Key takeaways:

• • • Stability is the story 鈥� The OBBB’s main value has been predictability for business planning, not sweeping new rules 鈥� a sharp contrast to the disruption of prior major tax legislation like the TCJA.

    • Section 1202 is a live opportunity 鈥� The expanded QSBS exclusion has reopened planning conversations around corporate structuring that had cooled in recent years.

    • Plan for both today and tomorrow 鈥� Practitioners should help clients capitalize on current certainty while preserving flexibility, and they should help clients build tax positions that can hold up to increasingly AI-powered IRS scrutiny.

When major tax legislation lands, the instinct is to brace for upheaval. But one year after the passage of the (OBBB) Act, the consensus among practitioners is notably different: The OBBB didn鈥檛 rewrite the rules so much as confirm them, and that distinction has mattered more than it might sound.

Certainty over seismic change

Unlike the (TCJA) 鈥� which was passed in 2017, mostly took effect the following year, and forced practitioners to relearn much of the code 鈥� the OBBB’s significance lies less in what it changed and more in what it settled. It gave businesses a stable set of rules to plan against, rather than a moving target to which to react.

“From a purely tax lens, it was… easier to unpack than in prior years because there are fewer seismic changes,鈥� says , Partner at Plante Moran, reflecting on the past year under the OBBB. 鈥淚t was providing a lot of clarity that just [meant], at least for the next several years, we had the rules.”

That clarity is not a small thing. Multi-year business decisions 鈥� around such big-ticket items as entity structuring, capital investment, and succession planning 鈥� depend on practitioners being able to tell clients that the rules will hold. Thus, OBBB’s real contribution was buying back that predictability.

Section 1202 comes back to life

If one provision captures the OBBB’s practical impact, it’s the revitalization of 鈥� the qualified small business stock (QSBS) gain exclusion. The expansion of this program has done more than simply adjust a technical detail; indeed, it has reopened a whole category of planning conversations that had gone quiet.

“The action around the qualified small business stock gain exclusion… has really reinvigorated the Section 1202 planning conversations,鈥� Eckert explains. 鈥淯ltimately, what we got was an expansion of the program. So, what that has done is reinvigorated those conversations around planning into corporate structures.”

For founders, investors, and the tax advisors who serve them, that means is back on the table 鈥� and often earlier in a company’s lifecycle than before, since the incentive to structure correctly from the outset is now more valuable.

A new kind of advisory opportunity

Of course, stability doesn’t mean passivity. If anything, the OBBB has expanded what tax professionals can offer clients. With a known set of rules, advisors can move beyond compliance and into genuine strategy by helping clients maximize their position under current law while still preparing for the fact that today’s certainty has a shelf life.

That balance 鈥� seize the moment, but don’t get comfortable 鈥� is a concept that isn鈥檛 lost on many tax specialists. “Maximize your opportunities today but also have a long-term view while having flexibility and preserving flexibility wherever you can, and knowing and anticipating that there could be future changes,” Eckert says, framing this moment as a broader opening for the profession, not just a technical one.

Legislative clarity, he argues, gives practitioners a reason to go deeper with clients than simply processing the next filing. “From a practitioner lens, I think [legislative changes] are a huge opportunity… giving us an opportunity to really bring value to our clients and to also get to know our clients better,鈥� he notes. 鈥淚t’s been, in a certain sense, a great opportunity to just build deeper relationships.”

In other words, the firms getting the most out of this environment aren’t the ones treating the OBBB as a compliance checklist; rather, they’re the ones using it as a reason to have a better conversation with clients about where they’re headed.

The IRS isn’t standing still either

The one area in which practitioners should definitely not get comfortable is enforcement. A smaller IRS workforce doesn’t mean lighter scrutiny 鈥� it likely means a different kind. As the agency leans more heavily on AI-driven tools, its ability to examine returns at scale is set to expand even as headcount contracts.

“I think across the board, we’re certainly aware of that and are counseling clients on the need to establish and build positions and think carefully about it,鈥� Eckert explains. 鈥淚n a world of AI-enabled tools, the scrutiny may actually increase, and the ability for the IRS to quickly and efficiently examine lots of data is something that could certainly exist.”

That means that tax advisors need to help their clients build positions that can withstand more sophisticated review, not less. Meticulous documentation and defensible reasoning matter more, not less, in an environment in which fewer human examiners can still cover more ground with better tools.

One year in, the OBBB’s legacy isn’t a story of dramatic reform, but rather it’s a story of tax firms and their clients finally getting room to plan. The tax advisors making the most of that room are the ones using it to build sharper strategies and deeper client relationships, all while keeping an eye on an IRS that’s quietly getting more capable of deeper examination.

You can find more of听our coverage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act听here

Key takeaways:

• • • The deal isn’t dead, but it’s not settled either 鈥� USMCA stays in force for now, but the refusal by the US to confirm a 16-year extension triggers rolling annual reviews, with a hard expiration in 2036 if no resolution is reached.

    • Auto rules of origin are the central battleground 鈥� Washington is pushing to raise North American content requirements well above the current 75% threshold, with a specific push for more US-based final assembly and parts production.

    • Uncertainty itself is a cost 鈥� Automakers make multibillion-dollar, multi-decade plant and supply-chain investments, and not knowing what the rules will look like next year (let alone in 2036) makes those bets harder to justify.

On July 1 鈥� the sixth anniversary of the United State-Mexico-Canada Agreement听(USMCA), taking effect 鈥� the United States, Mexico, and Canada were required under the agreement’s to jointly decide whether to extend the pact for another 16 years. The U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, announced that the Trump Administration would not agree to renew USMCA in its current form, citing persistent US trade deficits with both neighbors and what the administration considers 鈥渦nresolved shortcomings鈥� in the deal. The move by the US pushed the North American trade pact into a new period of annual reviews and extended negotiations over tariffs, market access, and manufacturing rules.

This isn’t a withdrawal; indeed, the agreement will remain in force for another decade, providing that none of the three countries exits the agreement. However, the lack of a clean renewal opens the door to years of contentious negotiations over the rules governing continent-wide supply chains. Both Canada and Mexico had favored a straightforward 16-year extension, but the US was unwilling to sign off without changes.

Why automakers are ground zero

No sector is more exposed to this outcome than automotive manufacturing. Vehicles and parts routinely cross the borders of the US, Mexico, and Canada multiple times before final assembly, a pattern built up since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) first opened North American auto trade in 1994, and the sector alone accounts for roughly 18% of all trade among the three countries.

At the heart of the dispute is the 鈥� the share of a vehicle’s value that must originate in North America to qualify for duty-free treatment. USMCA currently sets that threshold at 75% for passenger vehicles and light trucks, up from 62.5% under the old NAFTA rules. The Trump administration is reportedly seeking to push that figure to 82%, with half of that value required to come specifically from the United States 鈥� a change aimed squarely at pulling more engine, transmission, and assembly work back across the border.

