• • • The ceasefire is between the US and Iran and is not a regional peace 鈥�听Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon within hours of the announced deal. Iran hit oil infrastructure in Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia 鈥� including the East-West Pipeline, the primary route for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Companies planning around a return to normal should instead plan around the idea that the war has narrowed, not ended.

    • If the disruption stays within one quarter, the economic damage is painful but reversible 鈥� The Dallas Fed projects WTI oil at roughly $98 per barrel with a modest GDP hit in a short-closure scenario. The catastrophic scenario 鈥� WTI above $132 with sustained negative growth 鈥� requires the closure of the war to drag past Q2. Every week the ceasefire holds improves the odds, but Iran’s strike on the Saudi bypass pipeline complicates even the optimistic timeline.

    • Iran may have stumbled into the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history 鈥� At conservative estimates, transit fees charged for traversing the Strait of Hormuz could generate $40 billion to $50 billion for Iran annually, or roughly 10% to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP 鈥� all at near-zero operating cost. That revenue stream inverts Tehran’s incentives. Indeed, keeping the toll system in place may now be worth more than restoring free transit.

On April 7, less than two hours before a self-imposed deadline that threatened the destruction of Iran’s civilian infrastructure, President Donald J. Trump announced a two-week ceasefire in the war in Iran that began on the last day of February and continued over 38 days of sustained air strikes by the Unites States and Israel. In turn, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks across over a dozen countries and forced the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

The honest answer is, not yet 鈥� and the first 24 hours have already shown why.

A fragile, but functional peace

The ceasefire is remarkably thin, and it鈥檚 based on three operative clauses: i) the US and Israel halt strikes on Iran; ii) Iran halts retaliatory attacks on the US and Israel; and iii) Iran allows “safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz. Everything else 鈥� from nuclear terms, sanctions, reconstruction, and the legal status of Hormuz transit 鈥� has been punted to negotiations in Islamabad beginning April 10, with Pakistan mediating.

With the ceasefire, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: “How can I plan around this?”

However, what the ceasefire covers matters less than what it doesn’t. Within hours of the announcement, Israel launched its heaviest strikes yet on Lebanon, and Iran warned it would withdraw from the ceasefire if attacks on Lebanon continue. Meanwhile, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain all reported fresh Iranian missile and drone strikes targeting oil, power, and desalination infrastructure after the ceasefire was in place. Most critically, Iran struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the main route by which Gulf producers have been rerouting oil to bypass the blockaded strait.

That pipeline strike should command attention in every supply chain and energy risk briefing this week because it signals how shaky the agreement is, and that Iran remains a long-term threat to vital infrastructure across the region.

For companies operating in or sourcing from the Gulf, the practical implications are immediate. This is not a ceasefire that restores pre-war operating conditions; rather it is a bilateral pause between two belligerents while the regional war continues around them. Insurance premiums, shipping risk assessments, and supply chain contingency plans should reflect that distinction until there is a meaningful shift.

What does this mean for the next two weeks?

Both sides are claiming victory 鈥� and increasingly, claiming different deals. Trump called Iran’s 10-point proposal “a workable basis on which to negotiate”; and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council called the ceasefire a “crushing defeat” for Washington. The White House now says the 10-point plan Iran is publicly circulating differs from the terms that were actually negotiated for the ceasefire. Tehran, meanwhile, says there is no deal at all if Lebanon isn’t included 鈥� a condition the US has not acknowledged. And of course, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

These are not the hallmarks of a stable agreement; but they may be the hallmarks of a durable one. The deal is thin enough so that each side can brief its domestic audience on a different story, and as long as neither is forced to reconcile those stories publicly, the pause holds.

And the incentives to keep talking are asymmetric but real. The US has watched gas prices surge past $4 nationally as domestic support for the war 鈥� which started at levels best described as in a hole 鈥� continued to drop even further. Goldman Sachs raised its recession probability to 30% and JPMorgan to 35%, and every day the strait stays closed pushes those numbers higher. The administration needs the global economy to exhale and needs distance itself from a war so it can focus on other priorities, including an already difficult midterm election cycle.

With the ceasefire, all that has paused. Yet, the question every boardroom, general counsel’s office, and procurement team is asking right now is simple: How can I plan around this?

Iran, for its part, wants the bombing to stop. Its conventional navy has been functionally destroyed, its air defenses are highly degraded, its nuclear facilities have sustained severe damage, and its cities, bridges, and transportation networks have been hit repeatedly. The regime survived and arguably emerged with greater domestic legitimacy than it had before the war, but the physical toll is mounting. Tehran wants the strikes to stop so it can claim victory by survival without incurring any more costs.

