Key highlights:

• • • Stricter foreign entity requirements and sourcing rules 鈥� The OBBBA imposes stricter requirements for foreign entity and sourcing, especially targeting Chinese involvement, which significantly impacts clean energy project eligibility for tax credits.

    • New compliance requirements for buyers 鈥� Developers and tax credit buyers must carefully comply with new documentation, supply chain, and ownership requirements to avoid disqualification or recapture of credits.

    • Early planning is essential 鈥� Accelerated deadlines for wind and solar projects, along with ongoing uncertainty about compliance standards, make early and thorough planning essential for success.

The (OBBBA), which passed in early July, represents a major shift from the industrial and energy policies set out in 2022鈥檚 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). For example, the OBBBA makes significant changes to the tax credits available for eligible clean energy components and facilities, while increasing support for fossil fuels.

The legislation also introduced tougher foreign entities of concern (FEOC) requirements that, while also applicable to Russia, North Korea, and Iran, will primarily restrict the participation in the US clean energy sector (whether as owner, investor, lender, or supplier) by companies owned or controlled by the Chinese government or its citizens and residents. These restrictions present significant challenges for developers given China’s dominance in the clean energy supply chain.

OBBBA鈥檚 changes to clean energy credits

The OBBBA introduces several important revisions to federal clean energy tax credits, which, as part of the IRA, had been reshaping the landscape for developers and investors in the clean energy sector. The OBBBA鈥檚 revisions include:

Stricter FEOC requirements 鈥� Clean energy tax credits are not available to any project owned by a specified foreign entity (SFE) or a foreign-influenced entity (FIE), over which an SFE has effective control, or, in some cases, that receives material assistance from an SFE or FIE. The material assistance requirement is intended to limit sourcing of equipment, components, and critical minerals from China and applies to credits under Sections 45X, 45Y, and 48E of the IRA.

Accelerated deadlines for project credit qualification 鈥� The OBBBA shortened the deadlines for several types of clean energy projects, but especially for wind and solar projects, which must begin construction by July 4, 2026, or failing that, be placed in service by December 31, 2027. These tight deadlines 鈥� coupled with potential changes to the requirements for beginning construction that are expected after an issued on July 7, 2025 鈥� raised significant planning issues for project developers and investors in the US clean energy sector.

No changes in other areas of clean energy 鈥� The tax credits for other clean energy technologies 鈥� such as battery storage, geothermal, and nuclear 鈥� were largely left unchanged. But these projects are also subject to the more stringent FEOC regulations.

You can find from 成人VR视频 Practical Law here

Continuation of key IRA innovations

The IRA introduced two new provisions that have had a material impact on clean energy project development. Bonus credits increased the amount of tax credit available to qualifying projects by 10% or 20%. This includes an energy community bonus for locating a project in communities affected by coal mine or coal plant closures.

The other was the ability to sell tax credits to unrelated parties for cash (known as transferability), which gave project owners a new and less expensive method to monetize their clean energy tax credits than traditional tax equity.

The OBBBA didn’t alter the bonus credits and producers of clean energy projects can still qualify for bonus credits if they fulfill certain conditions. It did, however, extend the energy community bonus to advanced nuclear energy facilities located in certain communities.

Transferability remains, but with FEOC restrictions. Projects subject to the new FEOC restrictions are disqualified from receiving tax credits, potentially limiting the supply of tax credits in the market. The new material assistance requirements also add a layer of complexity that buyers of tax credits subject to these requirements must consider.

You can read from 成人VR视频 Practical Law here

Guidance for project developers

Going forward, project developers will need to navigate complex new laws and regulations regarding FEOCs and what it means to begin construction for wind and solar projects. To avoid credit disqualification and manage compliance risk, project developers should keep detailed records to demonstrate compliance with the FEOC ownership and establish effective control requirements.

Project developers also should audit their supply contracts and carefully track the source and costs of their equipment and other inputs to ensure compliance with applicable material-assistance caps. Similarly, they need to insert robust FEOC provisions in their supply, operation & maintenance, and construction agreements to ensure continued compliance with these requirements.

Regarding their wind and solar projects, project developers need to check their project development pipelines to determine whether they can meet the new deadlines. Unfortunately, developers are in a tough spot at the moment because they are not able to determine with any certainty the activities that may be sufficient to meet this requirement until the new guidance around beginning construction is issued. In the interim, developers should make sure that any actions they take toward construction are meaningful and not intended to manipulate this requirement, although there is no guarantee that action will prove sufficient.

Guidance for tax credit buyers

Buyers of tax credits must take action 鈥� such as conducting more extensive due diligence 鈥� to ensure the purchased credits are not disqualified or, in certain cases, recaptured, and that the credits deliver on the intended financial benefit. Buyers also should obtain detailed documentation from tax credit sellers to verify there is no direct or indirect ownership or effective control by FEOCs and to confirm that the project or component underlying the credit has not received material assistance from FEOCs in excess of the permitted caps.

Tax credit buyers should also consider inserting FEOC-specific provisions in their tax credit transfer agreements, including:

• • • adding specific representations around FEOC compliance, sourcing of materials, and eligibility under the OBBBA;
    • expanding the seller’s indemnification provisions to include losses incurred if the purchased credits are later disallowed due to FEOC or sourcing violations; and
    • requiring sellers to promptly notify them of any changes in the sellers’ FEOC status or supply chain arrangements that could affect credit eligibility. More expansive tax credit insurance policies may also be obtained to mitigate the additional risks the FEOC restrictions present.

Clearly, the OBBBA brings new challenges and opportunities for clean energy developers and investors; and careful planning and strict compliance will be essential for success in this changing landscape.

You can find more of our coverage of听our coverage of environmental and sustainability issues here

Key findings:

• • • Conflicting court rulings鈥� Two federal courts have issued opposing decisions on the legality of Trump-era tariffs, creating a jurisdictional clash that may force the Supreme Court to intervene.

    • Massive stakes for importers 鈥� A ruling against the tariffs could trigger large-scale refunds and curtail executive trade authority; a ruling in favor could entrench broad presidential powers around trade.

    • Uncertain timeline & political fallout鈥� With expedited appeals underway and potential Supreme Court review by mid-2026, the litigation is already fueling legislative reform efforts and shaping the future of US trade governance听

Two landmark cases are now at the center of the legal battle over former President Trump鈥檚 use of emergency powers to impose sweeping tariffs. With conflicting rulings from federal courts and billions in trade at stake, this could be the most consequential trade-based decision ever put before the United States Supreme Court.