That shift likely would ripple through the industry unevenly. The annual from American University’s Kogod School of Business, which tracks US content in vehicles annually, found that only 109 models are estimated to hit 51% or more US content for its upcoming index, down from 123 the year before 鈥� a sign of how far the current supply chain sits from any tightened standard. As one researcher involved in that analysis explains, automakers will ultimately have to weigh absorbing new tariff costs against relocating engine, transmission, and component production 鈥� or even entire assembly plants 鈥� into the United States.

have largely tried to protect the status quo rather than push for disruption. General Motors, Ford, and Stellantis have publicly urged Washington to extend the existing agreement, arguing it’s essential to American production, even as they privately brace for the possibility of major changes. Stellantis has also warned regulators about a separate risk: If US rules don’t keep pace with vehicles imported from outside North America, American-built models will keep losing ground to Asian imports, to the detriment of US autoworkers.

Managing the uncertainty tax

Perhaps the most immediate effect isn’t a specific rule change 鈥� it’s the absence of a deadline forcing one. that the decision doesn’t immediately change the flow of goods and services across North America, but it could weigh on business planning, particularly in industries that depend on long-term capital commitments.

Scott Lincicome of the Cato Institute, for example, pointed to exactly this risk, telling that the resulting uncertainty could weigh on investment decisions, which matters enormously for an industry that plans plant investments, supplier contracts, and vehicle platforms on five- and ten-year horizons.

There’s also a geopolitical wrinkle shaping the negotiations reflected in a growing concern in Washington over Chinese-made components entering North American supply chains through Mexico. Lawmakers have already proposed legislation directing US trade officials to prioritize protecting USMCA from Chinese investment during the review, which could translate into rules disqualifying vehicles that use components tied to Chinese state actors.

What happens next with the USMCA?

Formal bilateral talks between the US and Mexico are continuing, while US-Canada negotiations have barely begun. The US and Mexico are set to meet again the week of July 20 for a third round of bilateral negotiations tied to the joint review. Barring a breakthrough, expect this to become a recurring headline 鈥� another review, another round of tariff and rules-of-origin brinkmanship, repeated annually until either a deal is struck or the clock runs out in 2036.

For automakers, the message is less about any single new rule and more about planning in an environment in which the ground can shift every year. That’s a very different operating reality than the one the industry built its North American footprint on over the past three decades.

You can find out more about the USMCA and the challenges it faces here

Key insights:

• • • Sect. 301 and IEEPA tariffs operate on fundamentally different legal foundations 鈥� The IEEPA tariffs flow from an executive emergency declaration that can be unwound overnight, while Sect. 301 findings are built on a formal evidentiary record that can survive numerous administrations.

    • Those manufacturers that diversified away from China now face compounded exposure 鈥� The countries to which many manufactured moved their trade operations 鈥� including Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, and Malaysia 鈥� are now named in the recent Sect. 301 action.

    • Managing this complexity without purpose-built tools is no longer realistic 鈥� The need for access to quality vendor data, tariff classifications, country-of-origin mapping, and duty layering requires systems that can be updated continuously, not spreadsheets that are reviewed quarterly.

Since early 2025, manufacturers have lived in a tariff environment defined by volatility that鈥檚 been dictated seemingly at the whim of the United States. Rates announced one week were paused the next, country-specific deals emerged from diplomatic calls, and 90-day exemptions became the operating rhythm. For supply chain teams, the rational response was to treat every new tariff as provisional 鈥� something to monitor, not necessarily something to plan around.

That logic does not apply to the of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), under听Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974听that a list of 60 economies 鈥� comprising the largest US trading partners 鈥� had failed to enforce a ban on goods produced with forced labor听are therefore were听restrictive to US trade.

To understand why, it actually requires and how it compares to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which the Trump Administration had used as its authority behind the 2025 reciprocal tariffs until that was disallowed .

Unlike the IEEPA, Sect. 301 is not an executive power that turns on or off depending on when a national emergency is declared. Rather, it is a statutory framework that requires the USTR to conduct a formal investigation, gather evidence, hold public hearings, and build a record before making an actionability determination. In the June 2 action alone, the USTR received testimony from nearly 60 witnesses and almost 500 public comments before issuing its findings.

That record matters, because it is what makes tariffs issued in response to Sect. 301 findings structurally resistant to reversal. Unwinding them requires either a new formal determination, a negotiated bilateral resolution in which the trading partner actually changes its practices, or Congressional action. A new administration cannot simply issue a presidential order lifting them because the legal bar is categorically higher.

And this distinction is no longer theoretical. After the Supreme Court ruled his tariffs invalid, President Trump immediately pivoting to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which permits a temporary global surcharge of up to 15% for no more than 150 days. That took effect February 24, and is set to expire July 24, unless extended by Congress. Tariffs imposed because of the June 2 Sect. 301 findings were never exposed to the same legal vulnerability and is now the administration’s primary vehicle for building durable tariff authority.

There is also a political dimension that compounds the durability. The June 2 findings are grounded specifically the failure of the named economies to prohibit the importation of goods made with forced labor. That framing carries broad bipartisan support in Washington, and neither party is positioned to argue against forced labor prohibitions, which means the political incentive to reverse these tariffs is far weaker than it was for the IEEPA-based tariffs.

The compounded exposure problem

For manufacturers that spent 2024 and 2025 diversifying their supply chains away from the tariff-heavy China, the June 2 findings create a specific and uncomfortable problem. The most common destinations for that diversification 鈥� Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 鈥� are all named in USTR’s recent action. Proposed additional duties of 10% to 12.5% would layer on top of existing duties and any Sect. 122 tariffs still in place during the transition period.

In other words, the move that looked like risk mitigation then may now carry its own tariff exposure now 鈥� and unlike the situation in 2025, there is no obvious alternative jurisdiction.

That means vendor management systems that integrate tariff data in real time 鈥� pulling current duty rates by code, flagging country-of-origin changes, modeling landed cost across multiple sourcing scenarios 鈥� are no longer a competitive advantage. Now they are a baseline operational requirement. The same applies to supplier compliance documentation. As forced labor attestations become relevant to exclusion eligibility under Sect. 301, having those records organized, current, and accessible is not an audit-readiness question, rather, it鈥檚 a cost-of-goods question.

Then, the practical challenge for manufacturers becomes an operational one, not just a strategic one. Tracking tariff exposure across dozens of suppliers, multiple countries of origin, layered duty structures, and evolving classification rules is not a task that can be easily scaled with traditional tools. For example, in the 24 hours following the Supreme Court鈥檚 tariff ruling, the US terminated one tariff regime, enacted a replacement under a different statute, and announced the launch of multiple new Sect. 301 investigations. A manufacturer鈥檚 spreadsheet that鈥檚 updated monthly cannot keep pace with a regulatory environment moving at that speed.

The durable lesson

The IEEPA tariff experience trained supply chain teams to stay nimble 鈥� and then demonstrated exactly how fragile executive-action tariffs can be when the Supreme Court invalidated them. That instinct toward flexibility still has value, of course; however, the Sect. 301 framework requires a parallel capability that requires manufacturers to recognize when a tariff is structural, model its long-term cost impact, and adapt sourcing and vendor strategies accordingly.

These new Sect. 301-based tariffs are not a negotiating position waiting to be resolved. They are a legal determination, built on a formal record, grounded in a cause 鈥� the elimination of forced labor from global supply chains 鈥� that has strong consensus across the political spectrum.

Those manufacturers that plan around them as permanent while investing in the tools to manage that complexity in real time will be better positioned than those waiting for the next exemption announcement.

