Key insights:

• • • AI as a force multiplier 鈥� Advanced analytics now reveal financial and behavioral anomalies that traditional monitoring systems routinely miss, giving executives a clearer view of emerging risks.

    • Geospatial and digital intelligence converge 鈥� Intelligent networks like OSINT, ADINT, and location-based data expose hidden networks and movement patterns, improving the detection of money laundering, trafficking, and smuggling operations.

    • Enterprise risk strategies must evolve 鈥� Organizations that integrate AI-driven intelligence across compliance, security, and operations can respond faster, reduce blind spots, and operate with greater resilience during high-risk events.

Illicit financial activity has always evolved faster than the systems designed to stop it. And today, the speed and sophistication of criminal networks are accelerating in ways that traditional compliance processes can no longer match. Major international events, such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, bring millions of visitors, heightened commercial activity, and a surge in cross鈥慴order movement, all creating fertile ground for exploitation.

AI as an intelligence multiplier

In this environment, financial institutions are on the front lines of detection and mitigation, and corporations must strengthen their ability to detect hidden risks. AI 鈥� particularly when combined with digital intelligence sources, behavioral analytics, and geo-referenced data 鈥� has emerged as the most powerful accelerator of that transformation.

Among all of this high-volume activity, AI is redefining how institutions detect early-stage indicators of illicit activity. Instead of relying solely on manual reviews or rule-based monitoring, organizations are increasingly deploying systems capable of analyzing vast volumes of structured and unstructured data at once. Three capabilities are shaping this new frontier:

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) 鈥� Criminal activity, even when intentionally concealed, tends to leave trace signals online. OSINT tools can examine social platforms, online marketplaces, media sources, forums, and digital discussion channels to uncover suspicious behavioral patterns, potential recruitment or exploitation signals, inconsistencies between official identification and online presence, or clusters of accounts linked by shared attributes. For many executives, OSINT has become an indispensable layer of enhanced due diligence, risk scoring, and early threat detection long before suspicious activity appears in financial records.

Advertising intelligence (ADINT) 鈥� ADINT focuses on metadata produced by mobile applications and digital advertising ecosystems. While it does not expose personal identifiers, it reveals mobility patterns, device behavior, and clustering anomalies. This type of intelligence becomes particularly powerful during large-scale events because of the ability to monitor the movement of devices across high-risk corridors, identify unusual concentrations of activity near event venues or border regions, or detect digital behavior consistent with organized criminal logistics. ADINT introduces a geographic and behavioral dimension to risk that enables institutions to understand not only who a customer appears to be, but where they go, how they behave, and whether those patterns align with legitimate economic activity.

AI-enhanced investigations 鈥� Modern platforms now merge financial data with OSINT and ADINT inputs and then apply descriptive and generative AI (GenAI) to draw connections that would be impossible to detect manually. These systems can classify digital communications by sentiment or intent, identify unusual financial behavior within seconds, convert large datasets into actionable intelligence summaries, translate and interpret foreign-language content, and map networks through recurring metadata or visual similarity. For decision-makers and organizational stakeholders, this shift represents a dramatic reduction in blind spots and a faster escalation pathway when emerging threats surface.

Why financial institutions and corporations must lead

Human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and money laundering cannot function at scale without the financial system. Even when exploitation occurs offline, profits eventually make their way into the formal economy through remittances, structured cash movements, shell companies, digital wallets, recruitment payments, or short-term rental arrangements.

AI enhanced investigations can help institutions identify subtle but meaningful indicators, such as coached or inconsistent customer responses, accounts linked through shared devices or addresses, rapid deposits followed by immediate withdrawals, purchases that do not correspond to a customer鈥檚 risk profile, payments directed to unverifiable recruiters, unusual patterns of short-term housing across multiple individuals, or transaction flows that follow established exploitation routes.

Illicit financial activity has always evolved faster than the systems designed to stop it. And today, the speed and sophistication of criminal networks are accelerating in ways that traditional compliance processes can no longer match.

All this information already exists inside institutional data today; AI simply makes it visible and usable much more easily and quickly.

While financial institutions are central in detecting illicit finance, companies across multiple sectors face heightened exposure during large events. Hospitality, logistics, transportation, construction, real estate, and digital services all see risk intensifying as demand surges and oversight becomes more complex.

Those senior leaders who responsible for operational continuity should integrate AI-powered monitoring into their internal controls. This can help detect unusual workforce recruitment patterns, unexpected badge or access activity, subcontractor behavior that conflicts with declared operations, repeated presence in high-risk zones, or digital communications that hint at coercive or exploitative conduct.

In the fight against illicit finance, technology is no longer optional. Indeed, it is our most powerful ally.

You can find out more about the fight against illicit finance and money laundering here

Key insights:

• • • Tariffs erode supply chain integrity, not just margins 鈥� Rapid policy shifts can destabilize manufacturers鈥� supplier relationships, customs compliance, and production networks.

    • Unpredictability is the real threat 鈥� Changing duty rates and exemptions undermine forecasting and inventory planning, creating bottlenecks that ripple across customer commitments.

    • Adaptation beats anticipation 鈥� Leading manufacturers aren’t waiting for policy clarity, rather they鈥檙e adapting to the uncertain environment now.

Tariffs have presented significant challenges for manufacturers, increasing input costs and undermining the stability of global supply chains. During the Trump administration, tariffs have become a focal point in debates over the broader economic implications of trade policy. Since 2025, has included a 10% minimum global tariff on a broad range of imports, additional measures targeting China, and various product- and country-specific actions 鈥� all developments that have reshaped corporate sourcing strategies and international trade planning.

In February, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in听 marked a pivotal shift in trade authority. By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that the President lacked the constitutional authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, emphasizing that such measures constitute taxes and are therefore within exclusive legislative domain of the U.S. Congress. The ruling invalidated many tariffs implemented by President Trump in 2025, providing some legal clarity while also raising questions about the future of US trade policy. Although the decision limits executive power, uncertainty still persists regarding how Congress will exercise its reasserted authority and what new legislative or trade measures may follow in such a dynamic and uncertain economic environment.

This Supreme Court’s ruling does not eliminate tariffs but rather shifts their governance by curtailing unilateral executive authority under IEEPA and reasserting Congress’s constitutional role in setting tax and customs policy. That means, of course, that tariffs will not disappear but instead will become more politically negotiated and legislatively codified. For supply chain leaders, this introduces a different kind of uncertainty that will be rooted in legislative timelines, committee negotiations, and the potential for prolonged policy stalemates.

Indeed, it鈥檚 unclear whether tariffs imposed through statute will prove more durable and harder to reverse than those enacted via executive order. Ultimately, this legal shift underscores the need for manufacturers to take a proactive adaptation and not one of complacency.

For corporate risk professionals, particularly those within manufacturing companies, these developments carry substantial implications. Tariffs extend beyond increasing import prices and affect profitability, workforce planning, and long-term supply chain resilience. They introduce volatility into customs procedures, supplier qualification, cross-border logistics, and production network design. When trade rules change rapidly, as they have in recent months, the integrity of global supply chains is increasingly difficult to maintain.

Why tariffs hit supply chain integrity so hard

In a global supply chain, every cross-border movement is governed by import and export rules set by the countries involved. Tariffs change those economics immediately, and they also trigger a chain reaction that ripples through sourcing, logistics, compliance, and planning. For example, the (CBP) has had to issue repeated implementation updates on new tariff actions, including guidance tied to imports from China, Canada, and Mexico, underscoring how quickly operating conditions can change for importers. That creates several clear risks to supply chain integrity.

One of the first impacts is on supplier relationships. When tariffs make a sourcing region less viable, manufacturers are often forced to move away from long-established suppliers and instead quickly on-board alternatives in lower-tariff markets. That may reduce immediate cost pressure, but it can also weaken quality control, transparency, and reliability if the new suppliers prove to be less able.

This is already showing up in manufacturer behavior. , a nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting manufacturing leaders, reported that in January, more than half (57%) of manufacturers said that US tariff policies were having a moderate or significant negative effect on confident decision-making related to sourcing, pricing, and investment timing. The same research found that companies were increasingly shifting from passive monitoring their supply chains to making active changes in sourcing.