This mutual exhaustion is the load-bearing structure of the ceasefire. If the ceasefire holds for 72 hours (as I think it might), and if the strait begins opening to escorted traffic by Friday as Iranian officials have signaled, and if neither side finds a reason to walk away before the Islamabad talks convene, then the ceasefire will likely be extended. Not because the underlying disputes get resolved, but because the cost of resuming hostilities exceeds the cost of continuing to talk. Expect a rolling series of extensions, probably 30 to 45 days at a time, that resolve nothing while letting global markets gradually stabilize.

As we wrote earlier this month, if the disruption remains limited to roughly one quarter, the oil price shock is painful but reversible, ugly, but manageable. And every week the ceasefire holds pushes the trajectory toward the manageable scenario.

What happens after the ceasefire?

Again, if the ceasefire holds, we then have to start thinking about how this conflict resolves. Not surprisingly, this is where it gets uncomfortable.

The conventional assumption in Washington and in global markets is that the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal once the fighting stops. That assumption underestimates what Iran has built.

Iran’s parliament is working to pass a Strait of Hormuz Management Plan, codifying its claimed sovereignty over strait transit and establishing a legal framework for collecting toll fees. Media reports indicate Iran has been charging vessels between $1 million and $2 million per transit and is planning to keep charging those tolls for all ships as the strait reopens. So, at $1 million per ship, and with up to 135 transits per day, 365 days a year, that’s about $40 billion to $50 billion in annual revenue for Iran, or up to 15% of Iran’s pre-war GDP. All at an operating cost that approaches zero.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Compare that to Iran’s oil sector, which generated approximately $53 billion annually in 2022 and 2023, required massive capital investment and maintenance, and was subject to constant disruption. The toll revenue is comparable in scale, dramatically cheaper to operate, and immune to sanctions. If the final number is even a fraction of this, it鈥檚 still a massive financial shot in the arm for Iran that could become a far greater advantage than the damage to capital that the war has inflicted upon the state.

Iran didn’t enter this war planning to build the most lucrative chokepoint tax in modern history, but it may have stumbled into exactly that.

Of course, this changes the structural incentives around the Strait of Hormuz in ways most analysts haven’t fully absorbed. A permanent toll system gives Iran a revenue base to rebuild the military assets it lost, reduce its dependence on oil exports, and fund domestic investment that could blunt future protest movements. The regime’s cost-benefit calculus has inverted: Keeping the toll operational in place may now be worth more than restoring the pre-war status quo.

For the US and Israel, the only way to dismantle this arrangement is by force and the last 38 days demonstrated the limits of that approach. The US achieved air and naval superiority, destroyed Iran’s conventional military, and killed the supreme leader. None of it was enough to compel capitulation, and in fact, may not have even come close. A second campaign faces the same likely result, against a population now unified by the experience of surviving the first one.

The war didn’t just disrupt global trade. It may have permanently repriced the most important shipping lane on Earth 鈥� and left every piece of energy infrastructure in the Gulf more vulnerable than it was before the first air strike landed.

Please add your voice to 成人VR视频鈥� flagship , a global study exploring how the professional landscape continues to change.听

Key takeaways:

• • • Q2 is a wound that heals if the war stops 鈥� Oil spikes, inflation revisions, and supply disruptions are painful but mostly reversible in a short-war scenario. The exception is insurance and risk premiums for Gulf maritime transit, which are permanently repriced.

    • Q3 is a wound that scars 鈥� Sustained oil at $130 per barrel changes household and business behavior in ways that don’t snap back. Recession probability crosses the coin-flip threshold and supply chain disruptions cascade into industries far from the Gulf.

    • Q4 is a different body 鈥� Even if the war ends, the global economy has rebuilt itself around the disruption. Trade routes, supplier relationships, and risk models have been permanently rewired, especially if there is nothing structural to prevent the Strait from closing again.

This is the second of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we鈥檒l walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Previously, we made the case that the US-Iran war is unlikely to end quickly. The regime hasn’t collapsed, the asymmetric force controlling the Strait of Hormuz is nowhere near neutralized, and diplomacy seems dead on arrival. Most significantly, the United States military is escalating, not winding down.

While the first part of this series was about the military and diplomatic picture, this piece is about your balance sheet.

What follows is a quarter-by-quarter map of what a prolonged conflict means for the global economy, charted from now through Christmas 2026. We鈥檒l cover how oil, supply chains, GDP forecasts will be revised in real time, and how disruptions that look temporary in Q2 could trigger a permanent rewiring of how the global economy moves goods, prices risk, and sources critical inputs.

Even if your company doesn鈥檛 import a single barrel of Gulf crude, you could still get hit by this. Indeed, if you’re plugged into the global economy like the rest of us, you’re going on this ride.