You can find out more about how tariffs continue to impact global trade here

Key takeaways:

• • • The 2027 end date is not a runway 鈥� The One Big Beautiful Bill sets a statutory de minimis end date of July 1, 2027, but its own legislative history explicitly preserves the president鈥檚 authority to restrict it before that date. Sellers banking on a two-year transition period are reading the headline, not the fine print.

    • The Supreme Court win didn鈥檛 save the refunds 鈥� The Supreme Court鈥檚 IEEPA decision was real, but the administration switched legal authority to Section 1321 and kept the suspension running. Combined with congressional cover from the One Big Beautiful Bill, the path to recovering tariffs already paid is genuinely uncertain 鈥� not just delayed.

    • The refund clock just reset 鈥� The lead test case for processing refunds through CBP鈥檚 KAPE system, Atmos, just settled, forcing the process to restart with a new test case. Sellers waiting on refunds are further back in the queue than they realize.

Most e-commerce merchants couldn鈥檛 have told you what de minimis meant two years ago 鈥� mostly because they didn鈥檛 need to. It was the invisible infrastructure of cross-border trade, the threshold below which imported goods pass through customs without duties or taxes. And in the United States, that threshold sat at $800. For small online sellers sourcing internationally, it wasn鈥檛 a technicality 鈥� it was their business model. Now, that model is over.

De minimis was deliberate trade policy built on simple logic: the cost of collecting duties on a $25 phone case exceeds the revenue it generates. Let low-value goods flow freely, the thinking went, and e-commerce would grow 鈥� and it did.

The Trump administration鈥檚 first moves targeted Canada, Mexico, and China on fentanyl-related grounds. Then came Executive Order 14324, suspending duty-free de minimis for all countries effective August 29, 2025. Sellers who had never filed a customs entry suddenly had to file informal entries for goods valued up to $2,500 鈥� and pay tariffs on every single one. Last count, that has meant $175 billion in tariffs paid annually, with small shipments accounting for roughly 63% of that.

The legal basis for Trump鈥檚 tariffs 鈥� the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 鈥� went to the Supreme Court, which constrained presidential authority to pass these tariffs. Many sellers took that as a signal that tariff refunds were coming 鈥� they shouldn鈥檛 have.

Then came the legislative layer that changed everything. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) 鈥� H.R. 1, now law 鈥� codifies the end of de minimis under Title 19 with a statutory end date of July 1, 2027. Buried in the legislative history, however, is language explicitly stating that nothing in the bill limits the president鈥檚 existing authority to restrict de minimis before that date. The current suspension has congressional cover, meaning that any court challenge faces a much tighter call than it would have had a year ago.

What most sellers are getting wrong

What鈥檚 making matters worse, however, is that many small e-commerce merchants may not fully understand all the nuances of the laws and regulations they are trying to navigate. Indeed, there are certain aspects of the situation that many are getting wrong, including:

The 2027 date is a headline, not a lifeline 鈥� When the ne Big Beautiful Bill passed with a July 1, 2027, , many sellers assumed they had a transition period 鈥� time to adjust pricing, renegotiate supplier terms, and build a compliance infrastructure. Buried in House Report 119-106, however, is language explicitly stating that nothing in the bill limits the president鈥檚 existing authority to restrict de minimis before that date. Congress didn鈥檛 create breathing room; rather, it codified the end while leaving the accelerator fully intact. The 2027 date is when de minimis ends by law. Indeed, it could end sooner 鈥� and effectively already has.

The Supreme Court decision didn鈥檛 unlock refunds 鈥� The Court鈥檚 IEEPA ruling was significant, but the administration鈥檚 response was swift: reimposed the suspension of tariffs under Section 1321 authority as of February 24. The tariff meter never stopped; and now, with the OBBBA鈥檚 legislative history providing congressional cover, the 鈥� which specifically addresses whether sellers are entitled to refunds in the de minimis context 鈥� faces a much harder statutory construction argument than it would have a year ago. This may mean that the Supreme Court win was a legal victory that may not translate into money back.

The refund process just lost its test case 鈥� For sellers hoping to recover duties paid, the most practical path was through the KAPE system run by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 鈥� a workaround allowing refund claims to feed directly into an听听for verification. The lead case proving out that process, , just settled. Now, the trade legal community has to start over with a new test case, and nobody knows how long that is going to take. Sellers who filed protests rather than complaints at the Court of International Trade (CIT) are in a particularly difficult position 鈥� protests have time limits, and the CBP is under court order to re-liquidate open ones. Which legal bucket your entries fall into matters enormously right now.

The bottom line

The de minimis era enabled a generation of small merchants to compete globally on terms that would have been unimaginable 20 years ago. Its sunset doesn鈥檛 mean the end of cross-border e-commerce 鈥� but it does mean the end of operating on assumptions. The 2027 date, the Supreme Court decision, the refund process 鈥� each looked like relief and turned out to be more complicated than the headline suggested.

E-commerce merchants impacted by these de minimis developments need to talk to a trade attorney 鈥� not for the basics, but to understand where your claims stand, whether your protest strategy is still viable, and what the Atmus settlement means for you.

The storm isn鈥檛 over 鈥� and it may be more complicated than most sellers have been told.

For more on this, please tune into the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 鈥淐larity鈥� podcast, featuring , about the challenges facing small e-commerce merchants today

Key insights:

• • • Tariffs erode supply chain integrity, not just margins 鈥� Rapid policy shifts can destabilize manufacturers鈥� supplier relationships, customs compliance, and production networks.

    • Unpredictability is the real threat 鈥� Changing duty rates and exemptions undermine forecasting and inventory planning, creating bottlenecks that ripple across customer commitments.

    • Adaptation beats anticipation 鈥� Leading manufacturers aren’t waiting for policy clarity, rather they鈥檙e adapting to the uncertain environment now.

Tariffs have presented significant challenges for manufacturers, increasing input costs and undermining the stability of global supply chains. During the Trump administration, tariffs have become a focal point in debates over the broader economic implications of trade policy. Since 2025, has included a 10% minimum global tariff on a broad range of imports, additional measures targeting China, and various product- and country-specific actions 鈥� all developments that have reshaped corporate sourcing strategies and international trade planning.

In February, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in听 marked a pivotal shift in trade authority. By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that the President lacked the constitutional authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, emphasizing that such measures constitute taxes and are therefore within exclusive legislative domain of the U.S. Congress. The ruling invalidated many tariffs implemented by President Trump in 2025, providing some legal clarity while also raising questions about the future of US trade policy. Although the decision limits executive power, uncertainty still persists regarding how Congress will exercise its reasserted authority and what new legislative or trade measures may follow in such a dynamic and uncertain economic environment.

This Supreme Court’s ruling does not eliminate tariffs but rather shifts their governance by curtailing unilateral executive authority under IEEPA and reasserting Congress’s constitutional role in setting tax and customs policy. That means, of course, that tariffs will not disappear but instead will become more politically negotiated and legislatively codified. For supply chain leaders, this introduces a different kind of uncertainty that will be rooted in legislative timelines, committee negotiations, and the potential for prolonged policy stalemates.

Indeed, it鈥檚 unclear whether tariffs imposed through statute will prove more durable and harder to reverse than those enacted via executive order. Ultimately, this legal shift underscores the need for manufacturers to take a proactive adaptation and not one of complacency.

