

You can find out more about the fight against illicit finance and money laundering here

Key insights:

• • • Big sporting events create perfect cover for sex trafficking 鈥� The World Cup鈥檚 massive crowds, temporary workers, and stretched local infrastructure make it easier for traffickers to blend in and exploit vulnerable people while staying largely out of sight.

    • Money trails and online ads are where traffickers slip up 鈥� Trafficking often leaves patterns, such as payments tied to commercial sex ads, round鈥慸ollar peer鈥憈o鈥憄eer transactions, and repeat phone numbers or language across online ads. Banks and investigators can spot these red flags, if they know what to look for.

    • Early, cross鈥憇ector collaboration is what actually makes a difference 鈥� The strongest prevention efforts happen before kickoff, when law enforcement, financial institutions, and nonprofits share intelligence, use formal information鈥憇haring tools, and build trusted local networks to respond quickly and protect victims.

As millions of soccer fans descend upon stadiums across North America for the 2026 FIFA World Cup in June and July, perpetrators of human rights crimes also are getting ready to operate in the shadows of host cities. Criminal networks are preparing to exploit the crowds, traffic, and chaos during the event by trafficking vulnerable individuals for commercial sex.

Human traffickers and organized crime groups often exploit major sporting events as opportunities to make quick money because the massive influx of visitors, temporary workers, and strained infrastructure creates perfect conditions for traffickers to operate while being largely undetected. At the same time, the stakeholders involved in countering this illegal activity 鈥� including law enforcement, civil society organizations, and financial institutions 鈥� stand ready to detect it, disrupt it, and protect vulnerable individuals who are exploited by criminal actors.

Indeed, close coordination and collaboration among these entities in advance of the games is key. To that end, the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) and 成人VR视频 are collaborating on a virtual and live event series to support these planning counter-trafficking efforts among stakeholders in several local cities this Spring.

Why major sporting events attract human trafficking activity

Not surprisingly, large crowds draw business opportunities whether they are legitimate or illicit. Collaboration between public and private entities underscore spikes in human trafficking activity. For example, during a recent large sporting event in 2025, 成人VR视频 Special Services partnered with federal law enforcement and other partners to identify nine adult encounters & services offered, which led to the recovery of two juveniles from sex trafficking and three state arrests

Common industries that involve the exploitation of vulnerable individuals include hospitality, construction, illicit massage businesses, escort services, and adult content production. The chaos of events and large influx of people mask the reality that exploitation is happening and makes detection significantly more challenging during these high-traffic periods.

Human traffickers and organized crime groups often exploit major sporting events as opportunities to make quick money because the massive influx of visitors, temporary workers, and strained infrastructure creates perfect conditions for traffickers to operate while being largely undetected.

Critically, understanding human trafficking as a business model depends on the recruitment of vulnerable people and access to money flows. These aspects of the business are also where detection can occur. Financial institutions and money service businesses can identify suspicious transactions related to human trafficking by understanding and recognizing specific transactional patterns, including payments to commercial sex advertisement websites, round-dollar peer-to-peer transactions, and merchant services linked to illicit massage businesses.

This online footprint left by traffickers proves invaluable for detection. Investigators track advertisements across adult services websites, identifying criminal networks through repeated phone numbers, distinctive emojis, and similar wording that may appear across multiple cities. However, smaller-scale operations present significant challenges as well. When the trafficker is an intimate partner or family member with limited transaction volumes, detection becomes exponentially more difficult without external intelligence.

Collaboration is key for prevention and detection

The most critical element for combating human trafficking at major sporting events is collaboration among anti-trafficking experts and employers of these professionals. Effective prevention requires building strong partnerships before these major events occur. Specific actions that can be taken include:

Establishing multi-sector task forces 鈥� The most successful anti-trafficking efforts involve joint task forces that combine federal, state, and local law enforcement with trusted private sector partners and supportive nonprofits or non-government organizations (NGOs) that offer victim services. This toolkit for large scale public events and other anti-trafficking toolkits are excellent resources for local host cities to use to execute these partnerships. These collaborative mechanisms allow different entities to share information in a timely manner.

Leveraging information sharing mechanisms 鈥� Financial institutions can use Section 314(b) authority for peer-to-peer information sharing between banks. This allows financial institutions to piece together fragments of suspicious activity that individually might seem insignificant but collectively reveal trafficking networks. Large federal agencies are consumed by multiple priorities and benefit from information sharing through Section 314(a) and assistance from financial sector partners during special operations to act as a force multiplier. Law enforcement also can benefit from detailed Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that contain specific dollar amounts, clear timelines, behavioral observations, and explicit keywords like human trafficking.

Preparing host cities by building networks and outreach in advance 鈥� Some World Cup host cities have already established human rights plans with robust collaborative systems within local task forces, government awareness campaigns, QR codes that link to support services, and multidisciplinary safety plans.

In addition, anti-trafficking professionals across all sectors are accessible and willing to help. Resources include national hotlines, such as the , referral directories on website, and the for cases involving minors. The most important step is simply reaching out to establish connections before crises occur.

Preparing for a safer event

The 2026 World Cup presents a pivotal moment to strengthen collaborative efforts against human trafficking across North America’s host cities. By establishing robust information-sharing networks between financial institutions, law enforcement, NGOs, and host communities before the tournament begins, stakeholders can transform heightened awareness into meaningful action that protects vulnerable individuals.