To help navigate this tricky, complex web of litigation, Stephen Josey, a tax controversy attorney from the international law firm Vinson & Elkins, offered his insight into the current situation, its major factors, and where things may go from here.

Two courts, two paths

The first of the two major cases is听V.O.S. Selections Inc. v. Trump, a consolidated case combining that of a small business importer with separate lawsuits filed by various states that is being tried in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), a specialized court with jurisdiction over customs and trade matters. Meanwhile, in听another case, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, plaintiffs took a more traditional approach, taking it before to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

While the named plaintiffs are mostly importers and small businesses, the legal fight has drawn in heavyweight political backing. In the CIT case, several states (including Oregon and New York) have filed briefs supporting the challenge, arguing that the tariffs have harmed their economies and exceeded presidential authority. The DC District case has seen similar support, with a coalition of states and trade associations lining up behind the plaintiffs. These aren鈥檛 just isolated business disputes; rather, they鈥檙e part of a broader constitutional clash over the limits of President Trump鈥檚 executive power, with Democrat-led state governments stepping in to defend their interests.

One of the more arcane but critical issues in the litigation is听that of jurisdiction, which can be a make or break for these kinds of cases even before argument on the merits becomes a factor.

Currently, in听V.O.S. Selections and听in another case, State of Oregon v. Trump, the CIT ruled that the tariffs issued by President Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were unlawful. The court found that the national emergency declared by President Trump did not justify the remedy. To put it simply, tariffs on goods from China, Mexico, and India were illegal because the triggering emergency (fentanyl trafficking and trade deficits) bore no rational connection to the trade measures imposed, the CIT ruled.

Meanwhile, in听Learning Resources, the DC District court went even further, holding that the IEEPA doesn鈥檛 authorize tariffs at all. The statute, which has historically been used to freeze assets or block specific transactions, contains no mention of tariffs and was never intended as a tool for reshaping global trade.

These rulings are now stayed pending appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has agreed to hear the CIT cases en banc on an expedited basis starting July 31, while the DC District court鈥檚 injunction has been paused by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. For now, importers must continue paying the tariffs 鈥� but the legal ground beneath them is anything but stable.

What鈥檚 at stake

One of the more arcane but critical issues in the litigation is听that of jurisdiction, which can be a make or break for these kinds of cases even before argument on the merits becomes a factor. Vinson & Elkins鈥� Josey says that while it appears that a Congressional statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT to consider these challenges to the president鈥檚 authority under the IEEPA, as it has near exclusive authority over tariff-related cases, the DC District court鈥檚 ruling has created a parallel litigation track. While district courts have occasionally weighed in on trade matters, they鈥檝e rarely done so in direct opposition to the CIT.

鈥淪everal other federal district courts 鈥� including one in Florida and one in Montana 鈥� have transferred cases challenging the IEEPA tariffs to the CIT due to a holding that the jurisdictional statute (28 USC Sec. 1581(i)) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the CIT,鈥� Josey notes, further supporting the CIT as the likeliest venue for a true resolution.

Further, the implications of these cases go far beyond the named plaintiffs. If the courts ultimately rule that the IEEPA tariffs were imposed ultra vires 鈥� beyond the President鈥檚 legal authority 鈥� it could trigger听it could usher in a wave of duty refund claims and severely curtail the executive branch鈥檚 ability to unilaterally reshape trade policy. Conversely, if the ruling is in favor of the President鈥檚 actions, it would signal a massive expansion of presidential authority which is likely to reshape the relationship between the U.S. Congress and the President. A case with such substantial implications is all but certain to end up before the Supreme Court.

At that point, there are four likely paths forward:

1. 1. 1. The Supreme Court grants certiorari 鈥� Affirming the lower courts鈥� rulings would greatly curtaining President Trump鈥檚 ability to place tariffs without the authorization of Congress. It could also trigger a return of previously collected tariff revenue.
      2. The Supreme Court reverses 鈥� By restoring broad presidential authority under IEEPA would allow the administration to continue on its current course without oversite.
      3. The Court punts 鈥� By either ruling narrowly or on procedural grounds, the Court could leave the core question unresolved and effectively allow President Trump to continue as is while forcing plaintiffs to go back to the beginning, potentially delaying any ruling until 2027 or 2028.

1. 1. 4. The Court could issue a split decision 鈥� By upholding one ruling while reversing another, the Court could simply complicate the effort even further.

The timeline is fluid. The Federal Circuit鈥檚 expedited review could yield a decision by late summer or early fall. From there, a Supreme Court petition could be filed before year鈥檚 end, with a final ruling possible by June 2026.

Of course, it鈥檚 impossible to know which of the paths the Supreme Court (or even the Appeals Courts) would take, Josey says, adding that this could leave a massive question mark hanging over the US economy, which in turn could potentially set up a substantial wave of significant duty refund claims to consider if things go against the Trump Administration.

Policy fallout and the road ahead

Regardless of the outcome, the litigation has already sparked calls for reform. Democratic lawmakers are eyeing the听Trade Review Act, which would limit presidential authority under IEEPA and require Congressional approval for future tariff actions. But with the current Congress in control of the president鈥檚 party, any action is unlikely until after the 2026 mid-term elections.

鈥淚nternational trade law has always been around, but it wasn鈥檛 recently front of mind until Trump鈥檚 first term,鈥� explains Josey. 鈥淣ow, it鈥檚 front and center 鈥� and the courts are being asked to draw the line.鈥�

Whether that line holds 鈥� or shifts again 鈥� will shape the future of US trade policy for years to come.

You can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent听2025 Tariffs Report听here

Key takeaways:

• • • Understanding the announcement 鈥� The G7 鈥渆xemption鈥� is an informal understanding, not a legal change.

    • Rules still in effect 鈥� Pillar 2 rules remain in effect across most jurisdictions, and US multinationals must still comply. Compliance and reporting obligations will continue and may increase.

    • Corporate tax departments need to keep informed 鈥� Tax departments should stay the course and be prepared to adapt as guidance evolves.

The global tax landscape is in flux, especially for US multinationals navigating Pillar 2鈥檚 global minimum tax rules. The G7鈥檚 recent announcement of a potential exemption for US-parented groups from certain aspects of Pillar 2 has raised questions and cautious optimism. To provide clarity on this issue, Jacob Fulton, Head听of the Quantitative Tax Practice for , shares his insights with Nadya Britton of the 成人VR视频 Institute (TRI).