For corporate risk professionals, particularly those within manufacturing companies, these developments carry substantial implications. Tariffs extend beyond increasing import prices and affect profitability, workforce planning, and long-term supply chain resilience. They introduce volatility into customs procedures, supplier qualification, cross-border logistics, and production network design. When trade rules change rapidly, as they have in recent months, the integrity of global supply chains is increasingly difficult to maintain.

Why tariffs hit supply chain integrity so hard

In a global supply chain, every cross-border movement is governed by import and export rules set by the countries involved. Tariffs change those economics immediately, and they also trigger a chain reaction that ripples through sourcing, logistics, compliance, and planning. For example, the (CBP) has had to issue repeated implementation updates on new tariff actions, including guidance tied to imports from China, Canada, and Mexico, underscoring how quickly operating conditions can change for importers. That creates several clear risks to supply chain integrity.

One of the first impacts is on supplier relationships. When tariffs make a sourcing region less viable, manufacturers are often forced to move away from long-established suppliers and instead quickly on-board alternatives in lower-tariff markets. That may reduce immediate cost pressure, but it can also weaken quality control, transparency, and reliability if the new suppliers prove to be less able.

This is already showing up in manufacturer behavior. , a nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting manufacturing leaders, reported that in January, more than half (57%) of manufacturers said that US tariff policies were having a moderate or significant negative effect on confident decision-making related to sourcing, pricing, and investment timing. The same research found that companies were increasingly shifting from passive monitoring their supply chains to making active changes in sourcing.

Even after the Supreme Court鈥檚 legal invalidation, many impacts of previously imposed tariffs persist, as retroactive refunds are not guaranteed 鈥� indeed, the government has for such refunds. And these administrative delays in duty recovery can strain cash flow, while companies that already restructured their operations by relocating suppliers, renegotiating contracts, or investing in new logistics infrastructure cannot easily unwind those changes.

Clearly, the economic and operational consequences of past tariffs have already altered global sourcing maps, and those manufacturers that had shifted production to Southeast Asia or Mexico during the 2025 tariff surge may maintain those footprints even if duties are lifted, due to sunk costs or new regional advantages. This illustrates how even temporary policy shifts can have permanent effects on supply chain integrity.

Tariffs force structural changes and create bottlenecks

Tariffs also create operational instability. When duty rates, exemptions, and country-specific rules change, manufacturers鈥� ability to forecast their trade strategy becomes more difficult, and inventory planning becomes less reliable. Customs processing can become more complicated as companies work through classification questions, preference claims, and changing documentation requirements.

For manufacturers running lean networks, that unpredictability can be dangerous. Delays at ports, shipment holds, or reworks tied to customs compliance can ripple across production schedules and customer commitments. The CBP has specifically noted ongoing tariff implementation updates through its Cargo Systems Messaging Service, which only underscores how much administrative attention that manufacturers now need to dedicate to keeping updated on trade compliance.

Tariffs can also break the logic of just-in-time supply chains. If landed costs become unstable or sourcing risk rises, companies often shift toward just-in-case strategies by holding more inventory, extending forecast horizons, or redesigning production footprints. That may improve resilience in the short term, but it also ties up working capital and reduces efficiency.

Manufacturers Alliance research describes this as a move toward tactical adaptation rather than true resolution. In other words, many manufacturers are learning how best to operate in a tariff-heavy environment; however, as the system becomes more buffered, more complex, and often less efficient, it鈥檚 unclear when or whether things will return to a state resembling the previous stability.

How supply chain professionals can mitigate tariff risk

For corporate risk and supply chain leaders, the most practical response starts with supplier diversification. Overconcentration in one tariff-exposed region creates avoidable vulnerability. Manufacturers also should use supplier information management technology to map sub-tier dependencies, because tariff exposure often sits deeper in the supply base than tier-one suppliers alone reveal.

Other strong mitigation strategies include nearshoring to reduce long-distance logistics exposure and scenario planning to stress-test tariff shocks before they happen.

Those manufacturers best positioned for continued disruption ; instead, they are building flexibility into sourcing, inventory, and trade compliance now.

The bottom line

The Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources marks a significant check on executive power around tariffs, but it does not signal a return to stable or predictable trade policy. Tariffs remain a potent and politically salient tool, now subject to legislative rather than unilateral control.

For manufacturers and their corporate risk professionals, the imperative remains unchanged: Supply chains must be designed not just to survive today’s tariffs, but to adapt to the next wave of trade policy disruption. Indeed, resilience is no longer a function of cost minimization alone. It requires transparency, agility, and a deep understanding of how legal, political, and economic forces converge at the border. The most effective manufacturing companies will continue to be those that treat tariff exposure not as a compliance afterthought, but as a core dimension of supply chain integrity.

You can find out more about the challenges manufacturers are facing from tariffs here

• • • The ceasefire is between the US and Iran and is not a regional peace 鈥�听Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon within hours of the announced deal. Iran hit oil infrastructure in Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia 鈥� including the East-West Pipeline, the primary route for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Companies planning around a return to normal should instead plan around the idea that the war has narrowed, not ended.

    • If the disruption stays within one quarter, the economic damage is painful but reversible 鈥� The Dallas Fed projects WTI oil at roughly $98 per barrel with a modest GDP hit in a short-closure scenario. The catastrophic scenario 鈥� WTI above $132 with sustained negative growth 鈥� requires the closure of the war to drag past Q2. Every week the ceasefire holds improves the odds, but Iran’s strike on the Saudi bypass pipeline complicates even the optimistic timeline.

    • Iran may have stumbled into the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history 鈥� At conservative estimates, transit fees charged for traversing the Strait of Hormuz could generate $40 billion to $50 billion for Iran annually, or roughly 10% to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP 鈥� all at near-zero operating cost. That revenue stream inverts Tehran’s incentives. Indeed, keeping the toll system in place may now be worth more than restoring free transit.

On April 7, less than two hours before a self-imposed deadline that threatened the destruction of Iran’s civilian infrastructure, President Donald J. Trump announced a two-week ceasefire in the war in Iran that began on the last day of February and continued over 38 days of sustained air strikes by the Unites States and Israel. In turn, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks across over a dozen countries and forced the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

The honest answer is, not yet 鈥� and the first 24 hours have already shown why.

A fragile, but functional peace

The ceasefire is remarkably thin, and it鈥檚 based on three operative clauses: i) the US and Israel halt strikes on Iran; ii) Iran halts retaliatory attacks on the US and Israel; and iii) Iran allows “safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz. Everything else 鈥� from nuclear terms, sanctions, reconstruction, and the legal status of Hormuz transit 鈥� has been punted to negotiations in Islamabad beginning April 10, with Pakistan mediating.

With the ceasefire, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: “How can I plan around this?”

However, what the ceasefire covers matters less than what it doesn’t. Within hours of the announcement, Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon, and Iran warned it would withdraw from the ceasefire if attacks on Lebanon continue. Meanwhile, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain all reported fresh Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting oil, power, and desalination infrastructure after the ceasefire was in place. Most critically, Iran struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the main route by which Gulf producers have been rerouting oil to bypass the blockaded strait.

That pipeline strike should command attention in every supply chain and energy risk briefing this week because it signals how shaky the agreement is, and that Iran remains a long-term threat to vital infrastructure across the region.