Even after the Supreme Court鈥檚 legal invalidation, many impacts of previously imposed tariffs persist, as retroactive refunds are not guaranteed 鈥� indeed, the government has for such refunds. And these administrative delays in duty recovery can strain cash flow, while companies that already restructured their operations by relocating suppliers, renegotiating contracts, or investing in new logistics infrastructure cannot easily unwind those changes.

Clearly, the economic and operational consequences of past tariffs have already altered global sourcing maps, and those manufacturers that had shifted production to Southeast Asia or Mexico during the 2025 tariff surge may maintain those footprints even if duties are lifted, due to sunk costs or new regional advantages. This illustrates how even temporary policy shifts can have permanent effects on supply chain integrity.

Tariffs force structural changes and create bottlenecks

Tariffs also create operational instability. When duty rates, exemptions, and country-specific rules change, manufacturers鈥� ability to forecast their trade strategy becomes more difficult, and inventory planning becomes less reliable. Customs processing can become more complicated as companies work through classification questions, preference claims, and changing documentation requirements.

For manufacturers running lean networks, that unpredictability can be dangerous. Delays at ports, shipment holds, or reworks tied to customs compliance can ripple across production schedules and customer commitments. The CBP has specifically noted ongoing tariff implementation updates through its Cargo Systems Messaging Service, which only underscores how much administrative attention that manufacturers now need to dedicate to keeping updated on trade compliance.

Tariffs can also break the logic of just-in-time supply chains. If landed costs become unstable or sourcing risk rises, companies often shift toward just-in-case strategies by holding more inventory, extending forecast horizons, or redesigning production footprints. That may improve resilience in the short term, but it also ties up working capital and reduces efficiency.

Manufacturers Alliance research describes this as a move toward tactical adaptation rather than true resolution. In other words, many manufacturers are learning how best to operate in a tariff-heavy environment; however, as the system becomes more buffered, more complex, and often less efficient, it鈥檚 unclear when or whether things will return to a state resembling the previous stability.

How supply chain professionals can mitigate tariff risk

For corporate risk and supply chain leaders, the most practical response starts with supplier diversification. Overconcentration in one tariff-exposed region creates avoidable vulnerability. Manufacturers also should use supplier information management technology to map sub-tier dependencies, because tariff exposure often sits deeper in the supply base than tier-one suppliers alone reveal.

Other strong mitigation strategies include nearshoring to reduce long-distance logistics exposure and scenario planning to stress-test tariff shocks before they happen.

Those manufacturers best positioned for continued disruption ; instead, they are building flexibility into sourcing, inventory, and trade compliance now.

The bottom line

The Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources marks a significant check on executive power around tariffs, but it does not signal a return to stable or predictable trade policy. Tariffs remain a potent and politically salient tool, now subject to legislative rather than unilateral control.

For manufacturers and their corporate risk professionals, the imperative remains unchanged: Supply chains must be designed not just to survive today’s tariffs, but to adapt to the next wave of trade policy disruption. Indeed, resilience is no longer a function of cost minimization alone. It requires transparency, agility, and a deep understanding of how legal, political, and economic forces converge at the border. The most effective manufacturing companies will continue to be those that treat tariff exposure not as a compliance afterthought, but as a core dimension of supply chain integrity.

You can find out more about the challenges manufacturers are facing from tariffs here

Key takeaways:

• • • Your post-OBBBA forecasts should look different 鈥� If the tax department doesn’t own the OBBBA model, someone else will own the OBBBA story.

• • • Rely on your department鈥檚 inner strengths 鈥� It鈥檚 governance and analysis 鈥� not tools 鈥� that get you into the strategy room.

    • Factor in the conflict in the Middle East 鈥� The Iran war risk belongs in your tax model, not just in your CFO’s macro deck.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), signed into law in July 2025, enacted large business tax cuts, most notably by providing permanent full expensing of many forms of investment. Under the previous major corporate tax legislation, 2017鈥檚 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), bonus depreciation was scheduled for gradual phase-out following 2023. The OBBBA restored that expensing 100% retroactively for assets acquired from mid-January 2025 onwards.

The after-tax cost of new machinery, fleets, and equipment has effectively fallen by around 21%, designed to encourage immediate capital outlays by allowing businesses to write off these expenses in the year they are incurred rather than amortizing them over five years.

For corporate tax departments, that’s not a disclosure footnote 鈥� that’s your capital plan.

Capital-intensive corporations will see tax burdens reduced through permanent rate extensions, depreciation adjustments, and expansion of the state and local tax (SALT) deduction cap 鈥� but only if your models are built to capture the timing and location of investment, the mix of debt compared to equity, and where your organization books its next dollar of income.

Not surprisingly, most corporate tax departments aren’t there yet. They’re still recalculating last year, plus a few adjustments. That’s glorified compliance, not modeling.

A standout tax department doesn’t ask, What’s the OBBBA impact? Rather, it asks, Which version of OBBBA do we choose for this business? 鈥� and it has the models to back it up.

From spreadsheet heroics to controlled modeling

For many organizations, tax modeling still means creating a massive spreadsheet that only one director truly understands. The spreadsheet gets pulled out for budget season, rebuilt under pressure, and quietly retired until next year. That’s a single point of failure, not a process.

And after OBBBA, continuing that practice is dangerous. One wrong assumption on expensing or interest limitation can move cash tax by millions of dollars and blindside the Finance Department.

Here’s what disciplined modeling looks like in practice:

• • • Create a unified model 鈥� Build one integrated model that the whole team can use or accept that your department is choosing to fly blind.
    • Use the same assumptions 鈥� Standardize the levers that matter most (such as capex timing, financing mix, jurisdiction, and incentives) and make sure every scenario runs off the same assumptions.
    • Conduct modeling reviews 鈥� Treat major OBBBA-driven decisions (such as large capex, funding shifts, supply-chain redesign) as tax deals that must go through a modeling review before they’re greenlit.
    • Document your assumptions explicitly 鈥� Under permanent full expensing, the difference between a well-supported assumption and a poorly documented one isn’t just an audit risk, rather it’s a credibility problem with your CFO.

It鈥檚 also important to remember that in a post-OBBBA world, this level of disciplined modeling is not technology transformation 鈥� it鈥檚 basic survival.

Governance: Where leaders quietly win or loudly fail

The differentiator isn’t which corporate tax department has the fanciest tool 鈥� it’s which one has the cleanest governance. And the data is unambiguous: More than half (55%) of tax departments are still in the reactive phase of their technological development, stuck with five capex models circulating with five discount rates and the tax team arriving late to the planning meeting.

Those tax departments that are breaking out of that pattern share one trait: They put someone formally in charge. In the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 2026 Corporate Tax Department Technology Report, a large portion (88%) of survey respondents said their company had appointed a person to lead the tax department’s technology strategy. That number jumped a whopping 37 percentage points, from 51%, from the previous year鈥檚 survey. That single structural move separates those departments with a governance model from those that simply hold a governance conversation every budget cycle and forget about it.

Clearly, this type of ownership drives results. Two-thirds of those surveyed agreed that their company’s investment in technology has enabled a shift from routine, reactive work to more strategic, proactive, higher-value work.

Under OBBBA, the kind of governance isn’t housekeeping. It’s how you get invited into strategy discussions instead of having to clean up after things go awry.

Why your OBBBA win may not feel like a win

On paper, the tax changes embedded in the OBBBA look generous. In practice, your effective tax benefit is colliding with something you don’t control.

When the war on Iran began, all shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was effectively halted, removing roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas supply from the market. Fuel prices throughout the world spiked and are likely to remain elevated as long as conflict persists.

With oil prices hovering around $100 a barrel, there are will wipe out the benefits of higher tax refunds this year for most Americans. If those benefits, arising from Trump’s 2025 tax cuts, are erased for the average American, only the top 30% of taxpayers will still seeing a net gain.

For corporate planning purposes, the parallel dynamic is real: The topline OBBBA benefit is being eroded by higher fuel, freight, and financing costs across the business and its supply chain.

Inflationary pressures are being driven by higher energy prices tied to the Iran war, and the conflict’s impact on a wide range of goods and services is likely to last for months 鈥� with experts saying even a ceasefire is unlikely to immediately ease global energy shortages.