Nadya Britton (TRI): The G7鈥檚 June announcement about a Pillar 2 exemption for United States-based multinationals created a stir. Can you explain what this actually means?

Jacob Fulton (Orbitax): The announcement suggested that G7 countries 鈥� led by the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom 鈥� had reached an understanding to exclude US-parented groups from the Income Inclusion Rule and Undertaxed Profits Rule under Pillar 2. On its face, it sounded like significant relief for US multinationals.

However, there鈥檚 little detail on how this would work in practice. The statement is more of a political commitment than a change in law. The Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) remains in place, and the legislative removal of Section 899 from the One Big Beautiful Bill in the US doesn鈥檛 change the current Pillar 2 obligations for multinationals. So, while the announcement sounds promising, it introduces more questions and uncertainty rather than offering clear, immediate relief.

Britton: Given the uncertainty, should the in-house tax departments of US multinational change their approach to Pillar 2 compliance?

Fulton: No, they should not 鈥� the G7鈥檚 understanding doesn鈥檛 override existing laws. More than 50 jurisdictions have enacted Pillar 2 legislation, and those rules remain in force. For tax years 2024 and 2025, US multinationals are still subject to the same compliance and reporting obligations as before.

It鈥檚 important for corporate tax departments to stay the course. While there may be future guidance, we don鈥檛 know the timeline or the specifics. Delaying or pausing Pillar 2 implementation based on this announcement would be risky and could leave companies noncompliant if nothing changes.

Britton: What about tax planning? Is there an opportunity for companies to adjust their strategies in light of the G7 announcement?

Fulton: Not really. The current uncertainty makes tax planning more complex, not less. While it鈥檚 tempting to consider planning opportunities, there鈥檚 no concrete framework for how the exemption would be applied, or even if the exemption will be applied.

The Pillar 2 regime already contains robust transition rules designed to prevent companies from exploiting gaps or planning opportunities during the rollout. Any new guidance could target retroactive planning aimed at leveraging this potential exemption. Until there鈥檚 greater clarity, companies should be cautious and avoid making significant planning changes based on speculation.

Britton: Beyond the exemption, what broader challenges does Pillar 2 present, especially now?

Fulton: Pillar 2 was initially envisioned as a uniform global minimum tax, but in practice, it鈥檚 fragmented. Each jurisdiction has implemented the rules on different timelines and with varying interpretations. The G7鈥檚 move may add further complexity, as only a few countries are part of this understanding. In fact, most jurisdictions have not agreed听to adjust their laws to this point, so US multinationals could face inconsistent rules and additional compliance requirements.

If only some countries adopt the exemption for US groups while others do not, companies may need to navigate a patchwork of rules, increasing the risk of errors and duplicative reporting. This environment heightens the need for robust technology solutions to manage calculations, track legislative changes, and handle complex reporting obligations.

Britton: Does this mean the compliance burden for US multinationals is likely to increase?

Fulton: Yes, absolutely. The G7 announcement, rather than simplifying things, adds another layer of complexity. Even if some countries provide relief, others may not, so corporate tax departments need to be prepared for additional filings and ongoing compliance rules in multiple jurisdictions.

For example, even where the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Information Return might not be required due to an exemption, local jurisdictions may impose increased QDMTT reporting or other compliance burdens. Each country鈥檚 requirements are unique, and in many cases, they apply regardless of whether a tax liability exists. The compliance workload will not decrease in the near term.

Britton: Given all this, what should in-house tax departments be doing right now?

Fulton: Tax departments should continue with their current Pillar 2 compliance and implementation plans. It鈥檚 critical to keep up with local legislation, maintain documentation, and be prepared for reporting in every jurisdiction in which it鈥檚 required.

Investing in technology is more important than ever. Automated solutions can help track legislative changes, manage calculations, and streamline reporting. As the rules evolve and complexity increases, manual approaches will struggle to keep pace.

Finally, corporate tax teams should stay engaged with industry groups and advisors, monitor new guidance closely, and be ready to adapt as the situation develops.

Britton: Any final thoughts for US multinationals navigating this evolving landscape?

Fulton: The G7鈥檚 announcement is a headline, not a new law 鈥� and it doesn鈥檛 change the immediate reality for US multinationals. The best course is to continue preparations, invest in robust technology, and remain vigilant for further developments.

As Pillar 2 evolves, flexibility and readiness to adapt will be critical. While the promise of an exemption is attractive, the reality is increased complexity and ongoing compliance obligations for the foreseeable future.

You can find more of our coverage of听the impact of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act听here

Key insights:

• • The North American economic bloc facing significant challenges 鈥� Due to escalating trade tensions and policy uncertainties, the trading bloc comprised of the US, Canada, and Mexico is currently facing significant challenges that have the potential to undermine economic growth and stability across the region.

  • Customized trading strategies needed 鈥� Given each country鈥檚 unique economic outlook, policymakers will need to work on tailored strategies to address each nation鈥檚 specific issues.

  • Communication & collaboration are key 鈥� The future of North American economic cooperation hinges on sustained dialogue and cooperation among the member countries. For continued and shared economic prosperity in the region, the three nations must work together.

For many years, the North American economic landscape has been defined by robust collaboration among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Policymakers strategically leveraged the region’s unique geographical advantages and opportunities to foster prosperity, leading to the creation of one of the world’s most powerful trading blocs. After the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was supplanted by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020, it became the world’s , with the combined imports among the three nations amounting to .

Despite this success, the bloc鈥檚 partnership is now precarious. Escalating trade tensions now pose considerable challenges not only for the three participating nations but for the global economy as a whole now and in the future.

The United States

The Trump administration activities around tariffsand ensuing policy uncertainty has led to significant concerns among businesses throughout North America. These concerns are expected to , while consumer spending may also decelerate due to higher unemployment and persistent inflation.

In fact, economists foresee weaker growth in the US economy. Even though real US GDP grew 2.8% in 2024, shows that it may decelerate to 1.8% in 2025. According to the IMF, unemployment will stand at 4.2% this year, further signaling a soft labor market.

Tariffs also will result in price increases for consumers on imported goods, likely leading to additional pressure on overall price levels. Indeed, consumer prices rose 2.7% in June compared to the previous year, potentially indicating the beginning effects of Trump鈥檚 tariff policy on inflation.