For companies operating in or sourcing from the Gulf, the practical implications are immediate. This is not a ceasefire that restores pre-war operating conditions; rather it is a bilateral pause between two belligerents while the regional war continues around them. Insurance premiums, shipping risk assessments, and supply chain contingency plans should reflect that distinction until there is a meaningful shift.

What does this mean for the next two weeks?

Both sides are claiming victory 鈥� and increasingly, claiming different deals. Trump called Iran’s 10-point proposal “a workable basis on which to negotiate”; and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council called the ceasefire a “crushing defeat” for Washington. The White House now says the 10-point plan Iran is publicly circulating differs from the terms that were actually negotiated for the ceasefire. Tehran, meanwhile, says there is no deal at all if Lebanon isn’t included 鈥� a condition the US has not acknowledged. And of course, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

These are not the hallmarks of a stable agreement; but they may be the hallmarks of a durable one. The deal is thin enough so that each side can brief its domestic audience on a different story, and as long as neither is forced to reconcile those stories publicly, the pause holds.

And the incentives to keep talking are asymmetric but real. The US has watched gas prices surge past $4 nationally as domestic support for the war 鈥� which started at levels best described as in a hole 鈥� continued to drop even further. Goldman Sachs raised its recession probability to 30% and JPMorgan to 35%, and every day the strait stays closed pushes those numbers higher. The administration needs the global economy to exhale and needs distance itself from a war so it can focus on other priorities, including an already difficult midterm election cycle.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

Iran, for its part, wants the bombing to stop. Its conventional navy has been functionally destroyed, its air defenses are highly degraded, its nuclear facilities have sustained severe damage, and its cities, bridges, and transportation networks have been hit repeatedly. The regime survived and arguably emerged with greater domestic legitimacy than it had before the war, but the physical toll is mounting. Tehran wants the strikes to stop so it can claim victory by survival without incurring any more costs.

This mutual exhaustion is the load-bearing structure of the ceasefire. If the ceasefire holds for 72 hours (as I think it might), and if the strait begins opening to escorted traffic by Friday as Iranian officials have signaled, and if neither side finds a reason to walk away before the Islamabad talks convene, then the ceasefire will likely be extended. Not because the underlying disputes get resolved, but because the cost of resuming hostilities exceeds the cost of continuing to talk. Expect a rolling series of extensions, probably 30 to 45 days at a time, that resolve nothing while letting global markets gradually stabilize.

As we wrote earlier this month, if the disruption remains limited to roughly one quarter, the oil price shock is painful but reversible, ugly, but manageable. And every week the ceasefire holds pushes the trajectory toward the manageable scenario.

What happens after the ceasefire?

Again, if the ceasefire holds, we then have to start thinking about how this conflict resolves. Not surprisingly, this is where it gets uncomfortable.

The conventional assumption in Washington and in global markets is that the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal once the fighting stops. That assumption underestimates what Iran has built.

Iran’s parliament is working to pass a Strait of Hormuz Management Plan, codifying its claimed sovereignty over strait transit and establishing a legal framework for collecting toll fees. Media reports indicate Iran has been charging vessels between $1 million and $2 million per transit and is planning to keep charging those tolls for all ships as the strait reopens. So, at $1 million per ship, and with up to 135 transits per day, 365 days a year, that’s about $40 billion to $50 billion in annual revenue for Iran, or up to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP. All at an operating cost that approaches zero.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Compare that to Iran’s oil sector, which generated approximately $53 billion annually in 2022 and 2023, required massive capital investment and maintenance, and was subject to constant disruption. The toll revenue is comparable in scale, dramatically cheaper to operate, and immune to sanctions. If the final number is even a fraction of this, it鈥檚 still a massive financial shot in the arm for Iran that could become a far greater advantage than the damage to capital that the war has inflicted upon the state.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Of course, this changes the structural incentives around the Strait of Hormuz in ways most analysts haven’t fully absorbed. A permanent toll system gives Iran a revenue base to rebuild the military assets it lost, reduce its dependence on oil exports, and fund domestic investment that could blunt future protest movements. The regime’s cost-benefit calculus has inverted: Keeping the toll operational in place may now be worth more than restoring the pre-war status quo.

For the US and Israel, the only way to dismantle this arrangement is by force and the last 38 days demonstrated the limits of that approach. The US achieved air and naval superiority, destroyed Iran’s conventional military, and killed the supreme leader. None of it was enough to compel capitulation, and in fact, may not have even come close. A second campaign faces the same likely result, against a population now unified by the experience of surviving the first one.

The war didn’t just disrupt global trade. It may have permanently repriced the most important shipping lane on Earth 鈥� and left every piece of energy infrastructure in the Gulf more vulnerable than it was before the first air strike landed.

You can find more about the global impact of the war in Iran here

Key takeaways:

• • • Q2 is a wound that heals if the war stops 鈥� Oil spikes, inflation revisions, and supply disruptions are painful but mostly reversible in a short-war scenario. The exception is insurance and risk premiums for Gulf maritime transit, which are permanently repriced.

    • Q3 is a wound that scars 鈥� Sustained oil at $130 per barrel changes household and business behavior in ways that don’t snap back. Recession probability crosses the coin-flip threshold and supply chain disruptions cascade into industries far from the Gulf.

    • Q4 is a different body 鈥� Even if the war ends, the global economy has rebuilt itself around the disruption. Trade routes, supplier relationships, and risk models have been permanently rewired, especially if there is nothing structural to prevent the Strait from closing again.

This is the second of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we鈥檒l walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Previously, we made the case that the US-Iran war is unlikely to end quickly. The regime hasn’t collapsed, the asymmetric force controlling the Strait of Hormuz is nowhere near neutralized, and diplomacy seems dead on arrival. Most significantly, the United States military is escalating, not winding down.

While the first part of this series was about the military and diplomatic picture, this piece is about your balance sheet.

What follows is a quarter-by-quarter map of what a prolonged conflict means for the global economy, charted from now through Christmas 2026. We鈥檒l cover how oil, supply chains, GDP forecasts will be revised in real time, and how disruptions that look temporary in Q2 could trigger a permanent rewiring of how the global economy moves goods, prices risk, and sources critical inputs.

Even if your company doesn鈥檛 import a single barrel of Gulf crude, you could still get hit by this. Indeed, if you’re plugged into the global economy like the rest of us, you’re going on this ride.

Q2 2026 (April鈥揓une): The wound that heals

If the war ends by the close of the second quarter on June 30, most of the damage is reversible 鈥� painful, but reversible.

Brent crude is up about 60% since before the start of the war when it was roughly $70 per barrel; and Capital Economics , prices could fall back toward $65 by year-end. The interim outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now to be 4.2% for 2026, up sharply from 2.8%, assuming energy disruptions ease by mid-year. If that assumption holds true, it鈥檚 likely we鈥檒l be able to muddle through the pain.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking. The Gulf supplies roughly 45% of global sulfur, and Qatar produces around one-third of the world’s helium, which is essential for semiconductor manufacturing. Further, Qatar鈥檚 liquified natural gas (LNG) production was significantly damaged by Iranian strikes.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking.

Further disruptions in fertilizer supply chains could delay spring planting, which could ripple into agricultural yields well into 2027. These effects don’t snap back the moment oil flow normalizes; they have their own timelines.

And here’s the one thing that doesn’t reverse even in the best case 鈥� risk premiums. The Strait of Hormuz was priced as a chokepoint that would never actually close. So when it did, that repricing is permanent and will be felt across the world as risk around other too important to fail chokepoints is itself reevaluated and priced higher.