Q2 2026 (April鈥揓une): The wound that heals

If the war ends by the close of the second quarter on June 30, most of the damage is reversible 鈥� painful, but reversible.

Brent crude is up about 60% since before the start of the war when it was roughly $70 per barrel; and Capital Economics , prices could fall back toward $65 by year-end. The interim outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now to be 4.2% for 2026, up sharply from 2.8%, assuming energy disruptions ease by mid-year. If that assumption holds true, it鈥檚 likely we鈥檒l be able to muddle through the pain.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking. The Gulf supplies roughly 45% of global sulfur, and Qatar produces around one-third of the world’s helium, which is essential for semiconductor manufacturing. Further, Qatar鈥檚 liquified natural gas (LNG) production was significantly damaged by Iranian strikes.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, however, Q2 introduces disruptions beyond oil that most people aren’t tracking.

Further disruptions in fertilizer supply chains could delay spring planting, which could ripple into agricultural yields well into 2027. These effects don’t snap back the moment oil flow normalizes; they have their own timelines.

And here’s the one thing that doesn’t reverse even in the best case 鈥� risk premiums. The Strait of Hormuz was priced as a chokepoint that would never actually close. So when it did, that repricing is permanent and will be felt across the world as risk around other too important to fail chokepoints is itself reevaluated and priced higher.

Q3 2026 (July鈥揝eptember): The wound that scars

If a Q2 end to the war represents a recoverable spike, a Q3 end is where the word structural starts showing up in the discussion.

Capital Economics models Brent at roughly $130 per barrel 鈥� or roughly 14% higher than where it is now 鈥� in a prolonged scenario. At those prices, the damage stops being abstract. And Moody’s Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi estimates that every sustained $10-per-barrel increase . At $130 (nearly double pre-war levels) that’s approaching $2,700 per family. That is the kind of money that changes behavior.

In this case, Zandi says, especially if the cost of oil stays elevated for months 鈥� and by Q3, it would have. Moody’s recession probability model was pushing 50% in late-March when oil was $108 per barrel. At $130, the math speaks for itself.

Again, in this scenario, the damage fans out beyond energy. Fertilizer shortages hit crop yields, and helium disruptions cascade into semiconductors, automotive, and medical devices. The potential impact on AI-related manufacturing alone could spook investors already primed to see AI as a bubble. Capital Economics projects Eurozone growth at 0.5% and Chinese growth below 3%. Emerging markets could face forced rate hikes that deepen their own recessions.

This is the quarter in which contingency plans become operating assumptions. The question is no longer When does this go back to normal? 鈥�听rather the question is whether normal is coming back at all.

Q4 2026 and beyond: The different body

Here’s what most forecasts don’t capture about a war that continues passed Q4: It almost doesn’t matter whether the war is still active or not. The damage has changed shape, and it’s no longer about what the conflict is doing to the global economy. Instead, it’s about what the global economy has done to itself in response.

Companies that spent Q2 and Q3 diversifying away from Gulf suppliers have now spent real money building alternatives. They are not going back to their pervious pathways even if there is a ceasefire. The sunk costs make the reversal unthinkable, and the memory of this conflict makes it irrational. No supply chain director is walking into a boardroom to recommend re-concentrating risk in a chokepoint that closed once and might close again.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond.

Because, of course, it could close again. If Iran emerges weakened but intact, which is the most likely outcome per multiple intelligence assessments, the result is a hostile state with every incentive to reconstitute its asymmetric capabilities the moment the pressure lifts.

Companies are thus going to reroute their future supplies around the Strait rather than through it. High oil prices and the potential for global shortage will also further accelerate green energy initiatives or alternate fuel sources across the globe as oil security reenters geopolitical calculations. Most importantly, every organization鈥檚 supply chain will need a reevaluation in light of an increasingly dangerous world, with expensive secondary supply chains becoming more a necessity than a luxury.

That鈥檚 the real legacy of a war continuing past the end of this year. Not oil prices on any given day or even insurance premiums, but the permanent repricing of an assumption. The war didn’t just disrupt the flow of goods through the Strait of Hormuz, it broke the premise that some geographies were too big to fail and would be protected and kept open. Once that premise is now broken so thoroughly companies will need to reevaluate whether the concentration of risk in individual areas is a luxury they can afford. Many will find the answer to be no, resulting in an increased push to diversify risk away from single points of failure.

The planning imperative

Fortunately, the best-case scenario remains possible. However, it requires Iran accepting terms it has publicly rejected as existential, its navy being neutralized despite retaining significant asymmetric combat capability, a coalition materializing from countries that have refused to send warships, and mine-clearance operations succeeding with the deck stacked against them. Only then, we鈥檒l see if civilian traffic is willing to risk billions of dollars that the clean-up job was done right. Each is possible, but the odds remain slim.