While traffickers will undoubtedly attempt to exploit the inevitable chaos surrounding a major event like the World Cup, a coordinated, multi-sector response grounded in shared intelligence, victim-centered approaches, and proactive preparation can disrupt their operations and ensure that the world’s celebration of soccer doesn’t come at the cost of human dignity and freedom.

You can find out more about听how organizations are trying to fight against human rights crimes here

Key insights:

• • • SAR volume is significantly underreported 鈥� Continuing and amended filings add approximately 20% to the official count yet remain invisible in trend analyses.

    • Filing activity is highly concentrated 鈥� A few large financial institutions dominate SARs volume, meaning trends reflect their practices more than systemic changes.

    • Agentic AI will drive a surge in SARs 鈥� Agentic AI risks increased noise over actionable intelligence, without addressing the unresolved question of whether current filings yield meaningful law enforcement outcomes.

The Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) that financial institutions file with the U.S. Treasury Department鈥檚 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) provide valuable insight, although they may not offer a comprehensive picture.

Prior to meaningful discussions regarding the future of SARs, it is essential for the financial crime community to clarify what is being measured. In 2025, for example, SAR filings of more than 4.1 million, representing an almost 8% increase compared to the total number of SARs filed in 2024.

Every figure FinCEN has published reflects original SARs only. Continuing activity SARs, which represent roughly 15% of all filings, are submitted under the original Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) identification number and never appear as new filings. Corrected and amended SARs add another 5% on top of that. This makes the real volume of SARs activity approximately 20% higher than what is reported.

The average community bank files fewer than one SAR a week, while the largest institutions file more than 500 a day.

Recent FinCEN guidance giving financial institutions more flexibility around continuing activity SARs sounds significant on paper, but as former Wells Fargo BSA/AML chief Jim Richards points out: “It won’t change the reported numbers 鈥� because those filings were never counted to begin with.” Financial crime professionals need to keep that gap in mind every time a trend line gets cited.

2025 was steady, not spectacular

There were roughly 300,000 SARs filed every single month of 2025, and the most notable thing is that nothing notable happened. That is likely a first on the volume side and worth acknowledging, but beyond that milestone the year did not hand financial crime professionals anything noteworthy. In a space that has dealt with pandemic distortions, crypto chaos, and fraud spikes that seemed to come out of nowhere, steady volume and predictable patterns are a little surprising. A quiet data set, however, is not the same as a quiet landscape, and financial crime professionals who are reading stability as stagnation may find themselves flat-footed when the numbers start moving again.

For example, one of the most underleveraged insights in the SARs space is just how concentrated filing activity really is. The numbers are stark: The top four banks file more SARs in a single day than 80% of the rest of the banks file in 10 years, according to 2019 data from a .

The average community bank files fewer than one SAR a week, while the largest institutions file more than 500 a day. “50 a year versus 500 a day,” notes Wells Fargo鈥檚 Richards, adding that such asymmetry has real implications for how the financial industry interprets trends. Meaningful movement in SARs data, up or down, is almost entirely dependent on what a handful of mega-institutions decide to do.

Not surprisingly, money services businesses (MSBs) are the second largest filing category, and virtual currency exchanges are almost certainly driving recent growth there, even if outdated category definitions make that difficult to confirm directly. Credit unions round out the top three.

The filing philosophy hasn’t changed and shouldn’t

Regulatory noise occasionally suggests that institutions should be more selective about what they file. However, compliance and legal reality have not shifted. No institution has ever faced serious consequences for filing too many SARs, and the cases that result in enforcement actions, reputational damage, and regulatory scrutiny are consistently about missed filings or late ones.

鈥淵ou’re not going to get in trouble from filing too much,鈥� Richards says. 鈥淣obody ever has, and I doubt if anyone ever will.” For financial crime professionals, the calculus remains exactly what it has always been 鈥� when in doubt, file. That posture isn’t going to change, and frankly it shouldn’t.

Yet, here is where the SARs space gets genuinely interesting. Agentic AI use in SARs filings 鈥� systems in which multiple AI agents work through a case from screening to decision to documentation 鈥� is beginning to move from concept to deployment. The impact on filing volume likely will be significant.

The risk is a system flooded with AI-generated SARs of variable quality, creating more noise for law enforcement to sort through rather than sharper intelligence to act upon.

Whereas a small team today might work through a handful of cases a week, AI-assisted workflows could push that into the dozens. Multiply that across institutions already inclined to file rather than miss something, and the result is a coming surge in SARs volume that could play out over the next two to four years.

“Agentic AI has the potential to be a game changer on how we do our work,鈥� Richards explains. 鈥淏ut I believe it’ll guarantee that there will be more SARs filed and not necessarily better and fewer SARs filed.” Indeed, the critical point for the financial crime community to internalize is exactly that.

The risk is a system flooded with AI-generated SARs of variable quality, creating more noise for law enforcement to sort through rather than sharper intelligence to act upon. Once the largest institutions adopt agentic AI as a best practice, others will follow quickly, and regulators will likely be several steps behind.

The value question can’t wait

The has been in place since 2014. Yet after 12 years of filings, the financial crime community still lacks a clear public accounting of whether that data has produced actionable law enforcement outcomes.

So, the question Richards is asking is one the entire industry should be asking: “Has anybody asked law enforcement?”

This question reflects a larger challenge that the industry needs to confront more aggressively, especially as AI technology is set to dramatically increase filing volume across the board. Increasing the volume without improving how the information is used does not represent progress. If SARs are not generating real investigative value, the solution is not to file more of them faster 鈥� instead, the pipeline should be fixed before it grows any bigger.