Q3 2026 (July鈥揝eptember): The wound that scars

If a Q2 end to the war represents a recoverable spike, a Q3 end is where the word structural starts showing up in the discussion.

Capital Economics models Brent at roughly $130 per barrel 鈥� or roughly 14% higher than where it is now 鈥� in a prolonged scenario. At those prices, the damage stops being abstract. And Moody’s Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi estimates that every sustained $10-per-barrel increase . At $130 (nearly double pre-war levels) that’s approaching $2,700 per family. That is the kind of money that changes behavior.

In this case, Zandi says, especially if the cost of oil stays elevated for months 鈥� and by Q3, it would have. Moody’s recession probability model was pushing 50% in late-March when oil was $108 per barrel. At $130, the math speaks for itself.

Again, in this scenario, the damage fans out beyond energy. Fertilizer shortages hit crop yields, and helium disruptions cascade into semiconductors, automotive, and medical devices. The potential impact on AI-related manufacturing alone could spook investors already primed to see AI as a bubble. Capital Economics projects Eurozone growth at 0.5% and Chinese growth below 3%. Emerging markets could face forced rate hikes that deepen their own recessions.

This is the quarter in which contingency plans become operating assumptions. The question is no longer When does this go back to normal? 鈥�听rather the question is whether normal is coming back at all.

Q4 2026 and beyond: The different body

Here’s what most forecasts don’t capture about a war that continues passed Q4: It almost doesn’t matter whether the war is still active or not. The damage has changed shape, and it’s no longer about what the conflict is doing to the global economy. Instead, it’s about what the global economy has done to itself in response.

Companies that spent Q2 and Q3 diversifying away from Gulf suppliers have now spent real money building alternatives. They are not going back to their previous pathways even if there is a ceasefire. The sunk costs make the reversal unthinkable, and the memory of this conflict makes it irrational. No supply chain director is walking into a boardroom to recommend re-concentrating risk in a chokepoint that closed once and might close again.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond.

Because, of course, it could close again. If Iran emerges weakened but intact, which is the most likely outcome per multiple intelligence assessments, the result is a hostile state with every incentive to reconstitute its asymmetric capabilities the moment the pressure lifts.

Companies are thus going to reroute their future supplies around the Strait rather than through it. High oil prices and the potential for global shortage will also further accelerate green energy initiatives or alternate fuel sources across the globe as oil security reenters geopolitical calculations. Most importantly, every organization鈥檚 supply chain will need a reevaluation in light of an increasingly dangerous world, with expensive secondary supply chains becoming more a necessity than a luxury.

That鈥檚 the real legacy of a war continuing past the end of this year. Not oil prices on any given day or even insurance premiums, but the permanent repricing of an assumption. The war didn’t just disrupt the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz, it broke the premise that some geographies were too big to fail and would be protected and kept open. Once that premise is now broken so thoroughly companies will need to reevaluate whether the concentration of risk in individual areas is a luxury they can afford. Many will find the answer to be no, resulting in an increased push to diversify risk away from single points of failure.

The planning imperative

Fortunately, the best-case scenario remains possible. However, it requires Iran accepting terms it has publicly rejected as existential, its navy being neutralized despite retaining significant asymmetric combat capability, a coalition materializing from countries that have refused to send warships, and mine-clearance operations succeeding with the deck stacked against them. Only then, we鈥檒l see if civilian traffic is willing to risk billions of dollars that the clean-up job was done right. Each is possible, but the odds remain slim.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond. They should model energy prices at between $120 and $150 per barrel, not $70. The smart companies are the ones building optionality now because the cost of flexibility is far lower than the cost of being caught flat-footed in September.

Four weeks ago, the assumption was that the Strait of Hormuz was too important to close. However, it did, and the assumption that it will reopen quickly deserves the same scrutiny.

You can find out more about the听geopolitical and economic situation in 2026听here

Key takeaways:

• • • Only IEEPA鈥慴ased tariffs are up for refund 鈥� Refunds will flow electronically to importers of record through ACE, the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, but only once CBP鈥檚 process is finalized.

    • Liquidation and protest timelines are now critical 鈥� An organization鈥檚 tax concepts that directly influence which entries are eligible and how long companies have to protect claims.

    • Tax functions must quickly coordinate with other corporate functions 鈥� In-house tax teams need to coordinate with their organization鈥檚 trade, procurement, and accounting functions to gather data, assert entitlement, and get the financial reporting right on any tariff refunds.

WASHINGTON, DC 鈥� When the United States Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling on President Donald J. Trump鈥檚 authority to impose mass tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in February it set the stage for what it to come.

The Court ruled the president did not have authority under IEEPA to impose the tariffs that generated an estimated $163 billion of revenue in 2025. In response, the Court of International Trade (CIT) issued a ruling in requiring the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to issue refunds on IEEPA duties for entries that have not gone final. That order, however, is currently suspended while CBP designs the refund process and the government considers an appeal.

At听the recent , tax experts discussed what this ruling means for corporate tax departments, outline what is and isn鈥檛 a consideration for refunds and the steps necessary to apply for refunds.

As panelists explained, the key issue for tax departments is that only IEEPA tariffs are in scope for refund 鈥� many other tariffs remain firmly in place. For example, on steel, aluminum, and copper; Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese-origin goods; and new of 10% to 15% on most imports still apply and will continue to shape effective duty rates and supply chain costs.

So, which entities can actually get their money back?

Legally, CBP will send refunds only to the importer of record, and only electronically through the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, known as the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system. That means every potential claimant needs an with current bank information on file. And creating an account or updating it can be a lengthy process, especially inside a large organization.

If a business was not the importer of record but had tariffs contractually passed through to it 鈥� for example, by explicit tariff clauses, amended purchase orders, or separate line items on invoices 鈥� they may still have a commercial basis to recover their share from the importer. In practice, that means corporate tax teams should sit down with both the organization鈥檚 procurement experts and its largest suppliers to identify tariff鈥憇haring arrangements and understand what actions those importers are planning to take.

Why liquidation suddenly matters to tax leaders

As said, the Atmus ruling is limited to entries that are not final, which hinges on the . CBP typically has one year to review an entry and liquidate it (often around 314 days for formal entries) with some informal entries liquidating much sooner.

Once an entry liquidates, the 180鈥慸ay protest clock starts. Within that window, the importer of record can challenge CBP鈥檚 decision, and those protested entries may remain in play for IEEPA refunds. There is also a 90鈥慸ay window in which CBP can reliquidate on its own initiative, raising questions about whether final should be read as 90 days or 180 days 鈥� clearly, an issue that will matter a lot if your company is near those deadlines.

Data, controversy risk & financial reporting

The role of in-house tax departments in the process of getting refunds requires, for starters, giving departments access to entry鈥憀evel data showing which imports bore IEEPA tariffs between February 1, 2025, and February 28, 2026. If a business does not already have robust trade reporting, the first step is to confirm whether the business has made payments to CBP; and, if so, to work with the company鈥檚 supply chain or trade compliance teams to access ACE and run detailed entry reports for that period.