This likely will contribute to inflation remaining persistent, with estimates 听throughout 2025 of 3.0%, one percentage point above the Fed鈥檚 2.0% target. At the same time, retaliatory tariffs from other countries are expected to lessen demand for US exports. In addition to trade and policy instability, Trump鈥檚 immigration agenda could continue to impact various sectors of the economy, such as construction and agriculture, where labor supply and demand may be affected.

In this environment, a slowing US economy is likely to lead to reduced tax collection, subsequently decreasing government revenue even further. An increase in government debt is anticipated, with general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP projected to rise to 122.5% in 2025.

As for 2026, real GDP growth is expected to slow further to 1.7%. Economists also project that inflation will continue to ease, reaching 2.5%, while unemployment is likely to remain stable at 4.2%. Although these figures suggest a relatively steady outlook, there are more notable downside risks than upside ones. Persistent, or even worse, increasing trade, policy, and geopolitical uncertainties could undermine economic performance and threaten the country鈥檚 stability.

Canada

In 2024, Canada鈥檚 , with real GDP increasing by 1.5%; however, the country鈥檚 economic outlook for 2025 has weakened. Rising trade tensions with the US have contributed to a deterioration in both business and consumer sentiment, while policy uncertainty has increased. As a result, the growing 1.4%, and the unemployment rate rising to 6.6% in 2025.

Unlike the two other countries in the region, inflation in Canada is expected to ease to its 2% target in 2025. However, the Bank of Canada will likely face a challenging environment in the coming months, as upward pressure from higher import prices due to tariffs and downward pressure from falling demand could infringe upon price stability.

Looking ahead, economists project a modest recovery in macroeconomic conditions for Canada in 2026. With projected real GDP growth of 1.6%, inflation at 2.1%, and unemployment at 6.5%, the economy is expected to demonstrate enhanced resilience.

Further, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) made some recommendations for the Canadian economy to help it weather these uncertain times, including seeking diversification of trading partners, strengthening innovation to boost productivity and competition, and increasing government investment in infrastructure.

Mexico

As of the midway point of 2025, Mexico鈥檚 economy is facing a challenging outlook. In 2024, the country’s real GDP grew by 1.5%; however, , with an anticipated contraction of 0.3%. to weakened exports resulting from tariffs, as well as restrained public consumption and investment.

The IMF鈥檚 forecasts also suggest that private consumption may be supported by moderate unemployment (3.8%) and declining inflation (3.5%) in 2025. Still, while unemployment is anticipated to remain at relatively low levels, this figure represents an increase from last year鈥檚 level. Also, while investment is aided by lower interest rates it is expected to recover only gradually amid persistent concerns that include geopolitical tensions and domestic uncertainty from policy changes and reforms.

Further out, a recovery for the Mexican economy is anticipated in 2026, with real GDP projected to grow by 1.4% after the previous year鈥檚 contraction. The labor market is forecasted to hold stable, with the unemployment rate standing at 3.8% in the same period. However, inflation is likely to persist at 3.2%, remaining above its target level.

The OECD has outlined several recommendations for Mexico as well, including improving property tax collection and digitalizing tax administration to grow government revenue. Conducting cost-benefit analyses could improve the efficiency of public spending; and creating regulations that encourage private investment in renewable energy could allow the country to leverage its natural resources and gain competitive advantage.

The future of the North America trading bloc

The economic performance of North America in 2025 is increasingly clouded by rising policy uncertainty and commercial tensions between the three member countries. is projected to slow to 1.6% in 2025 鈥� a percentage point lower than in 2024 鈥� as each country contends with unique challenges and the broader consequences of escalating trade disputes.

The imposition of new tariffs by the Trump administration has reverberated across the North American region, straining longstanding trade relationships and introducing additional volatility for businesses and individuals. These developments risk undermining the progress achieved under trade agreements such as NAFTA and its successor, the USMCA, which were designed to foster regional integration and collective growth. With the coming renegotiation of the USMCA in July 2026, the future of North American economic cooperation hangs in the balance.

By 2026, for the entire North American region. However, this outlook is contingent upon the resolution of the ongoing tariff disputes and successful renegotiation of the USMCA. Achieving agreements that address the United States鈥� trade deficit with each respective country remains a key priority for President Trump, as does advancing other significant agenda items, such as enhancing collaboration on immigration 鈥� particularly along the US/Mexican border 鈥� and increasing efforts to combat drug cartels in Mexico.

While it is very hard to predict what will happen in the coming months (let alone the next year) for North America, what is certain is that sustained dialogue and cooperation among the three countries will be essential to preserving the benefits of regional integration, restoring investor confidence, and promoting shared prosperity in the months and years ahead.

For more on the current trading environment, check out the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚听2025 Tariff Survey here

Key insights:

• • • Debt-fueled instability 鈥� Despite deep spending cuts, the bill permanently extends tax breaks for corporations and the wealthy, which is expected to add up to $6 trillion to the deficit.

    • Sectoral shockwaves 鈥� Clean energy, healthcare, and consumer sectors face major setbacks in the bill, while it gives short-term gains for the fossil fuel and defense industry.

    • Trade turbulence 鈥� Aggressive tariffs and subsidy rollbacks have roiled global trade, straining global alliances and raising inflation risks.

President Donald Trump鈥檚 sweeping tax-and-spend package 鈥� dubbed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) 鈥� has cleared the legislature, gotten his signature, and is on its way towards implementation. As expected of a 940-page piece of legislation, the Act will have repercussions across vast sectors of the nation鈥檚 economy, especially in the areas of the economy and global trade.

Proponents for the bill argue the framework will unleash growth and empower businesses by cutting taxes and trimming what they consider wasteful spending. However, the consensus among economists, analysts, and global institutions is that the United States is embarking on an incredibly risky fiscal experiment.

A classic austerity budget鈥� except

In many ways, the OBBBA looks like a classic austerity budget, with significant cuts in industrial subsidies, Medicaid, and other areas of discretionary spending. However, the United States may lose in the clean energy sector alone as a result of the bill, according to an estimate from the research firm C2ES.

While painful, this is the type of expense reduction that one would expect a government to pass if wanted to address its multi-trillion-dollar deficit 鈥� but only if it was combined with steep increases in taxes.

The problem is that, rather than raising taxes to eliminate the bill鈥檚 own budget deficit and chip away at the larger national debt, it instead makes the 2017 temporary tax cuts permanent, while further reducing taxes on corporations and the wealthiest Americans. The result, estimated by many institutions, could increase the deficit by up to $6 trillion over the next 10 years.