The prudent approach for companies remains clear. They should plan for the war to last into at least Q2, probably Q3, with structural effects persisting beyond. They should model energy prices at between $120 and $150 per barrel, not $70. The smart companies are the ones building optionality now because the cost of flexibility is far lower than the cost of being caught flat-footed in September.

Four weeks ago, the assumption was that the Strait of Hormuz was too important to close. However, it did, and the assumption that it will reopen quickly deserves the same scrutiny.

You can find out more about the听geopolitical and economic situation in 2026听here

Key takeaways:

• • • Only IEEPA鈥慴ased tariffs are up for refund 鈥� Refunds will flow electronically to importers of record through ACE, the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, but only once CBP鈥檚 process is finalized.

    • Liquidation and protest timelines are now critical 鈥� An organization鈥檚 tax concepts that directly influence which entries are eligible and how long companies have to protect claims.

    • Tax functions must quickly coordinate with other corporate functions 鈥� In-house tax teams need to coordinate with their organization鈥檚 trade, procurement, and accounting functions to gather data, assert entitlement, and get the financial reporting right on any tariff refunds.

WASHINGTON, DC 鈥� When the United States Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling on President Donald J. Trump鈥檚 authority to impose mass tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in February it set the stage for what it to come.

The Court ruled the president did not have authority under IEEPA to impose the tariffs that generated an estimated $163 billion of revenue in 2025. In response, the Court of International Trade (CIT) issued a ruling in requiring the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to issue refunds on IEEPA duties for entries that have not gone final. That order, however, is currently suspended while CBP designs the refund process and the government considers an appeal.

At听the recent , tax experts discussed what this ruling means for corporate tax departments, outline what is and isn鈥檛 a consideration for refunds and the steps necessary to apply for refunds.

As panelists explained, the key issue for tax departments is that only IEEPA tariffs are in scope for refund 鈥� many other tariffs remain firmly in place. For example, on steel, aluminum, and copper; Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese-origin goods; and new of 10% to 15% on most imports still apply and will continue to shape effective duty rates and supply chain costs.

So, which entities can actually get their money back?

Legally, CBP will send refunds only to the importer of record, and only electronically through the government鈥檚 digital import/export system, known as the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system. That means every potential claimant needs an with current bank information on file. And creating an account or updating it can be a lengthy process, especially inside a large organization.

If a business was not the importer of record but had tariffs contractually passed through to it 鈥� for example, by explicit tariff clauses, amended purchase orders, or separate line items on invoices 鈥� they may still have a commercial basis to recover their share from the importer. In practice, that means corporate tax teams should sit down with both the organization鈥檚 procurement experts and its largest suppliers to identify tariff鈥憇haring arrangements and understand what actions those importers are planning to take.

Why liquidation suddenly matters to tax leaders

As said, the Atmus ruling is limited to entries that are not final, which hinges on the . CBP typically has one year to review an entry and liquidate it (often around 314 days for formal entries) with some informal entries liquidating much sooner.

Once an entry liquidates, the 180鈥慸ay protest clock starts. Within that window, the importer of record can challenge CBP鈥檚 decision, and those protested entries may remain in play for IEEPA refunds. There is also a 90鈥慸ay window in which CBP can reliquidate on its own initiative, raising questions about whether final should be read as 90 days or 180 days 鈥� clearly, an issue that will matter a lot if your company is near those deadlines.

Data, controversy risk & financial reporting

The role of in-house tax departments in the process of getting refunds requires, for starters, giving departments access to entry鈥憀evel data showing which imports bore IEEPA tariffs between February 1, 2025, and February 28, 2026. If a business does not already have robust trade reporting, the first step is to confirm whether the business has made payments to CBP; and, if so, to work with the company鈥檚 supply chain or trade compliance teams to access ACE and run detailed entry reports for that period.

Summary entries and heavily aggregated data will be a challenge because CBP has indicated that refund claims will require a declaration in the ACE system that lists specific entries and associated IEEPA duties. Expect controversy pressure: As claims scale up, CBP resources and the courts could see backlogs. If that becomes the case, tax teams should be prepared for protests, documentation requests, and potential litigation over entitlement and timing.

On the financial reporting side, whether and when to recognize a refund depends on the strength of the legal claim and the status of the proceedings. If tariffs were listed as expenses as they were incurred, successful refunds may give rise to income recognition. In cases in which tariffs were capitalized into fixed assets, however, the accounting analysis becomes more nuanced and may implicate asset basis, depreciation, and potentially transfer pricing positions.