You can find more about the challenges that financial institutions face in managing SARs here

Key takeaways:

• • • Human trafficking is a financial crime 鈥� Without the financial system, human trafficking networks cannot operate at scale. Banks, compliance officers, money transmitters, and casinos are uniquely positioned to detect suspicious patterns.

    • The 2026 World Cup amplifies existing risks 鈥� With 5.5 million additional visitors expected in Mexico City alone, criminal networks will exploit the surge in cash flows, new customers, and cross-border movement.

    • Red flags are observable in financial behavior 鈥� Human trafficking networks often leave detectable financial footprints, which is why financial institutions must update monitoring systems and stay alert to unusual transaction spikes during the tournament.

MEXICO CITY 鈥� As the 2026 FIFA World Cup get ready to hold its tournament in June and July across three North American countries, anti-human trafficking experts are meeting as well and attempting to address the challenges facing the three host countries of the largest World Cup in history.

To that end, the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS), in partnership with 成人VR视频, organized one such event, focused on the scourge of human trafficking that often surrounds large sporting events like the World Cup.

One speaker at the event noted an important clarification in the difference between human trafficking and human smuggling 鈥� two terms that are frequently confused yet carry vastly different legal and humanitarian implications. The key distinction lies in consent and the nature of the crime. In human smuggling, the individual being transported across borders consents to the movement, typically driven by socioeconomic necessity, and the offense is considered a crime against the state. Human trafficking, by contrast, is a crime committed directly against the victim, often involving exploitation through force, coercion, threats, or deception, and does not require the crossing of any international border.

The ACAMS event challenged the common belief is that human trafficking is exclusively sexual in nature. In fact, there are 10 additional forms of exploitation beyond sexual abuse, including slavery, forced labor or services, use of minors in criminal activities, forced marriage, servitude, labor exploitation, forced begging, illegal adoption of minors, organ trafficking, and illicit biomedical experimentation on human beings.

As the World Cup approaches, financial institutions鈥� compliance teams must recognize that the same operational conditions that make major sporting events exciting are precisely the conditions that money launderers and traffickers seek to exploit.

Still, sexual exploitation remains the dominant form of human trafficking. Indeed, it is the second most lucrative illicit business in the world after drug trafficking, with every 15 minutes of sexual abuse of a trafficking victim generating approximately $30.

Of course, without clients, there is no demand, said one speaker from the 脕GAPE Foundation, an organization that works to raise awareness against gender-based violence and human trafficking.

Financial sector as a key line of defense

When identifying human trafficking, it鈥檚 wisest to examine it from a financial perspective to find important indicators, according to several speakers. Indeed, the financial sector plays a critical role given its capacity to detect suspicious accounts and payments, shell companies, cash movements, digital platforms, and commercial operations.

For example, when a customer opens an account or conducts a transaction, certain red flags can be visible, including whether the customer needs to consult notes to answer basic questions such as their address or occupation, or that their responses are not spontaneous or natural. Also, another indicator is if the customer’s profile is inconsistent with the type or volume of transactions being conducted.

For financial institutions, there are other patterns that have triggered alerts in illicit activity in the past, including near-immediate deposits and withdrawals with no clear justification for the cash flow, or multiple individuals registered at the same address or linked to the same account.

Similarly, another red flag would be if there鈥檚 a high number of accounts opened from the same state or municipality with similar patterns, particularly in areas identified as origin points for trafficking networks; or, payment of multiple short-term rentals or payments abroad to unverifiable recruiters or employment agencies.

Financial institutions should be on the lookout for companies that file no tax returns or invoice simulated transactions, or that use of front men to open accounts or conduct operations.

Also, new businesses whose declared activity does not correspond to their financial operations should be flagged, as well as any frequent, large-volume purchases of condoms, lingerie, or women’s clothing inconsistent with the declared business activity.

Indicators at the 2026 World Cup

In the context of major sporting events such as the World Cup, existing risks are significantly amplified, several speakers pointed out. Sexual tourism, including the commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, is a known and serious threat. Indicators that are relevant not only for the financial and banking sectors, but also for the real estate, tourism, transportation, hospitality, and restaurant industries including unusual accommodation requests, such as deactivating security cameras, delivering keys through third parties, or inquiring about the presence of neighboring guests.

When identifying human trafficking, it鈥檚 wisest to examine it from a financial perspective to find important indicators, and the financial sector plays a critical role given its capacity to detect suspicious accounts.

These industries should also be on the lookout for any adult or group of adults traveling with an unusually large number of minors, or individuals who travel in silence and are accompanied by someone who appears to exercise visible control over them.

As the World Cup approaches, financial institutions鈥� compliance teams must recognize that the same operational conditions that make major sporting events exciting 鈥� high transaction volumes, new customers, cross-border flows, and institutional attention diverted toward the event itself 鈥� are precisely the conditions that money launderers and traffickers seek to exploit.

For these compliance teams, monitoring systems must be updated, know-your-customer processes must go beyond documentation and reflect a genuine understanding of the client’s activity and context, and on-site verification visits must be conducted by personnel who know exactly what they are looking for.

The financial sector does not need to become an investigative body; however, it does need to remain alert, informed, and willing to report. Indeed, this is exactly what the compliance function exists for, and in the context of human trafficking, the cost of silence is measured not in fines or reputational damage, but in human lives.