Of course, the argument here is that the economic benefits of these tax cuts will trickle down through the rest of the country, boosting prosperity for everyone and strengthening the overall economy. However, the evidence is . Trickle鈥慸own economics has become more of a cautionary tale, widely debunked by economists and highlighted as an example of confirmation bias rather than a credible policy framework. In fact, no reputable forecasts predict sustained GDP growth above 3% over the next decade. And agencies like the Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. Federal Reserve, and many nonpartisan forecasters anticipate .

More worrisome, Moody鈥檚 Investors Service already downgraded the US credit rating in May, citing runaway deficits; and the OBBBA may pave the way for further credit rating downgrades, especially as interest rates weigh heavier on the federal budget. In fact, interest payments alone now constitute up to 20% of all federal spending, and the pressure on future budgets will only increase. Foreign creditors and bond investors are growing uneasy, with some moving out of U.S. Treasuries due to concern over these unsustainable fiscal trends.

Industries on the line

Specific industries will see another major impact of the OBBBA, as clean energy companies, for example, face a sudden U-turn once after years of robust federal incentives. The OBBBA repeals much of the Biden-era Inflation Reduction Act鈥檚 green tax credits that, in 2024 alone, launched more than $270 billion in solar and battery projects. Now, that momentum has likely been killed at a time when America is seeking more sources of electricity to drive AI technology.

鈥淗undreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs in the US are now in danger,鈥� warned U.S. Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), adding that he believes 鈥減rojects all over the country鈥� are already 鈥渂eing canceled.鈥�

You can find more of our coverage of听the impact of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act听here

In addition, the healthcare industry, especially hospitals and clinics that serve low-income or rural populations, will face strain. With nearly $1 trillion in Medicaid cuts planned for over the next 10 years, millions of Americans are predicted to lose healthcare coverage. Rural hospitals that rely on Medicaid funding fear service cutbacks or closures as revenue falls. Even the consumer sector could feel strain. Reduced benefits for lower-income households may limit discretionary spending, rippling through local economies.

While and stand to benefit from targeted spending boosts or tax breaks, the overall tilt away from future-looking sectors could undermine US competitiveness in the long run, critics contend.

The impact on global trade

One stated purpose of the Trump Administration鈥檚 ongoing trade conflict is to return manufacturing back to the United States; but if this is the case, the bill does little advance this goal. In fact, the OBBBA lacks the kind of large-scale, targeted investment in tooling, education, and infrastructure needed to support such a transition. With no significant federal funding behind any industrial reshoring push, there is little economic momentum for any large-scale factory-building effort.

On a more immediate level, the Federal Reserve cautions that these tariffs are likely to cause at least a temporary spike in US inflation. Given that the Fed鈥檚 number one priority is maintaining price stability, this threat of tariff-induced inflation has the Fed reluctant to lower interest rates, which in turn is driving up borrowing costs for businesses and consumers.

Meanwhile, industries benefiting from US tariffs 鈥� such as domestic steel or aluminum 鈥� might see short-term gains, but export-oriented US sectors (like agriculture and automotive) fear tariff retaliation abroad. And many US allies see the universal tariff as a blunt instrument that breaks from multilateral trade norms. The turbulence is forcing nations to diversify trade relationships away from over-reliance on the US, potentially redrawing global trade alliances that effectively bypass the United States.

Indeed, the global trade impact of the bill (and associated Trump trade policy) is a double-edged sword: While it seeks to protect some US industries, the risk of isolating the US more broadly and disrupting international commerce could backfire.

Overall, the economic and trade impact of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act harbors many of the potential drawbacks of an austerity budget without many of the resulting benefits. Its funding assumptions rely on a level of economic growth the US has rarely-if-ever sustained, and by prioritizing tax cuts for legacy industries like fossil fuels and steel 鈥� sectors whose long-term viability has been overtaken by technological and economic shifts 鈥� the bill sacrifices tomorrow鈥檚 investment in emerging industries and healthcare.

As a result, many critics contend that the OBBBA will make the federal debt more unwieldy, and there already are signs that nerves may be fraying, thus making the long-term prospects for the US economy uncertain at best.

For more on the tax impact of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, watch our recent Clarity podcast here

Key insights:

• • • Understand risks, act fast 鈥� Stay ahead of tariff shifts and assess financial impacts quickly.

    • Diversify supply, cut costs smartly 鈥� Rethink sourcing, leverage trade zones, and protect profits.

    • Automate, partner, and win globally 鈥� Use tech and strong partnerships to stay competitive worldwide.

The rise of economic nationalism, geopolitical tensions, and the constant changing of international agreements requires any organization that engages in global trade to have a well-structured, proactive trade response program. To be proactive, organizations need to have in place a system that can be nimble enough but not fleeting to be adaptive.

Indeed, having a response guide for managing trade and tariffs changes can offer a strategic roadmap to help businesses mitigate their risks, protect their margins, and remain competitive.

Understanding the global trade and tariff landscape

The foundation of any effective trade response is knowledge 鈥� companies must stay current with the regulatory and geopolitical environments that influence tariffs and trade policies. This requires every global trade department head to stay informed by monitoring trade news and developments using reliable sources. The sources selected must be able to provide real-time updates and should include government websites 鈥� such as customs agencies like the United States鈥� Customs & Border Protection or the European Union鈥檚 Taxation & Customs Union, both of which can offer timely insights.

Once informed, each trade professional must evaluate what this means for their organization and assess the possible exposure, financial and otherwise, as well as identify what percentage of a company鈥檚 imports or exports is vulnerable to tariff changes.

From there, an organization鈥檚 trade professional should conduct scenario planning, asking, for example, what a 25% increase in duties on a key component would mean for their organization. Or, asking how the company could handle the increase, and whether it would have to absorb that cost or consider changing prices 鈥� and, in either scenario, what would be the impact on margins and profits?

Understanding what鈥檚 taking place in the industry and how it will impact an organization can help set the stage for creating a strategic plan around trade and tariffs.

Strategic planning and adaptation

Proactive planning is the next step in building a resilient response framework. This involves having in place both short- and long-term tactics to help mitigate the impact of tariffs and more importantly, protect the organization鈥檚 profitability.

Since the global pandemic in 2020, many companies were faced with how reliant they had become on one region or one country for sourcing 鈥� a situation that was no longer viable. Many businesses began to look at ways to shift their supply chains and identify opportunities for sourcing from alternative countries. In fact, 72% of respondents to the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 2025 Tariff Survey said their organizations were already changing or considering changing their sourcing patterns.