Coordination between an organization鈥檚 financial reporting, tax accounting, and transfer pricing specialists is critical in order that customs values, income tax treatment, and any refund鈥憆elated credits remain consistent.

Action items for corporate tax departments

Corporate tax teams do not need to become customs experts overnight, but they do need to lead a coordinated response. Practically, that means they should:

• • • confirm whether their company was an importer of record and, if so, ensure ACE access and banking information are in place now, not after CBP turns the refund system on.
    • map which entries included IEEPA tariffs, identify which are non鈥憀iquidated or still within the 180鈥慸ay protest window, and file protests where appropriate to protect the company鈥檚 rights.
    • inventory all tariff鈥憇haring arrangements with suppliers, assess contractual entitlement to pass鈥憈hrough refunds, and align with procurement and legal teams on a consistent recovery approach.
    • work with accounting to determine the financial statement treatment of potential refunds, including whether and when to recognize contingent assets or income and any knock鈥憃n effects for transfer pricing and valuation.

If tax departments wait for complete certainty from the courts before acting, many entries may go final and fall out of scope. The opportunity for tariff refunds will favor companies that are data鈥憆eady, cross鈥慺unctionally aligned, and willing to move under time pressure.

You can find out more about the changing tariff situation here

Key takeaways:

• • • The US achieved conventional military dominance, but it hasn’t solved the core problem 鈥� The navy that was destroyed was never the one controlling the Strait of Hormuz. The asymmetric force that is, the IRGCN, retained 80% of its small-boat fleet and may be able to replenish losses from civilian infrastructure faster than the US can eliminate them.

    • All three pathways to a quick resolution are blocked 鈥� The regime has hardened rather than collapsed, the diplomatic positions are nowhere near overlapping, and the US military posture is escalating, including possible ground operations, while allied support remains symbolic.

    • The conflict is likely measured in quarters, not weeks, and the economic difference is not linear 鈥� Businesses should be stress-testing against sustained disruption rather than planning for a return to normal, because the conditions required for a rapid resolution would each need to break favorably 鈥� and right now, none of them are.

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This is the first of a two-part series on the impact of the war with Iran as the conflict continues. In this part, we look at different ways the war could wind down quickly, and why none of them offer an immediate pathway.

The war with Iran is not going to be over by the end of this week.

That sentence shouldn’t be controversial four weeks into the ongoing war with Iran being waged by the United States and Israel, but it runs against the grain of how markets, policymakers, and many business leaders have been processing this conflict. The dominant assumption, visible in equity markets that have wobbled but not cratered, is that this is an acute shock with a definable end date.

However, very little about the military, political, or strategic picture supports that assumption.

While I make no claim to predict the war’s exact duration, I can lay out why the most likely scenarios point to a conflict measured in quarters, not weeks 鈥� and why that difference matters. In the next part of this series, we’ll sketch the economic consequences on a quarter-by-quarter basis, drawing on the latest projections from top economic thinkers. First, however, here is why this war probably drags on.

The wins aren’t winning鈥�

By a surface level scorecard, Operation Epic Fury has been exactly the kind of lopsided success one would expect of a global superpower that鈥檚 going up against a regional player. Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader was killed in the opening strikes, Iran’s conventional navy was sunk at anchor before they could sortie, and full air supremacy by the US appears established. If you were grading this on the metrics that won wars in the 20th century, you’d be forgiven for thinking it was nearly over.

Yet it is not nearly over. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Daily transits have collapsed from 138 ships to fewer than five. Approximately 2,000 vessels and 20,000 seafarers are stranded in the region with nowhere to go. Brent crude is at $108 per barrel as of March 26, up roughly 50% since the war began. The International Energy Agency has called the current situation the largest disruption to global energy supplies in history.

The disconnect between the military scorecard and the strategic reality comes down to a single, underappreciated fact that the US destroyed the wrong navy. To be fair, it’s not like they had much of a choice. Iran’s conventional fleet had to go, and it went; however, that was playing on easy mode. Iran’s conventional fleet, its frigates, corvettes, and submarines, was a prestige force built for Indian Ocean power projection.

You can find out more about the here

The force actually designed to fight America, however, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), and it is something else entirely: a dispersed network of hundreds of armed speedboats, coastal missile batteries, thousands of sea mines, drone systems, and midget submarines spread across dozens of small bases along hundreds of miles of Persian Gulf coastline. The IRGCN’s entire doctrine, training, and equipment procurement were optimized for exactly one scenario, that of denying the Strait of Hormuz to a technologically superior adversary. That is the war Iran is now fighting.