You can find out more about the听challenges of hosting the 2026 FIFA World Cup here

Key insights:

• • • Convenience has outpaced consumer understanding 鈥斕齅any users treat apps, prepaid accounts, and rewards programs as simple payment tools, remaining unaware they are entrusting their money to entities with few safeguards.

    • Risk is no longer confined to traditional banks 鈥� Some of the most significant financial activities now occur within platforms and brands that do not resemble banks at all.

    • Opacity enables systemic vulnerability 鈥� The less transparent an institution’s obligations, leverage, and oversight, the easier it is for financial fragility, misconduct, and systemic risk to grow unchecked.

When you think of where money is held, you generally think of a bank. However, as we look at the financial landscape today, money is being held at a wide range of institutions that often have varying levels of safety and oversight. Entities from Starbucks to Visa to Coinbase hold money for individuals, effectively serving as a bank, but often without the regulatory framework that comes with it.

Behind the scenes, it can seem like . In its daily operation, it collects prepaid funds that resemble deposits, holds them as liabilities, and uses them internally 鈥� all without offering interest, cash withdrawals, or FDIC insurance. Starbucks’ rewards program holds $1.8 billion in customer cash, and if it were a bank, that would make it bigger, , than 85% of chartered banks, making the coffee chain one of the .

This dynamic extends well beyond coffee shops. “Popular digital payment apps are increasingly used as substitutes for a traditional bank or credit union account but lack the same protections to ensure that funds are safe,” warns the . If a nonbank payment app’s business fails, your money is likely lost or tied up in a long bankruptcy process.

Shadow banking

Think of a Starbucks gift card as a financial instrument. Technically it is one, but no one seriously worries about it being weaponized for any large-scale financial crimes. Most people鈥檚 concerns about a gift card is either losing it. The real concern lies not in lost gift cards, however, but in the broader trend: Nonbank institutions managing vast sums without commensurate oversight 鈥� and scale matters. A lost gift card is a personal inconvenience; but an unregulated institution managing billions of consumer dollars in leveraged capital is a systemic one.

Shadow banking encompasses credit and lending activities by institutions that are not traditional banks, and crucially, they do not have access to central bank funding or public sector credit guarantees. And because they are not subject to the same prudential regulations as depository banks, they do not need to hold as high financial reserves relative to their market exposure, allowing for very high levels of leverage which in turn can magnify profits during boom periods and compound losses during downturns.

The shadow banking ecosystem is diverse, and each segment of it presents distinct risks:

• • Hedge funds and private equity firms听鈥� Firms like Blackstone, KKR, and Apollo manage vast capital pools using leveraged strategies under limited oversight. Their size and borrowing levels may mean that market reversals can trigger rapid deleveraging, spilling risk into broader markets.
  • Family offices听鈥� A private company or advisory firm that manages the wealth of high-net-worth families, these can operate with even less transparency and often outside direct regulatory scrutiny, enabling them to engage in extreme leveraging and posing risks of sudden collapse.
  • Nonbank mortgage lenders and FinTechs听鈥� This group faces lower capital requirements than traditional banks, leaving thinner buffers to absorb losses during downturns, which can be especially concerning considering this sector鈥檚 rapid growth.
  • Crypto exchanges听鈥� Like much of the cryptocurrency ecosystem, these exchanges operate in jurisdictional gray zones, complicating enforcement and enabling illicit financial flows.
  • Money market funds 鈥� While these are generally perceived as safe, they can suffer runs if confidence in underlying assets erodes, which can force fire sales that destabilize related markets.
  • Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)听鈥� These investment instruments allow large institutions to move risk off their balance sheets, rendering such activity invisible to regulators.

Shadow banking may be the single greatest challenge facing financial regulation. These non-traditional institutions act like banks, but without the safeguards that make banks accountable. And where accountability is absent, opportunity often fills the void.

The same opacity that makes shadow banking difficult to regulate also makes it attractive to those with less legitimate intentions. Without mandatory reporting requirements, standardized oversight, or the threat of deposit insurance revocation, these institutions can become conduits for money laundering, fraud, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion in ways that traditional banks simply cannot. The question is no longer whether these vulnerabilities exist, but how they continue to be exploited.

The challenge of regulation

The global financial system has always evolved faster than the rules designed to govern it. What began as a coffee loyalty program and a few alternative lending platforms has quietly morphed into a parallel financial universe, one that moves trillions of dollars with a fraction of the transparency that traditional banking requires. That gap between innovation and oversight is not just a regulatory inconvenience, it鈥檚 an open door for illicit actors.

Closing that door will require more than periodic enforcement actions or piecemeal legislation. It will require regulators, lawmakers, and institutions to reckon honestly with how broadly the definition of a financial institution has expanded, and who bears the risk when things go wrong. Because historically, it has not been the institutions themselves; rather it has been the customers, the investors, and ultimately the public.

The first step, of course, is awareness. Recognizing that your money does not need to be in a bank to be at risk and that the custodians of that money need not be offshore shell companies to operate in shadows, can transform how we think about financial safety.

The line between a convenient app and an unaccountable financial intermediary is thinner than most realize. And in the world of financial crime, thin lines have a way of vanishing entirely.

You can learn more about the听many challenges facing financial institutions today听丑别谤别

Key highlights:

• • • Tax credit transferability survived intact鈥� The OBBBA preserved Section 6418 transferability rules despite earlier proposals to sunset or repeal them.