Summary entries and heavily aggregated data will be a challenge because CBP has indicated that refund claims will require a declaration in the ACE system that lists specific entries and associated IEEPA duties. Expect controversy pressure: As claims scale up, CBP resources and the courts could see backlogs. If that becomes the case, tax teams should be prepared for protests, documentation requests, and potential litigation over entitlement and timing.

On the financial reporting side, whether and when to recognize a refund depends on the strength of the legal claim and the status of the proceedings. If tariffs were listed as expenses as they were incurred, successful refunds may give rise to income recognition. In cases in which tariffs were capitalized into fixed assets, however, the accounting analysis becomes more nuanced and may implicate asset basis, depreciation, and potentially transfer pricing positions.

Coordination between an organization鈥檚 financial reporting, tax accounting, and transfer pricing specialists is critical in order that customs values, income tax treatment, and any refund鈥憆elated credits remain consistent.

Action items for corporate tax departments

Corporate tax teams do not need to become customs experts overnight, but they do need to lead a coordinated response. Practically, that means they should:

• • • confirm whether their company was an importer of record and, if so, ensure ACE access and banking information are in place now, not after CBP turns the refund system on.
    • map which entries included IEEPA tariffs, identify which are non鈥憀iquidated or still within the 180鈥慸ay protest window, and file protests where appropriate to protect the company鈥檚 rights.
    • inventory all tariff鈥憇haring arrangements with suppliers, assess contractual entitlement to pass鈥憈hrough refunds, and align with procurement and legal teams on a consistent recovery approach.
    • work with accounting to determine the financial statement treatment of potential refunds, including whether and when to recognize contingent assets or income and any knock鈥憃n effects for transfer pricing and valuation.

If tax departments wait for complete certainty from the courts before acting, many entries may go final and fall out of scope. The opportunity for tariff refunds will favor companies that are data鈥憆eady, cross鈥慺unctionally aligned, and willing to move under time pressure.

You can find out more about the changing tariff situation here

Key takeaways:

• • • The US achieved conventional military dominance, but it hasn’t solved the core problem 鈥� The navy that was destroyed was never the one controlling the Strait of Hormuz. The asymmetric force that is, the IRGCN, retained 80% of its small-boat fleet and may be able to replenish losses from civilian infrastructure faster than the US can eliminate them.

    • All three pathways to a quick resolution are blocked 鈥� The regime has hardened rather than collapsed, the diplomatic positions are nowhere near overlapping, and the US military posture is escalating, including possible ground operations, while allied support remains symbolic.

    • The conflict is likely measured in quarters, not weeks, and the economic difference is not linear 鈥� Businesses should be stress-testing against sustained disruption rather than planning for a return to normal, because the conditions required for a rapid resolution would each need to break favorably 鈥� and right now, none of them are.

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This is the first of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we look at different ways the war could wind down quickly, and why none of them offer an immediate pathway.

The war with Iran is not going to be over by the end of this week.

That sentence shouldn’t be controversial four weeks into the ongoing war with Iran being waged by the United States and Israel, but it runs against the grain of how markets, policymakers, and many business leaders have been processing this conflict. The dominant assumption, visible in equity markets that have wobbled but not cratered, is that this is an acute shock with a definable end date.

However, very little about the military, political, or strategic picture supports that assumption.

While I make no claim to predict the war’s exact duration, I can lay out why the most likely scenarios point to a conflict measured in quarters, not weeks 鈥� and why that difference matters. In the next part of this series, we’ll sketch the economic consequences on a quarter-by-quarter basis, drawing on the latest projections from top economic thinkers. First, however, here is why this war probably drags on.

The wins aren’t winning鈥�

By a surface level scorecard, Operation Epic Fury has been exactly the kind of lopsided success one would expect of a global superpower that鈥檚 going up against a regional player. Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader was killed in the opening strikes, Iran’s conventional navy was sunk at anchor before they could sortie, and full air supremacy by the US appears established. If you were grading this on the metrics that won wars in the 20th century, you’d be forgiven for thinking it was nearly over.

Yet it is not nearly over. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Daily transits have collapsed from 138 ships to fewer than five. Approximately 2,000 vessels and 20,000 seafarers are stranded in the region with nowhere to go. Brent crude is at $108 per barrel as of March 26, up roughly 50% since the war began. The International Energy Agency has called the current situation the largest disruption to global energy supplies in history.

The disconnect between the military scorecard and the strategic reality comes down to a single, underappreciated fact that the US destroyed the wrong navy. To be fair, it’s not like they had much of a choice. Iran’s conventional fleet had to go, and it went; however, that was playing on easy mode. Iran’s conventional fleet, its frigates, corvettes, and submarines, was a prestige force built for Indian Ocean power projection.

You can find out more about the here

The force actually designed to fight America, however, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), and it is something else entirely: a dispersed network of hundreds of armed speedboats, coastal missile batteries, thousands of sea mines, drone systems, and midget submarines spread across dozens of small bases along hundreds of miles of Persian Gulf coastline. The IRGCN’s entire doctrine, training, and equipment procurement were optimized for exactly one scenario, that of denying the Strait of Hormuz to a technologically superior adversary. That is the war Iran is now fighting.

Even though the IRGCN lost its most advanced platforms, those were not the workhorses of their fleet. The IRGCN retains an estimated 80% of its small-boat fleet, the fast boats that hide among fishing dhows, the crews that can scatter onshore and remount on surviving craft. The US is tasked with the mission of hunting small boats hiding among civilian vessels, in a fight in which Iran is willing to lose dozens of them a day to keep the Strait closed. This is not a mopping-up operation; rather, it is a war of attrition that the US is not structured to win quickly, and one in which Iran can replace its losses in ways a conventional navy cannot. For the US, it鈥檚 like trying to empty a bathtub while the spigot is still running.

Further, the math of the Strait itself is unforgiving. Iran had an estimated 5,000 sea mines before the war and has begun laying them. The US Navy decommissioned its last Gulf-based minesweepers in 2025 鈥� timing that, in hindsight, looks catastrophic.

Indeed, the US can sink every major Iranian warship afloat and still not reopen the waterway. That, in fact, is roughly what has happened.

鈥nd the off-ramps are blocked

If conventional military victory hasn’t solved the problem, there are three other ways this war ends quickly. As of late March, however, all three are jammed.

1. The regime isn’t collapsing

A US intelligence assessment completed before the war concluded that military action was unlikely to produce regime change even if Iran’s leadership was killed. That assessment has proven accurate. Iran鈥檚 constitutional succession mechanism activated as designed, and a new Supreme Leader, the previous one鈥檚 more hardline son, was installed within days. Also, protests are not sweeping the streets. Ideological regimes under external threat tend to harden, not fracture. Indeed, both the Taliban and Hamas have survived worse. The Iranian Islamic Republic, whatever else you want to say about it, appears to be surviving this conflict as well.

2. Diplomacy has nowhere to go

Iran rejected the 15-point plan offered by the US and published five counterdemands, including recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which is a nonstarter for the US. Iran’s foreign minister says Tehran has no intention of negotiating, even as President Donald J. Trump insists talks are continuing. These positions aren’t close to overlapping, and both sides are staking their credibility on not budging first.

And Iran has good reason to believe time is on its side. The war is deeply unpopular in the US and the same affordability anxiety that swept Republicans into power is now threatening to sweep them out in the midterms. Tehran knows for every day the war goes on, they get to roll the dice that Trump will back out, giving them a strong incentive to get as many rolls as they can.