A serious corporate tax department doesn’t handwave these concerns away. It takes three actions:

1. 1. 1. Run a war-extended scenario 鈥� The scenario should show exactly how sustained higher energy costs and borrowing rates change the payoff from accelerated expensing and leverage 鈥� with specific numbers, not just directional commentary.
      2. Share your forecasts internally 鈥� Put your monthly or quarterly cash-tax forecasts on the table for Finance to see, so that it can manage liquidity rather than hope the annual plan holds.
      3. Force the hard conversation 鈥� Ask the tough question: At today’s rates and fuel costs, the after-tax return on this project is X. Are we still in? That question should come from the tax team now, not from the finance team six months later.

Clearly, the daily fluctuations in oil prices matter less than monthly and quarterly averages 鈥� and volatility will likely remain elevated given the absence of a clear timeline for the end of the war. That’s exactly the kind of sustained uncertainty that belongs front and center in your scenario set, not in a footnote.

The bottom line

The OBBBA gives corporate tax departments a genuine opportunity to move from being simply a compliance function to becoming more of a strategic advisor. Permanent full expensing, richer cost recovery, and more flexible interest rules can create real levers to add value, but only for those organizations that model them rigorously, govern them cleanly, and stress-test them against the macro environment their business actually faces today.

Indeed, the Iran war is a live test of that readiness. The corporate tax departments that show up with modeled scenarios, cash-tax forecasts, and a clear point of view on after-tax returns will earn a seat at the strategy table. The ones that show up with caveats will be asked to leave it.

You can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 2026 Corporate Tax Department Technology Report here

• • • The ceasefire is between the US and Iran and is not a regional peace 鈥�听Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon within hours of the announced deal. Iran hit oil infrastructure in Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia 鈥� including the East-West Pipeline, the primary route for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Companies planning around a return to normal should instead plan around the idea that the war has narrowed, not ended.

    • If the disruption stays within one quarter, the economic damage is painful but reversible 鈥� The Dallas Fed projects WTI oil at roughly $98 per barrel with a modest GDP hit in a short-closure scenario. The catastrophic scenario 鈥� WTI above $132 with sustained negative growth 鈥� requires the closure of the war to drag past Q2. Every week the ceasefire holds improves the odds, but Iran’s strike on the Saudi bypass pipeline complicates even the optimistic timeline.

    • Iran may have stumbled into the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history 鈥� At conservative estimates, transit fees charged for traversing the Strait of Hormuz could generate $40 billion to $50 billion for Iran annually, or roughly 10% to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP 鈥� all at near-zero operating cost. That revenue stream inverts Tehran’s incentives. Indeed, keeping the toll system in place may now be worth more than restoring free transit.

On April 7, less than two hours before a self-imposed deadline that threatened the destruction of Iran’s civilian infrastructure, President Donald J. Trump announced a two-week ceasefire in the war in Iran that began on the last day of February and continued over 38 days of sustained air strikes by the Unites States and Israel. In turn, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks across over a dozen countries and forced the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

The honest answer is, not yet 鈥� and the first 24 hours have already shown why.

A fragile, but functional peace

The ceasefire is remarkably thin, and it鈥檚 based on three operative clauses: i) the US and Israel halt strikes on Iran; ii) Iran halts retaliatory attacks on the US and Israel; and iii) Iran allows “safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz. Everything else 鈥� from nuclear terms, sanctions, reconstruction, and the legal status of Hormuz transit 鈥� has been punted to negotiations in Islamabad beginning April 10, with Pakistan mediating.

With the ceasefire, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: “How can I plan around this?”

However, what the ceasefire covers matters less than what it doesn’t. Within hours of the announcement, Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon, and Iran warned it would withdraw from the ceasefire if attacks on Lebanon continue. Meanwhile, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain all reported fresh Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting oil, power, and desalination infrastructure after the ceasefire was in place. Most critically, Iran struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the main route by which Gulf producers have been rerouting oil to bypass the blockaded strait.

That pipeline strike should command attention in every supply chain and energy risk briefing this week because it signals how shaky the agreement is, and that Iran remains a long-term threat to vital infrastructure across the region.

For companies operating in or sourcing from the Gulf, the practical implications are immediate. This is not a ceasefire that restores pre-war operating conditions; rather it is a bilateral pause between two belligerents while the regional war continues around them. Insurance premiums, shipping risk assessments, and supply chain contingency plans should reflect that distinction until there is a meaningful shift.

What does this mean for the next two weeks?

Both sides are claiming victory 鈥� and increasingly, claiming different deals. Trump called Iran’s 10-point proposal “a workable basis on which to negotiate”; and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council called the ceasefire a “crushing defeat” for Washington. The White House now says the 10-point plan Iran is publicly circulating differs from the terms that were actually negotiated for the ceasefire. Tehran, meanwhile, says there is no deal at all if Lebanon isn’t included 鈥� a condition the US has not acknowledged. And of course, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

These are not the hallmarks of a stable agreement; but they may be the hallmarks of a durable one. The deal is thin enough so that each side can brief its domestic audience on a different story, and as long as neither is forced to reconcile those stories publicly, the pause holds.

And the incentives to keep talking are asymmetric but real. The US has watched gas prices surge past $4 nationally as domestic support for the war 鈥� which started at levels best described as in a hole 鈥� continued to drop even further. Goldman Sachs raised its recession probability to 30% and JPMorgan to 35%, and every day the strait stays closed pushes those numbers higher. The administration needs the global economy to exhale and needs distance itself from a war so it can focus on other priorities, including an already difficult midterm election cycle.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

Iran, for its part, wants the bombing to stop. Its conventional navy has been functionally destroyed, its air defenses are highly degraded, its nuclear facilities have sustained severe damage, and its cities, bridges, and transportation networks have been hit repeatedly. The regime survived and arguably emerged with greater domestic legitimacy than it had before the war, but the physical toll is mounting. Tehran wants the strikes to stop so it can claim victory by survival without incurring any more costs.

This mutual exhaustion is the load-bearing structure of the ceasefire. If the ceasefire holds for 72 hours (as I think it might), and if the strait begins opening to escorted traffic by Friday as Iranian officials have signaled, and if neither side finds a reason to walk away before the Islamabad talks convene, then the ceasefire will likely be extended. Not because the underlying disputes get resolved, but because the cost of resuming hostilities exceeds the cost of continuing to talk. Expect a rolling series of extensions, probably 30 to 45 days at a time, that resolve nothing while letting global markets gradually stabilize.

As we wrote earlier this month, if the disruption remains limited to roughly one quarter, the oil price shock is painful but reversible, ugly, but manageable. And every week the ceasefire holds pushes the trajectory toward the manageable scenario.

What happens after the ceasefire?

Again, if the ceasefire holds, we then have to start thinking about how this conflict resolves. Not surprisingly, this is where it gets uncomfortable.

The conventional assumption in Washington and in global markets is that the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal once the fighting stops. That assumption underestimates what Iran has built.

Iran’s parliament is working to pass a Strait of Hormuz Management Plan, codifying its claimed sovereignty over strait transit and establishing a legal framework for collecting toll fees. Media reports indicate Iran has been charging vessels between $1 million and $2 million per transit and is planning to keep charging those tolls for all ships as the strait reopens. So, at $1 million per ship, and with up to 135 transits per day, 365 days a year, that’s about $40 billion to $50 billion in annual revenue for Iran, or up to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP. All at an operating cost that approaches zero.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Compare that to Iran’s oil sector, which generated approximately $53 billion annually in 2022 and 2023, required massive capital investment and maintenance, and was subject to constant disruption. The toll revenue is comparable in scale, dramatically cheaper to operate, and immune to sanctions. If the final number is even a fraction of this, it鈥檚 still a massive financial shot in the arm for Iran that could become a far greater advantage than the damage to capital that the war has inflicted upon the state.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Of course, this changes the structural incentives around the Strait of Hormuz in ways most analysts haven’t fully absorbed. A permanent toll system gives Iran a revenue base to rebuild the military assets it lost, reduce its dependence on oil exports, and fund domestic investment that could blunt future protest movements. The regime’s cost-benefit calculus has inverted: Keeping the toll operational in place may now be worth more than restoring the pre-war status quo.

For the US and Israel, the only way to dismantle this arrangement is by force and the last 38 days demonstrated the limits of that approach. The US achieved air and naval superiority, destroyed Iran’s conventional military, and killed the supreme leader. None of it was enough to compel capitulation, and in fact, may not have even come close. A second campaign faces the same likely result, against a population now unified by the experience of surviving the first one.