    • AI-driven data center boom may revive renewable energy tax credits鈥� With data centers projected to consume 12% of all US energy by 2028, large operators have strong incentives to advocate for preserving and expanding renewable tax credits to meet massive energy demands through solar, geothermal, and battery storage solutions.

    • 2026 market conditions favor buyers due to supply-demand imbalance鈥擨ncreased supply of tax credits (particularly Section 45Z clean fuel production credits) combined with reduced buyer competition from provisions like Section 174 and bonus depreciation has created advantageous pricing.

At the start of the current Trump administration, green energy tax credits were expected to be slashed or disappear altogether. In reality, significant changes emerged instead of ceasing to exist. More specifically, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), passed in July 2025, kept the transferability rules around green energy tax credits intact.

As a result, the market for these credits remains robust in 2026 and 2027, says , an energy tax authority and principal at accounting firm CliftonLarsonAllen (CLA). In addition, multiple credits still have runway, and near-term dynamics in 2026 may favor buyers.

OBBBA鈥檚 changes result in shifts in marketplace conditions

When the OBBBA bill passed, the specifics revealed a more optimistic picture than many understand. According to Hill, specific examples include:

• • Wind and solar projects 鈥� Developers that begin construction by July 4, 2026, still have a four-year window to complete their projects and still claim credits. Even projects that miss this construction deadline can qualify if they’re placed in service by December 31, 2027.
  • Clean fuel production credits 鈥� Clean fuel production credits, detailed in OBBBA鈥檚 Section 45Z, received an extended runway through 2029.
  • Tax credit transferability 鈥� The tax credit transferability aspect under Section 6418 remained whole, despite previous versions of the bill proposing either a sunset date or outright repeal of transferability. This fact provides a level of marketplace certainty that can act as critical liquidity for developers that typically lack the tax liability to use credits themselves.

In addition, the legislation altered the buyer and seller environment. Provisions including OBBBA鈥檚 Section 174 and bonus depreciation generated additional deductions for certain companies, and as a result, reduced those companies鈥� 2025 corporate tax liability. Simultaneously, Section 45Z clean fuel production tax credits came into force and created a supply-demand imbalance that favors buyers.

Overall, in the latter half of 2025, Hill describes the marketplace as favorable for buyers because of an increased supply of tax credits that were for sale previously with fewer buyers. Into 2026 and beyond, both developers and corporate buyers still have significant opportunities to participate in the tax credit marketplace, explains Hill.

AI-related data center demand may spur new proposals for renewables tax credits

The explosive proliferation of data centers because of the growing AI demand across the United States may become the unexpected champion for renewable energy tax credits. Hundreds of facilities are currently under construction, and the energy demand implications are staggering. In fact, the projects that by 2028, data centers will consume 12% of all US energy.

Renewable energy technologies are emerging as essential solutions to meet these demands. Solar power, as a tried-and-true technology, offers ideal supplementation for data center operations; and geothermal heating and cooling systems directly address the massive temperature control challenges these facilities face. Perhaps most significantly, battery storage is rapidly becoming standard operating procedure, with both grid-based and solar-array-tied battery systems providing critical backup power.

These developments carry substantial policy implications. In fact, large data center operators have incentives to become vocal advocates for preserving and expanding renewable tax credits, says , a leader in federal tax strategies at CLA. “We want our AI, we want our cloud-based services. To do that鈥� we need massive data centers and massive computing demands,鈥� DePrima explains. 鈥淎nd that in turn requires massive amounts of energy consumption, which renewables can certainly supplement.鈥� This, in turn, creates the potential for a renewable energy tax credit “comeback” within two to three years, he adds.

Guidance for buyers and sellers

Looking ahead to 2026 and beyond, both buyers and sellers of renewable energy tax credits should recognize that significant opportunities remain despite regulatory changes. More specifically:

For buyers 鈥� Buyers should act now to capitalize on favorable market conditions. With increased credit supply and reduced buyer competition due to provisions like Section 174 and bonus depreciation, pricing has become more advantageous. Buyers of renewable energy tax credits should consider structuring 2026 transactions to directly offset estimated tax payments throughout the year, thereby improving cash flow by making payments to sellers rather than the IRS. Financial institutions remain particularly well-positioned as buyers, as many have explored tax credit carryback opportunities to increase their tax savings even further.

For sellers and developers 鈥� Renewable energy tax credits sellers and energy project developers can use tax-credit monetization as a critical component of project financing because the ability to convert credits into immediate cash proceeds is essential for paying down debt and funding new projects. Despite initial concerns, substantial opportunities remain with credits outlined in Sections 45Z, 45X, 48E, and 45Y which are transferable and viable through 2029 and beyond.

In either case, tax credit transferability under Section 6418 offers key opportunities in the marketplace. Whether buyers are looking to reduce their corporate tax burden while supporting clean energy goals, or developers are seeking to monetize renewable projects 鈥� tax credits offer incentives to move forward.

The information contained herein is general in nature and is not intended, and should not be construed, as legal, accounting, or tax advice or opinion provided by CliftonLarsonAllen LLP to the reader. The reader also is cautioned that this material may not be applicable to, or suitable for, the reader鈥檚 specific circumstances or needs, and may require consideration of nontax and other tax factors if any action is to be contemplated. The reader should contact his or her CliftonLarsonAllen LLP or other tax professional prior to taking any action based upon this information. CliftonLarsonAllen LLP assumes no obligation to inform the reader of any changes in tax laws or other factors that could affect the information contained herein.