3. The military posture is escalating, not resolving

Ground troops, including paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, are en route to the Gulf or have received deployment orders. Reports indicate the White House is weighing a seizure of Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil terminal, an operation that would put American boots on Iranian soil for the first time. Seven allied nations signed a statement supporting Strait security, but it鈥檚 a paperwork alliance, lacking the kind of committed hardware needed to force a solution to the Strait鈥檚 closure.

What does this mean for business?

The Iranian regime isn’t folding, diplomacy doesn鈥檛 seem to be catching on, and the US military posture is expanding. None of the conditions point to a rapid resolution, and in fact, several of them point to a prolonged conflict.

If this war is measured in quarters rather than weeks, the economic consequences stop being a temporary, albeit painful price spike and start being a structural disruptive event, one that reshapes supply chains, reprices risk, and forces companies to make hard choices about where and how they operate. The difference between a three-week war and a three-quarter war is not a difference of magnitude, it is a difference in kind.

In the concluding part of this series, we’ll walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Key takeaways:

• • • Violence against judges is escalating 鈥� Targeted shootings, coordinated harassment campaigns, and threats that now routinely follow judges to their homes and families.

    • The rhetoric driving the escalation is coming from the highest levels of government 鈥� The absence of any public denunciation from the Department of Justice is highlighting the source of the problem.

    • Will the violence itself become part of judicial rulings? 鈥� The endgame of judicial intimidation isn’t that judges stop ruling, it’s that the threat of violence becomes a silent presence in the deliberation itself.

NEW YORK 鈥� Those attendees who came to the recent听 to talk about AI, agentic workflows, and the business of legal technology, also were treated to a session that will likely stay with attendees and had nothing to do with AI.

In that session, four federal judges took the stage; but they were not there to talk about pricing models or AI adoption. They were there to talk about staying alive.

Setting the stage

Jason Wareham, CEO of IPSA Intelligent Systems and a former U.S. Marine Corps judge advocate, introduced the session 鈥� a panel of four sitting United States District Court judges 鈥� by speaking of how the rule of law once seemed resolute, yet how that faith in that has been shaken, year after year. He worked hard to frame his observations as nonpartisan, a matter of institutional fragility rather than political allegiance. It was a generous framing, but it was one that would not survive the weight of the ensuing discussion.

The Honorable Esther Salas of the District of New Jersey said that the reason she was there has a name. On July 19, 2020, a disgruntled, extremist attorney who had a case before her court arrived at her home during a birthday celebration. He shot and killed her twenty-year-old son, Daniel Anderl. He shot and critically wounded her husband. She has spent the years since on a mission to protect her judicial colleagues from the same fate.

The new normal

Next, the Honorable Kenly Kiya Kato of the Central District of California described what has changed. Judges鈥� rulings are still based on the Constitution, on precedent, and on the facts; but what’s different is the small voice in the back of a judge’s head. That voice, often coming after a judge issued a decision that they now have to fight against, asks: What will happen after this? It is now expected, Judge Kato explained, that a high-profile order will bring threats. When two colleagues in her district issued prominent decisions, her first thought was for their safety. That is not how it has been historically.

The Honorable Mia Roberts Perez of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asked how we got here, pointing to language from the highest levels of government: judges called monsters, a U.S. Department of Justice declaring war on rogue judges, and recently politicians bringing justice鈥檚 families into the conversation.

Judge Salas pushed even further. She acknowledged the instinct to frame the problem as bipartisan, but said the current moment is not apples to apples. It is apples to watermelons. The spike in threats since 2015, she argued, traces directly to rhetoric from political leaders using language never before deployed against the bench.

The federal judiciary is looking to break annual records for threats [against judges], and there is an absence of any public denunciation from the Attorney General or the DOJ.

The evidence is not abstract, nor are the victims, and the panel walked through it. Judge John Roemer of Wisconsin, zip-tied to a chair and assassinated in his home. Associate Judge Andrew Wilkinson of Maryland shot dead in his driveway while his family was inside. Judge Steven Meyer of Indiana and his wife Kimberly, shot through their own front door after attackers first posed as a food delivery, then returned days later claiming to have found the couple’s dog. Judge Meyer has just undergone his fifth surgery since the attack.

All of these incidents happened at the judges’ homes.

Judge Salas then played a voicemail, one of thousands that federal judges receive. It was less than 30 seconds long, but it did not need to be longer. While names had been redacted, what remained was a torrent of threats and obscenities, graphic, sexual and violent, delivered with the confidence of someone who does not expect consequences. Some judges receive hundreds of these after a single ruling, often from people with no case before them at all.

The shadow over the courts

Throughout the session, there was a presence the panelists circled but rarely named directly. A shadow that shaped every observation about escalating threats, every reference to rhetoric from the top down, every mention of language never before used by political leaders, of action or inaction the likes of which would have been unthinkable just several years ago. The specifics were spoken. The name, largely, was not.

It didn’t have to be.

Judge Kato said that what was perhaps the most disheartening aspect of all this is that these threats are getting worse. The people who know better are not doing better. Indeed, she said her children think about these problems every day. What will happen to mom today? Will someone come to the house? These are questions children should not have to carry. They did not sign up for this, and neither did the judges.

In 2026, Judge Salas noted, the federal judiciary is looking to break annual records for threats. She also noted the absence of any public denunciation from the Attorney General or the DOJ. The silence, she said, says a lot.

Not surprisingly, the implications extend beyond the judges themselves. As Judge Salas noted, if judges have to weigh their safety alongside the law, ordinary people don’t stand a chance. If one party is stronger, better funded, or more willing to threaten, then the scales tip.

That is the endgame of judicial intimidation. It鈥檚 not that judges stop ruling, but that the violent and the powerful 鈥� indeed, the people least fit to hold the scales 鈥� can tilt them at will.

That concern echoed an earlier warning from Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Judge Mehalchick said that judicial intimidation feeds on misunderstanding. When the public no longer grasps why judges must be insulated from pressure or conversely, mistakes independence for partisanship, the threat environment becomes easier to justify, easier to ignore, and harder to reverse.

What is perhaps the most disheartening aspect of all this is that these threats are getting worse, and the people who know better are not doing better.

In his 2024 year-end report, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts identified four threats to judicial independence: violence, intimidation, disinformation, and threats to defy lawfully entered judgements. The panel discussed this report as prophecy fulfilled. Public confidence in the judiciary has plummeted since 2021, and the reasons are complex. The judges insisted they are still doing their jobs the right way, but the violence is spreading anyway.

What survives

Judge Salas asked the audience to watch their thoughts. Are they negative and destructive, or positive and uplifting? Can we start loving more? She ended by sending love and light to everyone in the room.

The judges were visibly emotional on the stage.

The words were beautiful. They were also, in the context of everything that had just been described 鈥� the killings, the voicemails, the zip ties, the pizza deliveries masking a threat under a murdered son’s name 鈥� resting in a shadow that no amount of love and light could fully dispel on their own.

The room responded with a standing ovation.

Thousands of people came to Legalweek 2026 to talk about the future of legal technology. For one morning, four judges reminded them that none of it matters if the people charged with administering justice cannot do so safely.

So, while the billable hour may survive and the associate will adapt, the harder question, the one that should keep the legal industry awake at night, is whether the bench will hold.

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