After supply chains changes are made, companies will next want to look at how to manage their costs. Not surprisingly, an increase in tariffs often creates an increase in businesses鈥� operational costs; and, according to the Tariff Survey, most of the respondents expressed their concerns over the likelihood of increased operational costs as a result of tariff increases. To mitigate this challenge, companies need to evaluate how to manage these increases, whether through supplier negotiations, price adjustments, or absorbing costs in certain markets. Bulk purchasing agreements, hedging, and strategic supplier contracts can help stabilize pricing and reduce uncertainty.

Also, companies need to utilize trade zones to help manage costs. Leveraging allows companies to defer or reduce duty payments. Similarly, origin and classification engineering 鈥� processes by which the product is slightly modified or reclassified 鈥� can sometimes result in a lower tariff rate, provided the modified product complies with all regulations.

There are several other steps global trade professionals and their organizations can take to better navigate today鈥檚 trading environment, including:

Leveraging technology and data

Technology is the most critical tool for managing global trade and creating an effective response tool. With the right software systems, advanced technology solutions can allow companies to gain visibility, forecast changes, and act quickly. Indeed, the Tariff Survey underscores this point, noting that two-thirds of respondents said their companies are using technology that provides analysis of trade lanes, and more than half said their companies are using technology solutions to identify potential risk factors and determine strategies, including locating less costly trade routes, scenario-planning, and mapping supply chains.

It is worth noting that companies have to ensure they are keeping up with regulatory compliance, making it a necessity for compliance to be automated. Manual compliance processes are inefficient and error-prone, and automating certificate of origin verification, eligibility checks for Free Trade Agreements, and document management ensures consistency and reduces the risk of penalties. Automation also frees up compliance professionals to focus on more strategic and value-added activities.

Pursuing strategic partnerships

No man is an island to himself, and that goes for trading organizations as well. Companies should look to build or strengthen their relationships with strategic partners like customs brokers, trade attorneys, software vendors, and managed service providers. These alliances allow companies to expand their capabilities without expanding headcount. These partners also can provide expertise in classification, documentation, and compliance best practices.

Driving internal coordination and communication

A successful global trade response isn鈥檛 confined to the supply chain team. It requires cross-functional coordination and support from senior leadership across the entire organization.

Global trade department leaders must establish a cross-departmental tariff response team that includes professionals from corporate procurement, logistics, legal, finance, and sales teams. Indeed, these teams should meet regularly to review tariff updates, evaluate financial impacts, and align strategies.

Implementing the trade response guide: A practical framework

Once an organization considers the steps outlined above, a simple and practical framework for a global trade response guide begins to emerge. While the list below can get a company started, over time the guide can be expanded to become more robust as needed, changing to reflect what鈥檚 newly needed or what is no longer needed.

1. 1. 1. Assess exposure 鈥� Identify vulnerable goods, suppliers, and markets.
      2. Form a cross-functional team 鈥� Involve stakeholders from the organization鈥檚 compliance, logistics, legal, finance, and sales teams.
      3. Map and diversify the supply chain 鈥� Reduce dependency on high-risk regions.
      4. Leverage trade programs 鈥� Take full advantage of FTZs, Free Trade Agreements, and tariff engineering opportunities.
      5. Invest in technology 鈥� Use AI, trade platforms, and automation to gain speed and insight.
      6. Communicate internally 鈥� Keep leadership and departments aligned and informed.
      7. Review and adapt regularly 鈥� Conduct biannual reviews and remain agile in strategy.

Tariffs are no longer an occasional disruption 鈥� they are a structural feature of today鈥檚 global trade environment. Companies that treat tariffs as such and invest in robust, tech-enabled, and cross-functional response programs will be better positioned to mitigate risk and seize upon opportunities whenever possible.

You can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 2025 Tariffs Report here

Delivering a clear, insightful look at the most important tax provisions included in this sweeping legislation, the pair examine what this really means in practice 鈥� from key changes that impact your clients to strategies for effective communication and preparation.

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When examining export-related workflows, exporters typically face risks such as market access barriers, payment uncertainties, logistical challenges, and compliance with international trade regulations, including sanctions.

Further, rapid technological advancements and the proliferation of multifunctional goods are increasing the complexity and risk in global trade, according to a recent report by the World Customs Organization. This concern is echoed by the U.S. Department of Commerce鈥檚 Bureau of Industry and Security, which has introduced new export control regulations, including enhanced due diligence requirements for exporters of advanced computing integrated circuits, AI-driven technologies, and high-bandwidth semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Recent developments in US trade policy have further added to these risks. For instance, the current administration has signed trade deals with several Middle East Gulf States, lifting the AI Diffusion Rule that previously restricted the export of AI chips to countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, the lifting of sanctions against Syria may reflect a shift in strategic priorities, as noted by Fred Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council, who suggested that Muslim fundamentalism may no longer be a barrier to pursuing trade partnerships.

In light of these geopolitical shifts, exporters must continuously monitor and adapt to changes in sanctions, export regulations, and tariff structures.

The current administration鈥檚 commitment to enforcing trade regulations is evident in recent U.S. Department of Justice guidance on white-collar crime. Priorities now include trade and customs fraud, sanctions evasion, and shadow banking. Export activities are under increased scrutiny, with greater emphasis on documentation, customs declarations, and supplier due diligence. The guidance also targets companies that use complex ownership structures to evade tariffs and sanctions.

Keeping an eye on sanctions evasion

Such evasion has significantly undermined the effectiveness of sanctions, particularly those targeting Russia. This issue is more pronounced in Europe, which maintains a higher trade volume with Russia. Goods exported from Europe are often rerouted through third countries with the intent of reaching Russia regardless of the existing sanctions.

A analyzed EU shipments to Central Asia and the Caucasus. The surge in exports since 2022 far exceeds local demand, suggesting these countries are being used as trans-shipment hubs. For example, Germany鈥檚 direct trade with Russia fell by 91%, while exports to Georgia and Kazakhstan rose by 92% and 136%, respectively. Indeed, exports to Kyrgyzstan jumped from under $10 million in March 2022 to $70 million just months later.

In response, the EU鈥檚 11th sanctions package now restricts sensitive exports to high-risk third countries.

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project documented : Russian importers collaborate with intermediaries in regions like Hong Kong and China; and these intermediaries purchase chips from Western distributors. These components are then passed through multiple other intermediaries before reaching Russia. Such trans-shipment risks are widespread due to the ease in routing goods through multiple jurisdictions and buyers.