Even though the IRGCN lost its most advanced platforms, those were not the workhorses of their fleet. The IRGCN retains an estimated 80% of its small-boat fleet, the fast boats that hide among fishing dhows, the crews that can scatter onshore and remount on surviving craft. The US is tasked with the mission of hunting small boats hiding among civilian vessels, in a fight in which Iran is willing to lose dozens of them a day to keep the Strait closed. This is not a mopping-up operation; rather, it is a war of attrition that the US is not structured to win quickly, and one in which Iran can replace its losses in ways a conventional navy cannot. For the US, it鈥檚 like trying to empty a bathtub while the spigot is still running.

Further, the math of the Strait itself is unforgiving. Iran had an estimated 5,000 sea mines before the war and has begun laying them. The US Navy decommissioned its last Gulf-based minesweepers in 2025 鈥� timing that, in hindsight, looks catastrophic.

Indeed, the US can sink every major Iranian warship afloat and still not reopen the waterway. That, in fact, is roughly what has happened.

鈥nd the off-ramps are blocked

If conventional military victory hasn’t solved the problem, there are three other ways this war ends quickly. As of late March, however, all three are jammed.

1. The regime isn’t collapsing

A US intelligence assessment completed before the war concluded that military action was unlikely to produce regime change even if Iran’s leadership was killed. That assessment has proven accurate. Iran鈥檚 constitutional succession mechanism activated as designed, and a new Supreme Leader, the previous one鈥檚 more hardline son, was installed within days. Also, protests are not sweeping the streets. Ideological regimes under external threat tend to harden, not fracture. Indeed, both the Taliban and Hamas have survived worse. The Iranian Islamic Republic, whatever else you want to say about it, appears to be surviving this conflict as well.

2. Diplomacy has nowhere to go

Iran rejected the 15-point plan offered by the US and published five counterdemands, including recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which is a nonstarter for the US. Iran’s foreign minister says Tehran has no intention of negotiating, even as President Donald J. Trump insists talks are continuing. These positions aren’t close to overlapping, and both sides are staking their credibility on not budging first.

And Iran has good reason to believe time is on its side. The war is deeply unpopular in the US and the same affordability anxiety that swept Republicans into power is now threatening to sweep them out in the midterms. Tehran knows for every day the war goes on, they get to roll the dice that Trump will back out, giving them a strong incentive to get as many rolls as they can.

3. The military posture is escalating, not resolving

Ground troops, including paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, are en route to the Gulf or have received deployment orders. Reports indicate the White House is weighing a seizure of Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil terminal, an operation that would put American boots on Iranian soil for the first time. Seven allied nations signed a statement supporting Strait security, but it鈥檚 a paperwork alliance, lacking the kind of committed hardware needed to force a solution to the Strait鈥檚 closure.

What does this mean for business?

The Iranian regime isn’t folding, diplomacy doesn鈥檛 seem to be catching on, and the US military posture is expanding. None of the conditions point to a rapid resolution, and in fact, several of them point to a prolonged conflict.

If this war is measured in quarters rather than weeks, the economic consequences stop being a temporary, albeit painful price spike and start being a structural disruptive event, one that reshapes supply chains, reprices risk, and forces companies to make hard choices about where and how they operate. The difference between a three-week war and a three-quarter war is not a difference of magnitude, it is a difference in kind.

In the concluding part of this series, we’ll walk through what a quarter-by-quarter economic scenario would look like if the war continues.

Key takeaways:

• • • Violence against judges is escalating 鈥� Targeted shootings, coordinated harassment campaigns, and threats that now routinely follow judges to their homes and families.

    • The rhetoric driving the escalation is coming from the highest levels of government 鈥� The absence of any public denunciation from the Department of Justice is highlighting the source of the problem.

    • Will the violence itself become part of judicial rulings? 鈥� The endgame of judicial intimidation isn’t that judges stop ruling, it’s that the threat of violence becomes a silent presence in the deliberation itself.

NEW YORK 鈥� Those attendees who came to the recent听 to talk about AI, agentic workflows, and the business of legal technology, also were treated to a session that will likely stay with attendees and had nothing to do with AI.

In that session, four federal judges took the stage; but they were not there to talk about pricing models or AI adoption. They were there to talk about staying alive.

Setting the stage

Jason Wareham, CEO of IPSA Intelligent Systems and a former U.S. Marine Corps judge advocate, introduced the session 鈥� a panel of four sitting United States District Court judges 鈥� by speaking of how the rule of law once seemed resolute, yet how that faith in that has been shaken, year after year. He worked hard to frame his observations as nonpartisan, a matter of institutional fragility rather than political allegiance. It was a generous framing, but it was one that would not survive the weight of the ensuing discussion.

The Honorable Esther Salas of the District of New Jersey said that the reason she was there has a name. On July 19, 2020, a disgruntled, extremist attorney who had a case before her court arrived at her home during a birthday celebration. He shot and killed her twenty-year-old son, Daniel Anderl. He shot and critically wounded her husband. She has spent the years since on a mission to protect her judicial colleagues from the same fate.