The war didn’t just disrupt global trade. It may have permanently repriced the most important shipping lane on Earth 鈥� and left every piece of energy infrastructure in the Gulf more vulnerable than it was before the first air strike landed.

You can find more about the global impact of the war in Iran here

Key takeaways:

• • • Q2 is a wound that heals if the war stops 鈥� Oil spikes, inflation revisions, and supply disruptions are painful but mostly reversible in a short-war scenario. The exception is insurance and risk premiums for Gulf maritime transit, which are permanently repriced.

    • Q3 is a wound that scars 鈥� Sustained oil at $130 per barrel changes household and business behavior in ways that don’t snap back. Recession probability crosses the coin-flip threshold and supply chain disruptions cascade into industries far from the Gulf.

    • Q4 is a different body 鈥� Even if the war ends, the global economy has rebuilt itself around the disruption. Trade routes, supplier relationships, and risk models have been permanently rewired, especially if there is nothing structural to prevent the Strait from closing again.

This is the second of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we鈥檒l walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Previously, we made the case that the US-Iran war is unlikely to end quickly. The regime hasn’t collapsed, the asymmetric force controlling the Strait of Hormuz is nowhere near neutralized, and diplomacy seems dead on arrival. Most significantly, the United States military is escalating, not winding down.

While the first part of this series was about the military and diplomatic picture, this piece is about your balance sheet.

What follows is a quarter-by-quarter map of what a prolonged conflict means for the global economy, charted from now through Christmas 2026. We鈥檒l cover how oil, supply chains, GDP forecasts will be revised in real time, and how disruptions that look temporary in Q2 could trigger a permanent rewiring of how the global economy moves goods, prices risk, and sources critical inputs.

Even if your company doesn鈥檛 import a single barrel of Gulf crude, you could still get hit by this. Indeed, if you’re plugged into the global economy like the rest of us, you’re going on this ride.

Q2 2026 (April鈥揓une): The wound that heals

If the war ends by the close of the second quarter on June 30, most of the damage is reversible 鈥� painful, but reversible.

Brent crude is up about 60% since before the start of the war when it was roughly $70 per barrel; and Capital Economics , prices could fall back toward $65 by year-end. The interim outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now to be 4.2% for 2026, up sharply from 2.8%, assuming energy disruptions ease by mid-year. If that assumption holds true, it鈥檚 likely we鈥檒l be able to muddle through the pain.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking. The Gulf supplies roughly 45% of global sulfur, and Qatar produces around one-third of the world’s helium, which is essential for semiconductor manufacturing. Further, Qatar鈥檚 liquified natural gas (LNG) production was significantly damaged by Iranian strikes.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking.

Further disruptions in fertilizer supply chains could delay spring planting, which could ripple into agricultural yields well into 2027. These effects don’t snap back the moment oil flow normalizes; they have their own timelines.

And here’s the one thing that doesn’t reverse even in the best case 鈥� risk premiums. The Strait of Hormuz was priced as a chokepoint that would never actually close. So when it did, that repricing is permanent and will be felt across the world as risk around other too important to fail chokepoints is itself reevaluated and priced higher.

Q3 2026 (July鈥揝eptember): The wound that scars

If a Q2 end to the war represents a recoverable spike, a Q3 end is where the word structural starts showing up in the discussion.

Capital Economics models Brent at roughly $130 per barrel 鈥� or roughly 14% higher than where it is now 鈥� in a prolonged scenario. At those prices, the damage stops being abstract. And Moody’s Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi estimates that every sustained $10-per-barrel increase . At $130 (nearly double pre-war levels) that’s approaching $2,700 per family. That is the kind of money that changes behavior.

In this case, Zandi says, especially if the cost of oil stays elevated for months 鈥� and by Q3, it would have. Moody’s recession probability model was pushing 50% in late-March when oil was $108 per barrel. At $130, the math speaks for itself.

Again, in this scenario, the damage fans out beyond energy. Fertilizer shortages hit crop yields, and helium disruptions cascade into semiconductors, automotive, and medical devices. The potential impact on AI-related manufacturing alone could spook investors already primed to see AI as a bubble. Capital Economics projects Eurozone growth at 0.5% and Chinese growth below 3%. Emerging markets could face forced rate hikes that deepen their own recessions.

This is the quarter in which contingency plans become operating assumptions. The question is no longer When does this go back to normal? 鈥�听rather the question is whether normal is coming back at all.

Q4 2026 and beyond: The different body

Here’s what most forecasts don’t capture about a war that continues passed Q4: It almost doesn’t matter whether the war is still active or not. The damage has changed shape, and it’s no longer about what the conflict is doing to the global economy. Instead, it’s about what the global economy has done to itself in response.

Companies that spent Q2 and Q3 diversifying away from Gulf suppliers have now spent real money building alternatives. They are not going back to their previous pathways even if there is a ceasefire. The sunk costs make the reversal unthinkable, and the memory of this conflict makes it irrational. No supply chain director is walking into a boardroom to recommend re-concentrating risk in a chokepoint that closed once and might close again.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond.

Because, of course, it could close again. If Iran emerges weakened but intact, which is the most likely outcome per multiple intelligence assessments, the result is a hostile state with every incentive to reconstitute its asymmetric capabilities the moment the pressure lifts.

Companies are thus going to reroute their future supplies around the Strait rather than through it. High oil prices and the potential for global shortage will also further accelerate green energy initiatives or alternate fuel sources across the globe as oil security reenters geopolitical calculations. Most importantly, every organization鈥檚 supply chain will need a reevaluation in light of an increasingly dangerous world, with expensive secondary supply chains becoming more a necessity than a luxury.

That鈥檚 the real legacy of a war continuing past the end of this year. Not oil prices on any given day or even insurance premiums, but the permanent repricing of an assumption. The war didn’t just disrupt the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz, it broke the premise that some geographies were too big to fail and would be protected and kept open. Once that premise is now broken so thoroughly companies will need to reevaluate whether the concentration of risk in individual areas is a luxury they can afford. Many will find the answer to be no, resulting in an increased push to diversify risk away from single points of failure.

The planning imperative

Fortunately, the best-case scenario remains possible. However, it requires Iran accepting terms it has publicly rejected as existential, its navy being neutralized despite retaining significant asymmetric combat capability, a coalition materializing from countries that have refused to send warships, and mine-clearance operations succeeding with the deck stacked against them. Only then, we鈥檒l see if civilian traffic is willing to risk billions of dollars that the clean-up job was done right. Each is possible, but the odds remain slim.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond. They should model energy prices at between $120 and $150 per barrel, not $70. The smart companies are the ones building optionality now because the cost of flexibility is far lower than the cost of being caught flat-footed in September.

Four weeks ago, the assumption was that the Strait of Hormuz was too important to close. However, it did, and the assumption that it will reopen quickly deserves the same scrutiny.

You can find out more about the听geopolitical and economic situation in 2026听here

Key takeaways:

• • • Only IEEPA鈥慴ased tariffs are up for refund 鈥� Refunds will flow electronically to importers of record through ACE, the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, but only once CBP鈥檚 process is finalized.

    • Liquidation and protest timelines are now critical 鈥� An organization鈥檚 tax concepts that directly influence which entries are eligible and how long companies have to protect claims.

    • Tax functions must quickly coordinate with other corporate functions 鈥� In-house tax teams need to coordinate with their organization鈥檚 trade, procurement, and accounting functions to gather data, assert entitlement, and get the financial reporting right on any tariff refunds.

WASHINGTON, DC 鈥� When the United States Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling on President Donald J. Trump鈥檚 authority to impose mass tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in February it set the stage for what it to come.

The Court ruled the president did not have authority under IEEPA to impose the tariffs that generated an estimated $163 billion of revenue in 2025. In response, the Court of International Trade (CIT) issued a ruling in requiring the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to issue refunds on IEEPA duties for entries that have not gone final. That order, however, is currently suspended while CBP designs the refund process and the government considers an appeal.

At听the recent , tax experts discussed what this ruling means for corporate tax departments, outline what is and isn鈥檛 a consideration for refunds and the steps necessary to apply for refunds.