You can find out more about renewable energy tax credits here

Key insights:

• • • Geopolitical crises fuel financial volatility and illicit activity 鈥� Conflicts have traditionally accelerated capital shifts and flows, creating cover for bad actors.

    • Predictable patterns emerge 鈥� Financial institutions should watch for sudden cross-border activity, unusual cash deposits, and transactions from border areas.

    • Conflict zones enable black market expansion 鈥� They also should adapt their compliance systems to detect more sophisticated methods used by criminals, tightening screening and enhancing staff training.

While business and international politics may appear cold and calculating, these things are often driven by emotion, especially fear 鈥� and fear of instability often drives market volatility.

So it goes as the United States attacks one of the world’s largest militaries and supporters of regional terror groups, causing deepening instability in a Middle East already beset by violence. It is certain that there is already a surge of money flowing in and out of the region for different reasons. Legitimate and illegitimate actors alike will seek to both run away from the crisis and profit from it. However, there are some anti-money laundering specific thoughts that financial institutions need to consider during a time of global uncertainty.

The bottom line 鈥� lots of money is on the move. Funding will send aid groups towards the crisis; it will also send logistical supplies, war material, and other necessities. All of these cost money, and defense sectors in multiple countries will be pumping out munitions to refill stockpiles in any country that is related to or in the neighborhood of the conflict.

Not every large transaction is an unusual, reportable event, but financial institutions now need to look one or two layers below the surface. What does not seem related on the surface is always a red flag. Look at beneficial ownership of companies and vessels, look at relations of the owners, not just the 听(OFAC) results of those people themselves. The financial system will, and should, allow the legitimate funds to flow. However, financial investigators must remain diligent to catch bad actors that take advantage of the surge in non-profit activity or the urgency with which legitimate businesses operate in a conflict zone.

Risk Factor 1: Capital flight from regime change

Just as the fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria caused family funds to flow to as regime members fled the country, you will see the same with politically exposed persons (PEPs) who are inevitably fleeing regime change in Iran. A political crackdown will come. Whether the victors are on the side of the West or not remains to be seen, but some factions are going to flee the country and take family wealth with them.

Banks and other financial services should watch for anyone connected to people moving money through neighboring countries in which they may have literally hiked or driven before depositing cash into a financial institution. There are stories of refugees leaving places with gold bands on their arms, cash and false bottom purses, and diamonds in the lining of sweaters. These things will be converted to cash in neighboring countries and put into financial systems less affected by the conflict. An influx of cash throughout the region, therefore, could indicate this type of capital flight.

Risk Factor 2: Illicit finance and black markets

Since the fall of Syria, we have also become aware of that helps fuel addiction and armed conflict. There are certainly other substances and drug trafficking networks about which we know very little on this side of the secrecy veil.

Therefore, this instability will be seen as a time of opportunity for criminal groups. Indeed, with Assad鈥檚 security forces no longer controlling middle eastern captagon and other narcotics trade and various armed groups looking for funding sources, this is an illicit business opportunity.

Financial institutions can expect rapid movement of money between unrelated shell corporations, new corporations, and shadow vessels. They also should expect the black market to boom with drugs, contraband Iranian oil, and funds tied to narcotics that they have only yet to discover. Illegal arms will also generate funding, so all of the methods, both formal and informal, used to transfer value will become active.

In fact, large portions of such funding will flow through financial institutions; and peer to peer payment providers, FinTechs, and money transmitters should be especially wary of funds moving rapidly through their platforms. A burst in conflict means a burst in activity from illicit sources; therefore, enhanced, targeted monitoring is a must.

How financial institutions鈥� risk & compliance teams should respond

First, all financial institutions鈥� risk & compliance departments need to assess their institutions鈥� OFAC and sanctions screening search parameters. This is a good time to dial up fuzzy logic capability and reduce match percentage thresholds. In other words, risk tolerance should go down while the metaphorical dragnet gets wider. Surge the department鈥檚 personnel capability to compensate if you have to, because that is better than a strict-liability OFAC fine. Remember, OFAC sanctions are closely tied to national security, especially when it comes to Iran. This is not an arena in which leniency can be expected. Compliance teams should look at monitoring systems and thresholds immediately, create geographical targeting models to cover the conflict zone, and consider a command center approach to deal with the fluidity of the situation until things settle.

If your institution has not already taken the hint from regulators, this also is an opportunity to double down on Customer Due Diligence and identity verification. Front line staff and embedded business compliance personnel should receive updated training and job aids to increase awareness and hone internal reporting. Indeed, it is an advanced business skill to understand complex corporate beneficial ownership, much less to detect when it may be tied to illicit activity or corrupt regimes. Now is the time to increase that level of knowledge and thereby make the culture of compliance more robust.

In every crisis there is opportunity as well as risk: Managing the risk allows every company to take advantage of the opportunity, shore up its mission, and strengthen the institution.

You can find out more about听the geopolitical and economic outlook for 2026听here

Key insights:

• • • Different tools, different impacts鈥� Tariffs raise costs but allow business to continue; sanctions create legal barriers that can make transactions impossible, with severe penalties for violations.

    • Scale brings scrutiny鈥� Expansive US sanctions risk diminishing returns as targets develop workarounds and alternative financial systems.

    • Strategic or reactive use?鈥� The core challenge isn’t whether sanctions work, but whether they’re deployed as part of coherent strategy or simply as visible action that avoids harder diplomatic or military choices.