How exporters should respond

The growing complexity of global trade, which is driven by geopolitical shifts, dual-use technologies, and trans-shipment risks, requires a more data- and technology-enabled approach to export compliance. Similar to the increase in risks in import workflows, exporters need to invest in a variety of tools and strategies to mitigate certain risks and comply with export regulations.

End-user verification protocols

End-user verification goes beyond the typical Know-Your-Customer procedures. For example, Know-Your-End-User procedures require the creation of end-use certificates for a variety of goods, including critical chip technology or dual-use goods. Particularly for intermediaries of distributors 鈥� not only in higher risk jurisdiction such as China or Hong Kong, but in every jurisdiction that has economic ties with sanctioned countries 鈥� end-user certificates may increase transparency of final product usage. Further, the availability of third-party screening tools and beneficial ownership information plays an important role as well.

In sanction screening, for example, ownership roles are crucial because individuals or entities with ownership stakes in sanctioned parties may also be subject to sanctions themselves, even if the entities are not directly listed. The Office of Foreign Assets Control dictates that if a sanctioned entity owns 50% or more of another party, that subsidiary party is also subject to sanctions.

AI-driven trade surveillance

AI can be used in trade surveillance effectively by monitoring and measuring trade flows between regions, cities, and even between companies. Anomalies in trade flows could be seen as spikes in trading activity occurring in traditionally low-demand regions beyond their normal demand patterns as outlined in the above-mentioned report on trans-shipments from the Brookings Institution. Also, re-export patterns can be detected by mirroring sanctioned trade routes and corresponding traffic. AI in trade surveillance can be further applied in detecting changes of ownership structures, which now can be done in real time.

Blockchain for traceability

Although not yet widely adopted by trade professionals, blockchain technology offers potential for tracking goods across supply chains. With blockchain technology, each transaction can be recorded so that the integrity of the supply chain is guaranteed, and goods reach their intended end users.

Collaborative enforcement and data sharing

Data-sharing agreements, such as those under the , support the export control of dual-use goods. However, the rise of shell companies and trans-shipment hubs calls for a reassessment of these agreements, which could potentially .

Addressing a complex environment

The integration of surveillance tools and counterparty data enables companies to embed export compliance into their governance frameworks. Appointing a dedicated export control officer can centralize responsibility for technology selection and training across the organization鈥檚 sales, logistics, and legal functions. This role is especially important for those organizations that are operating in technology sectors and deal with dual-use technologies, such as semiconductors, aerospace, and AI.

As global trade becomes more fragmented and regulatory enforcement intensifies, exporters must move beyond checkbox compliance. A proactive approach 鈥� rooted in transparency, proper use of data, and robust governance 鈥� will not only mitigate risk but also can build trust with partners and regulators.

The future of export success lies in visibility and in knowing not just where your organization鈥檚 goods are going, but who is using them and for what purpose.

In the final installment in our series, we will look at the risks inherent in today鈥檚 global supply chains.

You can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚听2025 Tariffs survey听here

This time, we鈥檒l shift focus to the other side of the ledger: the powers and regions that choose patience over provocation, structure over spectacle. From China’s quiet deepening of regional ties to the European Union鈥檚 methodical expansion and Africa鈥檚 ambitious trade integration, these actors are demonstrating that long-term stability, not drama, may be the true source of competitive advantage in today鈥檚 global economy. And as we turn away from the noise of the disruptors, we examine what it looks like when the builders, not the breakers, set the pace.

Stability profits as disruption proves costly

If the past decade taught us that disruption can be a powerful political tool, 2025 is teaching us something else: economically, stability wins. The loudest actors on the trade stage 鈥� those countries that tore up agreements, imposed sweeping tariffs, or promised new deals at every podium 鈥� are now grappling with the aftershocks of their own volatility. Meanwhile, nations and blocs that prioritized continuity, scale, and long-term cooperation are quietly reaping the rewards.

As we turn away from the noise of the disruptors, we examine what it looks like when the builders, not the breakers, set the pace.

The US and the UK, current and former respective champions of shaking up the system, are discovering the costs of their endeavors. American manufacturers are contorting their operations just to stay afloat. For example, there鈥檚 been a surge in US firms to try to delay tariff payments on Chinese goods amid mounting uncertainty. British exporters, still navigating Brexit鈥檚 long tail, find themselves hemmed in by patchwork agreements with little to show for their Global Britain strategy. Indeed, they鈥檙e more a before. Even May鈥檚 new UK/EU deal, meant to reset relations and reduce friction, felt more like a belated course correction than a strategic breakthrough.

By contrast, China is doubling down on regional integration, finalizing an with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that expands cooperation into digital and green sectors. The deal鈥檚 substance reflects a broader strategic pivot: while Western leaders chase headlines, Beijing is investing in trade predictability. Similarly, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) , with nearly 50 countries ratifying the agreement and using it to lay the groundwork for intra-African trade stability, independent of Western volatility.

Even within the transatlantic sphere, . It has maintained cohesion, weathered global shocks, and moved steadily to secure new trade partners. In this context, it鈥檚 not just size that matters 鈥� it鈥檚 steadiness. Capital flows to the predictable, and investment favor reliability. And while the disruptors get airtime and expensive cease-fires, the builders get the contracts.

Past trade failures leave lingering scars nearly a decade later

If stability is now proving its worth, the costs of earlier disruptions are coming into sharper focus 鈥� none more so than Brexit. Sold as a chance for the UK to seize control of its economic destiny and strike bold new trade deals, Brexit instead triggered a cascade of economic strain. The UK鈥檚 decision to break from the EU gutted its most important trade relationships and left exporters to navigate a fragmented global landscape without the leverage or infrastructure needed to thrive.

What followed was a decade of compounding crises. The initial Brexit shock rolled directly into the COVID-19 pandemic, which was quickly followed by the energy crisis spurred by Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine and then compounded by the global inflationary shock. These blows landed hardest on a nation already adrift. And while this May marked a flurry of long-delayed trade activity, including renewed ties with the US, EU, and India, there鈥檚 little evidence that these efforts will meaningfully reverse the long-term damage.

If stability is now proving its worth, the costs of earlier disruptions are coming into sharper focus 鈥� none more so than Brexit.

Public sentiment also has turned sharply. Only 24% of Britons still support being outside the EU, according to a , which reflects a staggering collapse in confidence. The deals struck in May might be politically useful, but economically, they resemble damage control more than triumph. The India deal may offer the best terms, but it arrives too late to serve as a panacea for Britain鈥檚 stalled growth and sagging investor confidence.