As panelists explained, the key issue for tax departments is that only IEEPA tariffs are in scope for refund 鈥� many other tariffs remain firmly in place. For example, on steel, aluminum, and copper; Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese-origin goods; and new of 10% to 15% on most imports still apply and will continue to shape effective duty rates and supply chain costs.

So, which entities can actually get their money back?

Legally, CBP will send refunds only to the importer of record, and only electronically through the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, known as the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system. That means every potential claimant needs an with current bank information on file. And creating an account or updating it can be a lengthy process, especially inside a large organization.

If a business was not the importer of record but had tariffs contractually passed through to it 鈥� for example, by explicit tariff clauses, amended purchase orders, or separate line items on invoices 鈥� they may still have a commercial basis to recover their share from the importer. In practice, that means corporate tax teams should sit down with both the organization鈥檚 procurement experts and its largest suppliers to identify tariff鈥憇haring arrangements and understand what actions those importers are planning to take.

Why liquidation suddenly matters to tax leaders

As said, the Atmus ruling is limited to entries that are not final, which hinges on the . CBP typically has one year to review an entry and liquidate it (often around 314 days for formal entries) with some informal entries liquidating much sooner.

Once an entry liquidates, the 180鈥慸ay protest clock starts. Within that window, the importer of record can challenge CBP鈥檚 decision, and those protested entries may remain in play for IEEPA refunds. There is also a 90鈥慸ay window in which CBP can reliquidate on its own initiative, raising questions about whether final should be read as 90 days or 180 days 鈥� clearly, an issue that will matter a lot if your company is near those deadlines.

Data, controversy risk & financial reporting

The role of in-house tax departments in the process of getting refunds requires, for starters, giving departments access to entry鈥憀evel data showing which imports bore IEEPA tariffs between February 1, 2025, and February 28, 2026. If a business does not already have robust trade reporting, the first step is to confirm whether the business has made payments to CBP; and, if so, to work with the company鈥檚 supply chain or trade compliance teams to access ACE and run detailed entry reports for that period.

Summary entries and heavily aggregated data will be a challenge because CBP has indicated that refund claims will require a declaration in the ACE system that lists specific entries and associated IEEPA duties. Expect controversy pressure: As claims scale up, CBP resources and the courts could see backlogs. If that becomes the case, tax teams should be prepared for protests, documentation requests, and potential litigation over entitlement and timing.

On the financial reporting side, whether and when to recognize a refund depends on the strength of the legal claim and the status of the proceedings. If tariffs were listed as expenses as they were incurred, successful refunds may give rise to income recognition. In cases in which tariffs were capitalized into fixed assets, however, the accounting analysis becomes more nuanced and may implicate asset basis, depreciation, and potentially transfer pricing positions.

Coordination between an organization鈥檚 financial reporting, tax accounting, and transfer pricing specialists is critical in order that customs values, income tax treatment, and any refund鈥憆elated credits remain consistent.

Action items for corporate tax departments

Corporate tax teams do not need to become customs experts overnight, but they do need to lead a coordinated response. Practically, that means they should:

• • • confirm whether their company was an importer of record and, if so, ensure ACE access and banking information are in place now, not after CBP turns the refund system on.
    • map which entries included IEEPA tariffs, identify which are non鈥憀iquidated or still within the 180鈥慸ay protest window, and file protests where appropriate to protect the company鈥檚 rights.
    • inventory all tariff鈥憇haring arrangements with suppliers, assess contractual entitlement to pass鈥憈hrough refunds, and align with procurement and legal teams on a consistent recovery approach.
    • work with accounting to determine the financial statement treatment of potential refunds, including whether and when to recognize contingent assets or income and any knock鈥憃n effects for transfer pricing and valuation.

If tax departments wait for complete certainty from the courts before acting, many entries may go final and fall out of scope. The opportunity for tariff refunds will favor companies that are data鈥憆eady, cross鈥慺unctionally aligned, and willing to move under time pressure.

You can find out more about the changing tariff situation here

Key takeaways:

• • • The US achieved conventional military dominance, but it hasn’t solved the core problem 鈥� The navy that was destroyed was never the one controlling the Strait of Hormuz. The asymmetric force that is, the IRGCN, retained 80% of its small-boat fleet and may be able to replenish losses from civilian infrastructure faster than the US can eliminate them.

    • All three pathways to a quick resolution are blocked 鈥� The regime has hardened rather than collapsed, the diplomatic positions are nowhere near overlapping, and the US military posture is escalating, including possible ground operations, while allied support remains symbolic.

    • The conflict is likely measured in quarters, not weeks, and the economic difference is not linear 鈥� Businesses should be stress-testing against sustained disruption rather than planning for a return to normal, because the conditions required for a rapid resolution would each need to break favorably 鈥� and right now, none of them are.

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This is the first of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we look at different ways the war could wind down quickly, and why none of them offer an immediate pathway.

The war with Iran is not going to be over by the end of this week.

That sentence shouldn’t be controversial four weeks into the ongoing war with Iran being waged by the United States and Israel, but it runs against the grain of how markets, policymakers, and many business leaders have been processing this conflict. The dominant assumption, visible in equity markets that have wobbled but not cratered, is that this is an acute shock with a definable end date.

However, very little about the military, political, or strategic picture supports that assumption.

While I make no claim to predict the war’s exact duration, I can lay out why the most likely scenarios point to a conflict measured in quarters, not weeks 鈥� and why that difference matters. In the next part of this series, we’ll sketch the economic consequences on a quarter-by-quarter basis, drawing on the latest projections from top economic thinkers. First, however, here is why this war probably drags on.

The wins aren’t winning鈥�

By a surface level scorecard, Operation Epic Fury has been exactly the kind of lopsided success one would expect of a global superpower that鈥檚 going up against a regional player. Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader was killed in the opening strikes, Iran’s conventional navy was sunk at anchor before they could sortie, and full air supremacy by the US appears established. If you were grading this on the metrics that won wars in the 20th century, you’d be forgiven for thinking it was nearly over.

Yet it is not nearly over. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Daily transits have collapsed from 138 ships to fewer than five. Approximately 2,000 vessels and 20,000 seafarers are stranded in the region with nowhere to go. Brent crude is at $108 per barrel as of March 26, up roughly 50% since the war began. The International Energy Agency has called the current situation the largest disruption to global energy supplies in history.

The disconnect between the military scorecard and the strategic reality comes down to a single, underappreciated fact that the US destroyed the wrong navy. To be fair, it’s not like they had much of a choice. Iran’s conventional fleet had to go, and it went; however, that was playing on easy mode. Iran’s conventional fleet, its frigates, corvettes, and submarines, was a prestige force built for Indian Ocean power projection.

You can find out more about the here

The force actually designed to fight America, however, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), and it is something else entirely: a dispersed network of hundreds of armed speedboats, coastal missile batteries, thousands of sea mines, drone systems, and midget submarines spread across dozens of small bases along hundreds of miles of Persian Gulf coastline. The IRGCN’s entire doctrine, training, and equipment procurement were optimized for exactly one scenario, that of denying the Strait of Hormuz to a technologically superior adversary. That is the war Iran is now fighting.

Even though the IRGCN lost its most advanced platforms, those were not the workhorses of their fleet. The IRGCN retains an estimated 80% of its small-boat fleet, the fast boats that hide among fishing dhows, the crews that can scatter onshore and remount on surviving craft. The US is tasked with the mission of hunting small boats hiding among civilian vessels, in a fight in which Iran is willing to lose dozens of them a day to keep the Strait closed. This is not a mopping-up operation; rather, it is a war of attrition that the US is not structured to win quickly, and one in which Iran can replace its losses in ways a conventional navy cannot. For the US, it鈥檚 like trying to empty a bathtub while the spigot is still running.

Further, the math of the Strait itself is unforgiving. Iran had an estimated 5,000 sea mines before the war and has begun laying them. The US Navy decommissioned its last Gulf-based minesweepers in 2025 鈥� timing that, in hindsight, looks catastrophic.

Indeed, the US can sink every major Iranian warship afloat and still not reopen the waterway. That, in fact, is roughly what has happened.

鈥nd the off-ramps are blocked

If conventional military victory hasn’t solved the problem, there are three other ways this war ends quickly. As of late March, however, all three are jammed.