In the foreign policy arsenal of the United States, economic sanctions have become a widely used weapon. As their use expands, so does the debate about how effective they actually are, what additional risks they create, and what unintended consequences they may bring.

Tariffs vs. sanctions: What’s the difference?

In wartime or during high-tension economic crises, both tariffs and sanctions can significantly impact businesses, but the two methods work in different ways.

Tariffs are a form of economic pressure. Governments use them to reduce an adversary’s export revenue, raise the cost of critical imports, signal disapproval of countries that continue doing business with the target, and generate funds for their own efforts. For companies, tariffs usually create friction rather than a full stop. Businesses can often continue importing, but at a higher landed cost. And that can compress margins and force decisions around topics such as renegotiating pricing, passing costs to customers, or shifting to lower-tariff suppliers.

Sanctions are closer to an economic blockade. They aim to isolate the target by banning broad categories of trade, restricting strategic sectors, blacklisting specific entities and individuals, and sometimes pressuring third parties through secondary sanctions. The business impact is often binary. For example, if a counterparty or its majority owner is sanctioned, trading partners generally cannot make the deal work by paying more. The transaction becomes illegal, and violations can trigger severe penalties.

How the difference shows up in operations

Consider a European manufacturing company in March 2022 that is trying to manage the crisis situation caused by Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine.

If policymakers respond to the crisis with tariffs, such as a steep duty on Russian aluminum and timber, the primary challenge for this manufacturer is financial and operational planning. Costs rise, and then the company must decide whether to absorb the increase, reprice contracts, or switch suppliers, even if alternatives are more expensive.

Check out for more on the Supreme Court鈥檚 tariff decision here

If policymakers respond with sanctions, however, the situation can escalate quickly. Restrictions on major banks and key import categories, combined with aggressive designations of targeted companies and individuals can disrupt the entire supply chain. Payments can freeze, and goods can be delayed or seized. Even indirect connections to the sanctioned party can create problems, including for banks, shippers, insurers, and in some cases for logistics providers or warehouse owners. Indeed, what looked like a routine transaction can become non-compliant without warning.

The scale of sanctions use

Over the past several decades, the US has increasingly relied on economic sanctions as a core foreign-policy tool. In fact, by the early 2020s, US sanctions programs were targeting more than 30 countries and thousands of individuals and entities, with the sanctions primarily being administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). That trend has not only continued but accelerated under the current administration, which has turned to sanctions more frequently amid a volatile political environment. As the use of sanctions has expanded on a massive scale, their breadth and effectiveness have come under growing scrutiny.

Indeed, the phrase economic warfare reflects how modern sanctions often operate.

Many sanctions now target entire sectors, not only military goods. Secondary sanctions can threaten foreign companies that do business with sanctioned parties, effectively using access to the US financial system and the dollar as leverage. Critics argue that sanctions can also cause harm to civilians through inflation, shortages of essential goods including medicine, and broader economic damage. While targeted sanctions are intended to focus on elites, broader measures can affect entire populations.

What makes sanctions risky

The overuse of sanctions can create several problems. Yet sanctions can be politically attractive because they offer visible action without direct military risk, which may increase the temptation to use them even when they are unlikely to work.

As sanctions become routine, however, their impact may weaken as countries and companies develop workarounds, find alternative payment channels, and establish sanctions-resistant trade networks. Broad pressure from US sanctions can also encourage efforts to reduce reliance on the dollar-based financial system. China, Russia, and others have invested in alternative payment mechanisms such as cross-border interbank payment systems (CIPS) and systems for transfer of financial messages (SPFS) and expanded the use of non-dollar currencies. Over time, this response can reduce US financial leverage.

Sanctions can also provoke retaliation, including cyber activity, support for US adversaries, or wider regional instability. Sanctions also may harden diplomatic positions and make negotiation more difficult. In some cases, shared sanctions pressure can push sanctioned states closer together, strengthening the very coalitions that the US is trying to disrupt.

The argument for a middle ground

Supporters of sanctions argue that they provide an option between doing nothing and using military force. They can impose real costs on harmful actors, signal resolve, and respond to domestic demands for action, while still preserving diplomatic channels and avoiding full-on armed conflict.

The central question, however, is whether sanctions are being used as a substitute for strategy rather than as a single tool within a broader strategy. As sanctions continue to expand, it is worth weighing their benefits against their limits and long-term consequences. For policymakers and businesses alike, understanding these dynamics is critical to making informed decisions and managing risk.

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Key insights:

• • • Crypto crime is likely much bigger than it appears 鈥� Blockchain forensics firms only report what they can prove with 99%-plus accuracy, meaning the true scale of crypto crime is likely far larger than official reports suggest.

    • False negatives are still a problem 鈥� While achieving incredibly low false positive rates, these strict standards result in significant false negatives, with firms missing up to 75% of known criminal addresses in tested datasets.

    • This reporting gap reveals hidden losses 鈥� FBI data shows higher losses than do forensic reports and when accounting for the 85% of fraud victims who never report crimes, actual losses could exceed $110 billion annually.

Law enforcement has known about crypto-related crime for more than 14 years now. Five years ago, I felt these industry reports left a lot to be desired. A lot has happened in since then, however, and I have learned that clarity is becoming more important than caveats, because even my own are being taken out of context by the cryptocurrency ATM industry.