The new normal

Next, the Honorable Kenly Kiya Kato of the Central District of California described what has changed. Judges鈥� rulings are still based on the Constitution, on precedent, and on the facts; but what’s different is the small voice in the back of a judge’s head. That voice, often coming after a judge issued a decision that they now have to fight against, asks: What will happen after this? It is now expected, Judge Kato explained, that a high-profile order will bring threats. When two colleagues in her district issued prominent decisions, her first thought was for their safety. That is not how it has been historically.

The Honorable Mia Roberts Perez of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asked how we got here, pointing to language from the highest levels of government: judges called monsters, a U.S. Department of Justice declaring war on rogue judges, and recently politicians bringing justice鈥檚 families into the conversation.

Judge Salas pushed even further. She acknowledged the instinct to frame the problem as bipartisan, but said the current moment is not apples to apples. It is apples to watermelons. The spike in threats since 2015, she argued, traces directly to rhetoric from political leaders using language never before deployed against the bench.

The federal judiciary is looking to break annual records for threats [against judges], and there is an absence of any public denunciation from the Attorney General or the DOJ.

The evidence is not abstract, nor are the victims, and the panel walked through it. Judge John Roemer of Wisconsin, zip-tied to a chair and assassinated in his home. Associate Judge Andrew Wilkinson of Maryland shot dead in his driveway while his family was inside. Judge Steven Meyer of Indiana and his wife Kimberly, shot through their own front door after attackers first posed as a food delivery, then returned days later claiming to have found the couple’s dog. Judge Meyer has just undergone his fifth surgery since the attack.

All of these incidents happened at the judges’ homes.

Judge Salas then played a voicemail, one of thousands that federal judges receive. It was less than 30 seconds long, but it did not need to be longer. While names had been redacted, what remained was a torrent of threats and obscenities, graphic, sexual and violent, delivered with the confidence of someone who does not expect consequences. Some judges receive hundreds of these after a single ruling, often from people with no case before them at all.

The shadow over the courts

Throughout the session, there was a presence the panelists circled but rarely named directly. A shadow that shaped every observation about escalating threats, every reference to rhetoric from the top down, every mention of language never before used by political leaders, of action or inaction the likes of which would have been unthinkable just several years ago. The specifics were spoken. The name, largely, was not.

It didn’t have to be.

Judge Kato said that what was perhaps the most disheartening aspect of all this is that these threats are getting worse. The people who know better are not doing better. Indeed, she said her children think about these problems every day. What will happen to mom today? Will someone come to the house? These are questions children should not have to carry. They did not sign up for this, and neither did the judges.

In 2026, Judge Salas noted, the federal judiciary is looking to break annual records for threats. She also noted the absence of any public denunciation from the Attorney General or the DOJ. The silence, she said, says a lot.

Not surprisingly, the implications extend beyond the judges themselves. As Judge Salas noted, if judges have to weigh their safety alongside the law, ordinary people don’t stand a chance. If one party is stronger, better funded, or more willing to threaten, then the scales tip.

That is the endgame of judicial intimidation. It鈥檚 not that judges stop ruling, but that the violent and the powerful 鈥� indeed, the people least fit to hold the scales 鈥� can tilt them at will.

That concern echoed an earlier warning from Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Judge Mehalchick said that judicial intimidation feeds on misunderstanding. When the public no longer grasps why judges must be insulated from pressure or conversely, mistakes independence for partisanship, the threat environment becomes easier to justify, easier to ignore, and harder to reverse.

What is perhaps the most disheartening aspect of all this is that these threats are getting worse, and the people who know better are not doing better.

In his 2024 year-end report, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts identified four threats to judicial independence: violence, intimidation, disinformation, and threats to defy lawfully entered judgements. The panel discussed this report as prophecy fulfilled. Public confidence in the judiciary has plummeted since 2021, and the reasons are complex. The judges insisted they are still doing their jobs the right way, but the violence is spreading anyway.

What survives

Judge Salas asked the audience to watch their thoughts. Are they negative and destructive, or positive and uplifting? Can we start loving more? She ended by sending love and light to everyone in the room.

The judges were visibly emotional on the stage.

The words were beautiful. They were also, in the context of everything that had just been described 鈥� the killings, the voicemails, the zip ties, the pizza deliveries masking a threat under a murdered son’s name 鈥� resting in a shadow that no amount of love and light could fully dispel on their own.

The room responded with a standing ovation.

Thousands of people came to Legalweek 2026 to talk about the future of legal technology. For one morning, four judges reminded them that none of it matters if the people charged with administering justice cannot do so safely.