1. The regime isn’t collapsing

A US intelligence assessment completed before the war concluded that military action was unlikely to produce regime change even if Iran’s leadership was killed. That assessment has proven accurate. Iran鈥檚 constitutional succession mechanism activated as designed, and a new Supreme Leader, the previous one鈥檚 more hardline son, was installed within days. Also, protests are not sweeping the streets. Ideological regimes under external threat tend to harden, not fracture. Indeed, both the Taliban and Hamas have survived worse. The Iranian Islamic Republic, whatever else you want to say about it, appears to be surviving this conflict as well.

2. Diplomacy has nowhere to go

Iran rejected the 15-point plan offered by the US and published five counterdemands, including recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which is a nonstarter for the US. Iran’s foreign minister says Tehran has no intention of negotiating, even as President Donald J. Trump insists talks are continuing. These positions aren’t close to overlapping, and both sides are staking their credibility on not budging first.

And Iran has good reason to believe time is on its side. The war is deeply unpopular in the US and the same affordability anxiety that swept Republicans into power is now threatening to sweep them out in the midterms. Tehran knows for every day the war goes on, they get to roll the dice that Trump will back out, giving them a strong incentive to get as many rolls as they can.

3. The military posture is escalating, not resolving

Ground troops, including paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, are en route to the Gulf or have received deployment orders. Reports indicate the White House is weighing a seizure of Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil terminal, an operation that would put American boots on Iranian soil for the first time. Seven allied nations signed a statement supporting Strait security, but it鈥檚 a paperwork alliance, lacking the kind of committed hardware needed to force a solution to the Strait鈥檚 closure.

What does this mean for business?

The Iranian regime isn’t folding, diplomacy doesn鈥檛 seem to be catching on, and the US military posture is expanding. None of the conditions point to a rapid resolution, and in fact, several of them point to a prolonged conflict.

If this war is measured in quarters rather than weeks, the economic consequences stop being a temporary, albeit painful price spike and start being a structural disruptive event, one that reshapes supply chains, reprices risk, and forces companies to make hard choices about where and how they operate. The difference between a three-week war and a three-quarter war is not a difference of magnitude, it is a difference in kind.

In the concluding part of this series, we’ll walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Key insights:

• • • Different tools, different impacts鈥� Tariffs raise costs but allow business to continue; sanctions create legal barriers that can make transactions impossible, with severe penalties for violations.

    • Scale brings scrutiny鈥� Expansive US sanctions risk diminishing returns as targets develop workarounds and alternative financial systems.

    • Strategic or reactive use?鈥� The core challenge isn’t whether sanctions work, but whether they’re deployed as part of coherent strategy or simply as visible action that avoids harder diplomatic or military choices.

In the foreign policy arsenal of the United States, economic sanctions have become a widely used weapon. As their use expands, so does the debate about how effective they actually are, what additional risks they create, and what unintended consequences they may bring.

Tariffs vs. sanctions: What’s the difference?

In wartime or during high-tension economic crises, both tariffs and sanctions can significantly impact businesses, but the two methods work in different ways.

Tariffs are a form of economic pressure. Governments use them to reduce an adversary’s export revenue, raise the cost of critical imports, signal disapproval of countries that continue doing business with the target, and generate funds for their own efforts. For companies, tariffs usually create friction rather than a full stop. Businesses can often continue importing, but at a higher landed cost. And that can compress margins and force decisions around topics such as renegotiating pricing, passing costs to customers, or shifting to lower-tariff suppliers.

Sanctions are closer to an economic blockade. They aim to isolate the target by banning broad categories of trade, restricting strategic sectors, blacklisting specific entities and individuals, and sometimes pressuring third parties through secondary sanctions. The business impact is often binary. For example, if a counterparty or its majority owner is sanctioned, trading partners generally cannot make the deal work by paying more. The transaction becomes illegal, and violations can trigger severe penalties.

How the difference shows up in operations

Consider a European manufacturing company in March 2022 that is trying to manage the crisis situation caused by Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine.

If policymakers respond to the crisis with tariffs, such as a steep duty on Russian aluminum and timber, the primary challenge for this manufacturer is financial and operational planning. Costs rise, and then the company must decide whether to absorb the increase, reprice contracts, or switch suppliers, even if alternatives are more expensive.

Check out for more on the Supreme Court鈥檚 tariff decision here

If policymakers respond with sanctions, however, the situation can escalate quickly. Restrictions on major banks and key import categories, combined with aggressive designations of targeted companies and individuals can disrupt the entire supply chain. Payments can freeze, and goods can be delayed or seized. Even indirect connections to the sanctioned party can create problems, including for banks, shippers, insurers, and in some cases for logistics providers or warehouse owners. Indeed, what looked like a routine transaction can become non-compliant without warning.

The scale of sanctions use

Over the past several decades, the US has increasingly relied on economic sanctions as a core foreign-policy tool. In fact, by the early 2020s, US sanctions programs were targeting more than 30 countries and thousands of individuals and entities, with the sanctions primarily being administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). That trend has not only continued but accelerated under the current administration, which has turned to sanctions more frequently amid a volatile political environment. As the use of sanctions has expanded on a massive scale, their breadth and effectiveness have come under growing scrutiny.

Indeed, the phrase economic warfare reflects how modern sanctions often operate.

Many sanctions now target entire sectors, not only military goods. Secondary sanctions can threaten foreign companies that do business with sanctioned parties, effectively using access to the US financial system and the dollar as leverage. Critics argue that sanctions can also cause harm to civilians through inflation, shortages of essential goods including medicine, and broader economic damage. While targeted sanctions are intended to focus on elites, broader measures can affect entire populations.

What makes sanctions risky

The overuse of sanctions can create several problems. Yet sanctions can be politically attractive because they offer visible action without direct military risk, which may increase the temptation to use them even when they are unlikely to work.

As sanctions become routine, however, their impact may weaken as countries and companies develop workarounds, find alternative payment channels, and establish sanctions-resistant trade networks. Broad pressure from US sanctions can also encourage efforts to reduce reliance on the dollar-based financial system. China, Russia, and others have invested in alternative payment mechanisms such as cross-border interbank payment systems (CIPS) and systems for transfer of financial messages (SPFS) and expanded the use of non-dollar currencies. Over time, this response can reduce US financial leverage.

Sanctions can also provoke retaliation, including cyber activity, support for US adversaries, or wider regional instability. Sanctions also may harden diplomatic positions and make negotiation more difficult. In some cases, shared sanctions pressure can push sanctioned states closer together, strengthening the very coalitions that the US is trying to disrupt.

The argument for a middle ground

Supporters of sanctions argue that they provide an option between doing nothing and using military force. They can impose real costs on harmful actors, signal resolve, and respond to domestic demands for action, while still preserving diplomatic channels and avoiding full-on armed conflict.

The central question, however, is whether sanctions are being used as a substitute for strategy rather than as a single tool within a broader strategy. As sanctions continue to expand, it is worth weighing their benefits against their limits and long-term consequences. For policymakers and businesses alike, understanding these dynamics is critical to making informed decisions and managing risk.

You can find out more about here

Key takeaways:

• • • The Strait of Hormuz crisis threatens a global recession 鈥� The effective closure of the Strait, which is being driven more by insurance withdrawal and risk perception than a physical blockade, has effectively halted roughly 20% of global petroleum flow. If this disruptions persist beyond 30 days, economic modeling points to overwhelming recession risk for major importing economies, with oil potentially reaching $100 to $200 per barrel depending on severity.

    • The world is facing an unprecedented dual-chokepoint shipping crisis 鈥� With the Strait of Hormuz effectively shut and the Houthis resuming attacks on the Suez/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, roughly one-third of global seaborne crude trade is compromised simultaneously. All five major container lines have suspended Hormuz transits, and the cascading delays will hit supply chains far beyond the Middle East, including those companies with no direct Gulf exposure.

    • Companies that act now will fare far better than those that wait 鈥� Supply chain disruptions propagate on a lag of two to four weeks, meaning that the pain from today’s anchored tankers hasn’t arrived yet. Businesses should immediately audit their Gulf supply chain exposure, secure alternative freight capacity before it disappears, and prepare for a significant escalation in cyber threats from Iran and its allies.