The myth of “crypto crime”

Nick Furneaux points out 鈥� spoiler: it鈥檚 all just financial crime. Yet, the blockchain forensics industry still has the annual tradition of issuing crypto crime reports that end up getting reviewed . However, my previous post showed how the prevailing reports appeared to prove Nick鈥檚 point, stating that crypto crime represented just 鈥� effectively, a rounding error.

I wrote that these reports needed to be heavily caveated, as the figures identified were clearly smaller than the figures that may have been reasonably expected. In fairness to the industry, reports have since incorporated caveats on nearly all stated figures. However, this has still not stopped the industry from cherry picking figures that support the argument that there is no such thing as crypto crime.

The ironically good news in this year鈥檚 reports has been that the official figures for illicit activity across the industry has increased to of all crypto activity for the . This increase is an indicator that the industry has gotten better at identifying criminal activity; and while there is still room for improvement, we are moving in the right direction.

Art vs. science

The companies producing these reports continue to hold some of the largest datasets on crypto-crime and blockchain metadata in the world. They are ideally placed to speak to these trends in illicit activity in the crypto ecosystem. However, one of the early arguments in blockchain forensics was that it is not as effective as some people were claiming.

In the landmark case, (colloquially known as the Bitcoin Fog case), blockchain intelligence platform CipherTrace claimed that blockchain forensics was more of an art than a science. Based on evidence from Chainalysis, the case鈥檚 acknowledged blockchain forensic evidence was admissible in criminal court to based on the methods used.

Understanding the limits of these reports requires an understanding of the core audience for these forensic firms: Law enforcement, which has a high burden of proof to achieve before going to court with any evidence.

Chainalysis has been doing this for 12 years at this stage and has been one of the only services to undergo a of its data, albeit a tiny sample size of its overall dataset. In the last five years, competitor TRM Labs has become an industry leader based on its focus on blockchain intelligence and law enforcement support.

The accuracy trap

Understanding the limits of these reports requires an understanding of the core audience for Chainalysis and TRM Labs: Law enforcement, which has a high burden of proof to achieve before going to court with any evidence. As such, the standard held by industry leading companies is that a data model should achieve an accuracy level of 99%-plus. However, as with any machine learning algorithm, it is incredibly difficult to guarantee 100% accuracy. Still, 99% accuracy is higher than human-based systems are expected to have.

Despite this commitment to high standards, the blockchain forensics industry has come under fire for false negatives. In the academic research of Chainalysis鈥� data, researchers found its false positive rate to be 0.01%, 0.15%, and 0.11%, respectively across the three datasets, or at least 99.85% accuracy for what was in their tool. Obviously, this is much more scalable and accurate in the modern world in which criminals are using AI than having humans unravelling these datasets manually. However, this level of certainty does paradoxically result in a surprising level of false negatives.

Indeed, Alison Jimenez, of Dynamic Securities Analytics, pointed out that Chainalysis missed a significant percentage of all addresses in the three sample datasets. The study looked at coverage of three known illicit services: BestMixer, Hansa Market, and Wall Street Market.

Chainalysis was found to have been able to identify 25%, 79%, and 95% of the sampled addresses, respectively. While this may seem like the company is negligent to suggest they can identify crime when it missed 75% of Best Mixer addresses, a service designed to obfuscate the flow of funds, the reality is that identifying any of these services is pretty difficult in the first place 鈥� especially in a world in which criminals are actively trying to escape surveillance. And remember, this is just the data that made it to production; Forensics firms are still able to assist law enforcement to make informed decisions on their investigations based on a range of additional data that never gets surfaced in the tool or in reports.

The reporting gap

These forensic companies are unable to publish informed estimates of the level of crime, but they are saying that they have identified at least $154 billion dollars in illicit activity in 2025. These tools also assist law enforcement with investigations which they may not always have permission to include in their datasets. Yet, investigators can still use the technology to carry out their investigations safe in the knowledge that their evidence will be admissible in court. That means, the $154 billion figure is effectively a floor, not a ceiling for the potential effectiveness of blockchain forensics.

The FBI counts what victims report, whereas forensic firms count what they can prove on-chain. When you consider that academic research suggests 85% of fraud victims never report their crimes to anyone, the scale of the problem becomes staggering.

The discrepancy between forensic reports and law enforcement data is where the caveats become most visible. The for 2024 (released in late 2025) pegged crypto-related scam losses at $16.6 billion. This figure is 67% higher than Chainalysis鈥檚 estimate, and 55% higher than TRM Lab鈥檚 for the same category.

Why the gap? Because the FBI counts what victims report, whereas forensic firms count what they can prove on-chain. When you consider that academic research suggests 85% of fraud victims never report their crimes to anyone, the scale of the problem becomes staggering. If we extrapolate the FBI鈥檚 reported figures to account for this silent 85%, the potential loss to crypto scams could be as high as $110 billion. While not an academically rigorous calculation, this figure would not surprise many industry analysts.

What will these reports look like in another 5 years?

The critique I have of these reports is that they underestimate the size of the problem in order to be able to accurately stand by their data. This isn鈥檛 a bad thing, it just results in unfortunate outcomes. There may be a day when these reports are combined with academic research to make a more informed estimation of how big the crypto crime problem really is.

Thankfully, those in the blockchain forensics industry can鈥檛 speak in theories or artistic interpretation. They have to be able to prove their statements and back them up with verifiable data. Right now, these reports are effectively looking at the tip of the iceberg and showing what they know about what they can see 鈥� the caveat now is that this is just the known knowns. The challenge continues to be identifying the known unknowns. Fortunately, we are getting better at identifying criminal activity every year.

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