Nearly a decade since Brexit鈥檚 inception, the lesson is clear: while disruptions may begin as ideology, their ultimate test is in the domain of economics. And as the UK is currently exemplifying, the cost of failure may be brutal.

There is a defender鈥檚 advantage

One underappreciated reality of today鈥檚 trade environment is that disruption favors the defender. In times of chaos, the players with already-built supply chains, entrenched market share, and deep domestic subsidies can weather the storm far better than upstarts and disruptors.

Nowhere is this defender鈥檚 advantage more evident than in the US/China trade standoff. While both countries have suffered, the pain has not been symmetrical. Chinese firms, already supported by extensive state-backed infrastructure and increasingly diversified trading partners, have managed to reroute exports, absorb losses, and shift into friendlier markets. By contrast, many US companies, especially smaller manufacturers and retailers that may be reliant on predictable cost structures, have been caught flat-footed. Their defensive capabilities lie not in subsidies or centralized coordination but in adaptability 鈥� a trait that鈥檚 much harder to exercise amid constantly shifting policy terrain.

The same pattern plays out globally. The UK鈥檚 sluggish recovery from Brexit has made it less of a player and more of a proving ground for just how punishing trade realignment can be. The EU, despite internal frictions, remains one of the only major blocs capable of playing both defense and offense simultaneously 鈥� shielding its members with internal consistency while expanding market access abroad.

In geopolitical terms, this is the defender鈥檚 advantage: the strategic strength that comes from having established positions, clear expectations, and fewer self-inflicted wounds. While aggressors burn time and political capital in tit-for-tat escalation, defenders quietly build networks, deepen ties, and move forward.

The irony is that, in trade 鈥� an arena once dominated by bold deals and sweeping liberalization 鈥� the most competitive stance in 2025 may be the one that changes the least. Stability has become the new disruptor.

For more on the current trading environment, check out the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚听2025 Tariff Survey听here

In May, major trade deals were inked between the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the European Union, and India. Additionally, there were ongoing developments in global negotiations from Asia and Africa that have been long in the making and appear to be finally reaching the finish line, if not are already in effect.

The specifics of all these agreements vary significantly, ranging from extensive documents that could fill entire volumes to broader announcements that resemble agreements in principle rather than formal trade arrangements. Still, there are significant details that can offer insight into where global trade may be headed, both in the second half of 2025 and beyond.

When dealing with the US, relief does not mean resolution

Foremost in terms of implications for the near future was the de-escalation agreement between the US and China. President Donald J. Trump鈥檚 global trade war, a brutish fight with allies and rivals alike, resulted in a pitched battle of escalation, especially with China. Tarriff rates started obscenely high out of the gate and then exploded into the triple digits as a result of tit-for-tat responses. In May, both countries announced an agreement not so much to end the conflict as to de-escalate it for 90 days, along the lines of similar cessation of tensions agreements between the US, Mexico, and Canada.

On its face, the 90-day tariff truce between the US and China was a positive development. The agreement offered a temporary pause in escalating trade tensions, walking back tariffs both generally and on more specific products. However, nobody should kid themselves that this is anything close to a long-term solution.

Under the agreement, US-imposed from 145% to 30%, while China lowered its tariffs on US imports to 10% from 125%. This short-term relief still leaves massive barriers to trade still in place. While 30% and 10% appear small in comparison to the absurd levels of escalation that had effectively resulted in an embargo, these tariffs remain far above the danger levels that have led to economic calamity in the past. Indeed, US consumers are already appearing skittish, and inflation expectations have jumped to their .

The US/Chinese deal鈥檚 true benefit seems to be that the tariffs are low enough for companies to bring in enough imports to perhaps , a welcome relief to be sure, especially when compared to the previous near certainty of empty shelves. However, this added level of endurance may only enable further US aggression and a reignition of the conflict after the pause. Even at the lower level, the 30% tariff on Chinese goods is also guaranteed to hit consumers and thus the broader economy if maintained.

Special relationships mean special disappointment

Developments in the Atlantic are as informative as those in the Pacific. For all the symbolic weight of a US/UK trade agreement, the final product is strikingly underwhelming. What was once pitched as the crown jewel of post-Brexit strategy has arrived years late, half-formed, and burdened with tariffs that say more about economic leverage than strategic partnership.

In fact, the trade deal maintains a 10% tariff on most UK goods, a rate notably higher than pre-trade war levels and far higher than for what the UK government was hoping, given their initial optimism and glowing welcoming of the Trump administration. The deal also has the UK opening more of its market to US agricultural goods, while the US lifted tariffs on UK-made vehicles, steel, and aluminum. Still, a continuation of tariffs will likewise blunt any US gains beyond perhaps its agricultural sector, an area itself already by the conflict with China and Europe.

For an agreement with the largest nominal economy in the world, the deal is nowhere near what U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, or the parade of previous PMs were envisioning when they left the EU in 2020 with an eye towards closer trade relations to the US. Five years after their own disruptive maneuver, the UK seems to have gained little more than regret.

None of these deals involving the United States 鈥� whether struck with China, the UK, or others 鈥� . They are ceasefires, fragile and reversible, shaped more by political expedience than strategic consensus. Already, the Trump administration has hinted that even these limited truces could be if domestic conditions shift or foreign partners are deemed insufficiently deferential. After all, a US government that has offers little assurance that today鈥檚 handshake won鈥檛 become tomorrow鈥檚 threat.

In that light, the current deals don鈥檛 represent an end to the trade wars. Rather, they merely mark an intermission, one that could end the moment it becomes politically convenient to reignite the flames.

Looking towards trades deals without the US

So far, the story of May鈥檚 trade deals is one of disruption and relief that stops well short of resolution. For the US and UK, for example, the pursuit of leverage through maneuvering and changing the status quo has yielded volatile gains at best and lasting damage at worst. These latest agreements offer little in the way of structural change, and even less in terms of confidence that the agreements themselves will hold.

However, that鈥檚 only half the story 鈥� because May was a bustling month for trade deals, many of which did not involve the US. In my next piece, we will shift focus to the other end of the spectrum. From Asia鈥檚 quietly expansive dealmaking to Africa鈥檚 continental ambitions, we鈥檒l examine how consistency, integration, and long-term planning are beginning to define the next era of global trade.

For more on the current trading environment, check out the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 2025 Tariff Survey here