Just days into the largest military operation undertaken by the United States since the 2003 Iraq invasion, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered the most severe energy supply disruption since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The conflict with Iran has removed roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude from global markets and sent oil prices to above $80 as of press time. The conflict’s trajectory over the coming weeks will determine whether the world faces a manageable price shock or a full-blown recession.

How we got here

The February 28 strikes order by President Donald J. Trump followed weeks of negotiations around Iran鈥檚 nuclear program that ended without a deal just two days before the strikes began. Administration officials have since acknowledged that the timing was driven in part by Israel’s plans to strike Iran independently.

Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, age 86, along with his defense minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and approximately 5 to 10 senior Iranian officials, died in the opening salvo of the operation.

Even after the destruction of a large segment of Iran鈥檚 senior leadership, the war continues on. Hezbollah launched a rocket strike on March 3 with Israel initiating a ground invasion of Lebanon in response. Iran’s retaliation has extended across the region as drone and missile strikes have hit targets across Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Bahrain, while the US Embassy compounds in both Kuwait and Riyadh have been struck directly. Six American service members have been killed thus far.

Indeed, the regional escalation has given Iran the context to play one of the most feared cards in its arsenal 鈥� and one with the potential to throw an already fragile global economy into recession.

On March 2, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, vowing to attack any ship trying to pass through the strait. An European Union official said that began receiving VHF radio transmissions from the IRGC stating that no ships would be permitted to pass.

Ship-tracking data based on the MarineTraffic platform showed at least 150 tankers 鈥� crude oil and LNG vessels (those specifically built to transport liquefied natural gas 鈥� anchored in open Gulf waters. At least five tankers have been struck near the Strait, including one off Oman that was set ablaze, while the US-flagged tanker Stena Imperative was hit by two projectiles near Bahrain. On March 2, Marine insurers Gard, Skuld, and NorthStandard stated publicly they would effective March 5. One day later, four more of the 12 global insurance groups joined them, with London P&I Club, American Club, Steamship Mutual, and Swedish Club announcing similar moves.

Energy markets absorb the most severe supply shock in years

In light of 20 million barrels per day of crude being frozen out of the global markets, brent crude surged as much as 13% before settling at $83 per barrel, while WTI crude jumped to $76 at press time 鈥� both at their highest levels since the June 2025 conflict. Further, that several major oil companies and trading houses suspended shipments through the Strait as soon as strikes began.

“Unless de-escalation signals emerge swiftly, we expect a significant upward repricing of oil,” said , head of the company鈥檚 geopolitical analysis, citing the immediate impact of halting of traffic through Hormuz. UBS analysts warned clients that a material disruption scenario could send brent crude above $120 per barrel, while Barclays projected $100 per barrel as increasingly plausible. Just twenty-four hours later, that range has widened considerably. Goldman Sachs now models $120 to $150 per barrel in a prolonged war, JPMorgan sees $120 if the war lasts beyond three weeks, and Deutsche Bank’s worst-case approaches $200 if Iran mines the Strait.

OPEC+ announced a modest 206,000 barrel per day output increase for April, but as Le贸n told Reuters, markets are now more concerned with whether barrels can physically move than with spare capacity on paper. If Gulf export routes remain constrained, additional production provides limited immediate relief.

Global shipping faces an unprecedented dual-chokepoint crisis

While the energy supply shock is severe, it is only one dimension of a broader shipping disruption that has no modern precedent. For the first time in history, two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints are simultaneously compromised 鈥� the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, the latter under renewed threat after the Houthis announced they would resume attacks. Together, these two passages that connect Asia to Europe handle roughly one-third of the global seaborne crude oil trade and a significant share of containerized cargo. All five major container lines 鈥� Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and COSCO 鈥� have suspended or halted transits through Hormuz and are rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyage times.

The practical consequences for businesses extend well beyond higher shipping costs. The rerouting absorbs vessel capacity that was already stretched thin, meaning delays will cascade across trade lanes that have no direct connection to the Middle East. Companies that source components from Asia, ship finished goods to Europe, or depend on just-in-time inventory models should expect weeks 鈥� not days 鈥� of compounding delays.

Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi 鈥� three of the world’s busiest air cargo hubs 鈥� are also facing disruptions, meaning the usual fallback of shifting urgent shipments to air freight is itself constrained. For affected companies, the window to secure alternative routing and lock in freight capacity is closing fast; those companies that wait for the March 5 insurance deadline to pass before acting will find themselves competing for scarce logistics options in a market where scarcity is already the defining feature.

3 scenarios and their divergent economic consequences

There are three most likely scenarios as this conflict unfolds, each with their own challenges and potential outcomes:

Scenario 1: Rapid regime collapse and quick normalization

Credible but unlikely in the near term, this scenario banks on the fact that Iran’s opposition is real 鈥� the protest movement of the last year or so has been the largest since 1979, and the regime’s legitimacy has been severely eroded by economic collapse and violent crackdowns. If internal collapse occurs, energy markets would normalize rapidly.

Brent crude would likely retreat to the $70 to $75 range within weeks as the primary disruption drivers 鈥� fear and insurance withdrawal, not physical blockade 鈥� dissipates. Tanker traffic would resume once insurers restore war-risk coverage.

Scenario 2: Prolonged conflict, Strait mostly reopened

This is the most likely outcome based on available analysis. Energy Aspects founder Amrita Sen said she expects oil prices to , noting it is unlikely Iran could maintain a complete closure. She assessed that the US and Israel possess the military capability to neutralize Iran’s ability to fully shut down the Strait but acknowledged that sporadic attacks on individual vessels are far harder to prevent.

This is the critical distinction: A full blockade is unsustainable against US naval superiority, but one-off tanker strikes create an insurance and risk environment that chills commercial traffic almost as effectively. In this scenario, oil prices remain very high before gradually declining as the U.S. Navy establishes escort operations and mine clearance, with an open question revolving around insurance companies鈥� willingness to insure floating barrels of flammable liquid sailing into an open warzone, even under escort. Asian refiners face weeks of constrained supply access.

Scenario 3: Sustained Strait closure for weeks or months

This is the catastrophic tail risk. Roughly 20% of global petroleum consumption and significant LNG volumes moves through the Strait daily, representing an estimated $500 billion in annual energy trade. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Fujairah pipeline offer bypass capacity, but these routes can absorb only a fraction of the 15 million barrels per day now stranded.

Capital Economics estimated that a sustained $100 crude price could add to global inflation. And UBS warned that if disruptions extend beyond three weeks, Gulf producers could exhaust storage capacity and be forced to shut in output, pushing brent crude into the $100 to $120 range if not substantially higher if a significant blockade is held for a long duration.

The economic modeling is unambiguous, however, showing that disruption beyond 30 days carries overwhelming recession risk for major importing economies.

What companies should be doing right now

Of course, the economic impact of this conflict will not arrive all at once. Supply chain disruptions propagate on a lag 鈥� the tankers anchored outside Hormuz today represent goods and energy that won’t arrive at their destinations in two to four weeks. Companies that wait until these shortages materialize before they develop contingency plans will find themselves competing for scarce alternatives alongside everyone else. The window to act is now, not when the pain becomes visible.

Audit your supply chain exposure immediately

Any inputs, components, or raw materials that originate from or move through the Persian Gulf are at risk 鈥� and that extends well beyond oil. For example, one-third of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning agricultural and chemical supply chains face disruption as well.

Business leaders should identify their companies鈥� Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers that have Gulf exposure, assess existing inventory buffers, and begin conversations with alternative suppliers before demand for those alternatives spikes. And companies with operations dependent on Middle Eastern air hubs 鈥� such as Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi 鈥� should assume they鈥檒l face weeks of disruption to business travel and cargo routing and therefore plan accordingly.

Prepare for a serious escalation in cyber threats

Iran and its allies 鈥� including Russia, which has condemned the strikes and has well-documented cyberwarfare capabilities 鈥� have historically used cyber operations as an asymmetric response to kinetic military action. Indeed, there are signs already emerging that such actions are already taking place.

US critical infrastructure, financial services, and professional services firms are all plausible targets. The steps to prevent this are straightforward but urgent: Companies need to ensure that multi-factor authentication is enforced across all systems, verify that endpoint detection and backup protocols are current, brief employees on heightened phishing and social engineering risks, and confirm that incident response plans are not just documented but actually ready to be exercised.

The cost of preparation is negligible; the cost of a ransomware attack or data breach during a period of global economic stress is not.

Peering through the fog of war

As the conflict鈥檚 economic aftershocks move from risk to reality, the companies that act decisively now by diversifying supply chains, securing logistics, and hardening defenses will not just weather the disruption, but emerge more resilient whatever the outcome.

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Key insights:

• • • The Supreme Court decisively limited presidential tariff power under IEEPA鈥擳he decision held that the statute鈥檚 authority to 鈥渞egulate importation鈥� does not include the power to impose tariffs, especially absent clear congressional authorization for actions of major economic significance.

    • The ruling creates major uncertainty around refunds of already鈥憄aid IEEPA tariffs鈥� There is more than $175 billion potentially at stake and no clear, orderly mechanism yet for determining who is entitled to refunds or how they will be administered.

    • Tariffs are not ending but shifting to slower, more constrained legal authorities 鈥� As the administration pivots to statutes like Sections 232 and 301 that impose procedural hurdles and limits, it is likely to result in continued trade volatility rather than relief for businesses.

In a 6鈥�3 ruling handed down February 20 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize President Donald Trump to impose tariffs. For businesses that have spent the past year navigating a dizzying storm of rate changes, exemptions, and modifications 鈥� sometimes shifting within days of each other 鈥� the ruling offers a measure of vindication.

However, don’t exhale just yet. The decision is likely to produce more confusion and instability in the near term, not less. The IEEPA tariffs may be legally dead, but the trade policy fight is very much alive, the refund process is an open question, and the administration is already pivoting to Plan B. For businesses trying to plan around a coherent trade regime, the ground has shifted again 鈥� it just shifted in a different direction.

Shortly after the announcement of the Supreme Court鈥檚 ruling, President Trump announced that his is planning to invoke new trade authorities and potentially levy new, across-the-board tariff on US trading partners. As of press time, the White House declined further comment but had tentatively scheduled a news conference for later Friday afternoon.

Here’s what happened, what it means, and what comes next.

The Court鈥檚 ruling

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, framed the case around a simple but consequential question: Can two words 鈥� regulate and importation, separated by 16 other words in IEEPA’s text 鈥� support President Trump’s claim to his ability to impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope on imports from any country?

The answer, from the Court鈥檚 majority is No.

The Court’s reasoning proceeded along two tracks. First, three justices 鈥� Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett 鈥� invoked the major questions doctrine, the principle being that executive actions of vast economic and political significance require clear congressional authorization. They found none in the IEEPA. As Roberts wrote, the President must “point to clear congressional authorization” to justify his assertion of tariff power. “He cannot.”

If the past year has taught businesses anything about trade policy, it’s that certainty is now a luxury item.

Second, and commanding a full six-justice majority, the Court worked through IEEPA’s text and concluded that the word regulate simply does not encompass the power to tax. The U.S. Code is full of statutes authorizing agencies to regulate various things, but the government, in its arguments before the Court, could not identify a single one in which that power has been understood to include taxation. In one of the opinion’s sharpest lines, the majority expressed skepticism “that in IEEPA 鈥� and IEEPA alone 鈥� Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotidian power to ‘regulate.'”

What the ruling does not say

Here is where businesses may need to pay close attention: The Court said nothing about refunds of tariffs already paid.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, writing in dissent, flagged the looming chaos directly. “The Court’s decision is likely to generate other serious practical consequences in the near term,鈥� Justice Kavanaugh wrote. 鈥淩efunds of billions of dollars would have significant consequences for the U.S. Treasury鈥� . [T]hat process is likely to be a ‘mess’鈥� . Because IEEPA tariffs have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of dollars鈥� the Court’s decision could generate uncertainty regarding various trade agreements.”

Check out for more on the Supreme Court鈥檚 tariff decision here

That mess is now a real, operational problem. There is more than $175 billion in IEEPA tariff collections at risk, according to a estimate released today. Nearly 1,000 companies had already filed preemptive refund claims with the Court of International Trade (CIT) before today’s ruling. Indeed, the CIT has indicated it has jurisdiction to order reliquidation and refunds, and the government has stipulated it won’t challenge that authority.

However, the mechanics 鈥� who gets paid back, how much, and when 鈥� remain deeply uncertain. Some importers passed tariff costs downstream to their customers or absorbed them into pricing adjustments that can’t easily be unwound. For many businesses, the refund question will be less a windfall than a logistical headache.

What the Administration might do next

Make no mistake, the White House took a significant blow today. The IEEPA was the administration’s most flexible and powerful tariff instrument and the tool that let the President impose duties instantaneously, on any trading partner, at any rate, with no procedural prerequisites. That tool is now gone.

However, as mentioned, the administration signaled immediately that it intends an end-around in order to keep as many tariffs in place as possible. the United States would invoke alternative legal authorities, including Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (national security tariffs), Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (unfair trade practices), and other statutory provisions. None of these alternatives offer the speed and blunt-force flexibility that the IEEPA provided, however, and they may not replicate the full scope of the current tariff regime in a timely fashion.

Shortly after the announcement of the Supreme Court鈥檚 ruling, President Trump announced that his is planning to invoke new trade authorities and potentially levy new, across-the-board tariff on US trading partners.

Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, notably, conceded the point while framing it sympathetically: “In essence, the Court today concludes that the President checked the wrong statutory box by relying on IEEPA rather than another statute to impose these tariffs.”

That framing understates the practical significance. The alternative statutes each come with procedural requirements 鈥� agency investigations, public hearings, durational limits, rate caps 鈥� that IEEPA’s emergency framework did not impose. Section 122, for instance, caps tariffs at 15% for 150 days. Section 232 requires an investigation and report from the U.S. a Commerce Department. Section 301 demands a formal determination by the U.S. Trade Representative. These are not insurmountable hurdles of course, but they are hurdles and they will take time.

What businesses should do now

If the past year has taught businesses anything about trade policy, it’s that certainty is now a luxury item. Today’s ruling doesn’t change that; rather, it just changes the axis of uncertainty. Here’s what any organization impacted by trade should be thinking about:

• • Review your tariff exposure immediately 鈥� Understand which of your import duties were collected under IEEPA authority compared to the other statutes (Sections 232, 301, 201). Only IEEPA tariffs are affected by today’s Court ruling. Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, autos, and other goods remain fully in place, as do Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports. For many importers, a significant portion of their tariff burden will not change. For others, it may change everything.
  • Engage trade counsel on refund claims 鈥� If you’ve paid IEEPA duties, the clock is ticking. The CIT has a two-year statute of limitations on refund claims, running from the date the tariffs were published. For the earliest IEEPA tariffs (the fentanyl-related duties on Canada, Mexico, and China from February 2025, for example), that window is already narrowing. If you haven’t filed a protective claim yet, consult with counsel now.
  • Prepare for replacement tariffs 鈥� The administration has made clear it intends to reimpose tariffs under alternative authorities. Thus, the effective tariff rate is not going to 0%. Even without IEEPA tariffs, estimates suggest the average rate would settle around 9%, still far above the roughly 2% that prevailed before the beginning of President Trump’s second term. Businesses should map out scenarios to plan for a period in which IEEPA tariffs are lifted but gradually replaced by duties under other statutes, potentially with different rates, different product coverage, and different country-specific treatment.
  • Monitor trade deal stability 鈥� Many of the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements negotiated over the past year 鈥� with the United Kingdome, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and others 鈥� were structured around tariff levels built greatly upon the IEEPA. The legal basis for those arrangements is now uncertain. Watch for renegotiations, modifications, or lapses in these existing frameworks.
  • Build flexibility into supply chain planning 鈥� This is the hardest and most important advice. The trade policy environment is not returning to a stable equilibrium anytime soon. Today’s ruling is the end of one chapter, but the broader story 鈥� of a political system wrestling with how much tariff authority the President should have 鈥� is far from over. The administration will test the boundaries of its remaining statutory tools. And the courts will almost certainly be called upon again.

Taking in the bigger picture

For businesses, the practical takeaway from today鈥檚 Court order is more pedestrian but no less important: Strap in. The tariff landscape is shifting again, the refund process will be complicated, and the administration will find another way to pursue its trade objectives. Today brought clarity on the law, but clarity on the market is still a long way off.

For more on the impact of tariffs, you can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent听听here