So, while the billable hour may survive and the associate will adapt, the harder question, the one that should keep the legal industry awake at night, is whether the bench will hold.

You can find more of听our coverage of Legalweek events听here

Key takeaways:

• • • The supply hit is real, not just priced-in fear 鈥� Tanker insurance has collapsed, infrastructure is damaged, and volumes are physically offline. Some of this isn’t coming back quickly.

    • Tax policy is moving in five directions at once 鈥� Energy security incentives, BEPS 2.0 rollout, windfall tax rumblings 鈥� governments are improvising, and your effective tax rate is caught in the middle.

    • Your Evidence to Recommendations (EtR) guidance is probably already stale 鈥� If you haven’t stress-tested your EtR guidance against $100-plus per barrel oil and a multi-quarter disruption, you’re behind.

Let’s be direct: This isn’t a risky premium situation. When military strikes take out Middle Eastern infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and tanker insurers pull out of a corridor carrying 15% to 20% of global crude and liquefied natural gas (LNG), supply goes offline. That’s what’s happened.

At the time of writing, the price of oil continues to fluctuate. The recent release of the , which forecasts and analyze the global oil market, shows that more global markets are starting to say the word recession. And whether or not a recession actually materializes, the energy price environment has shifted in ways that will take multiple quarters, and maybe years, to unwind. For corporate tax departments, the question isn’t whether this changes their planning, it’s whether they’ve caught up yet.

Which scenario-modeling is most worth it?

Most ominously, nobody knows how this all ends, and that’s exactly why your tax team may need more than one base case.

The optimistic read is a short, sharp shock 鈥� prices spike, some flows resume, upstream books a windfall quarter, and consuming-country governments start muttering about excess profits taxes. Messy, but manageable.

The harder scenario is prolonged disruption: Hormuz remains constrained for months, along with repeated infrastructure hits with resulting rerouting that permanently shifts where profits land and which entities suddenly have a taxable presence for which they didn’t plan. Not surprisingly, transfer pricing and permanent听establishment听(PE) exposure get complicated fast.

Add to the mix, by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that multinational corporate tax departments are still required to adhere to and now plan for how it may interact and intersect with the other two scenarios.

The policy environment is a mess, but in a very specific way

Here’s what makes this cycle different from 2008 or 2014: Governments are pulling in opposite directions simultaneously. The United States has pivoted hard toward energy dominance 鈥� domestic fossils, nuclear, extraction incentives. Meanwhile, BEPS 2.0 is still rolling out unevenly across jurisdictions, which means your organization鈥檚 effective tax rate in any given country depends heavily on where it sits in the implementation timeline.

Throw in 鈥� which historically shows up about six months after prices stay high and voters get angry 鈥� and you have an environment in which the gap between your statutory tax rate and your actual sustainable rate could widen fast if you’re not actively managing it.

5 actions tax team leaders can take now

Of course, none of these are new concepts; but in a fast-moving situation, the basics that get done quickly will beat the sophisticated that gets done late.

First, rebuild your EtR guidance around at least three commodity paths. Not as a theoretical exercise 鈥� as something your CFO can actually present to the board with a straight face.

Second, map out which legal entities are genuinely exposed to Hormuz-dependent flow volumes. Companies鈥� operations and trading teams often know this; but the tax team too often doesn’t until there’s a problem. Close that knowledge gap now.

Third, re-rank your project pipeline on a real after-tax basis. Updated incentive assumptions, global minimum tax, domestic versus cross-border production 鈥� run all the numbers again. Some projects that looked marginal six months ago may look very different now, and vice versa.

Fourth, build a windfall tax playbook before you need one. The data you’d need to defend your profit levels and capital allocation decisions takes time to pull together. Don’t leave that work until the week the legislation drops.

Fifth 鈥� and this is the one that gets skipped most often 鈥� make sure the company鈥檚 tax, treasury, and trading groups are talking to each other in real time. Hedging decisions, financing structures, physical flow changes 鈥� all of these have tax consequences, and they’re happening fast right now.

One final thought

Corporate tax departments that come out of this looking good won’t be the ones that predicted the conflict. They’ll be the ones who translated what鈥檚 happened into specific, actionable data and numbers for their leadership 鈥� presented quickly, clearly, and with their own company’s footprint in mind.

That’s the brief. Now go build it.

You can find more of our coverage of the impact of the ongoing War in Iran here

Key highlights:

• • • Tax credit transferability survived intact鈥� The OBBBA preserved Section 6418 transferability rules despite earlier proposals to sunset or repeal them.

    • AI-driven data center boom may revive renewable energy tax credits鈥� With data centers projected to consume 12% of all US energy by 2028, large operators have strong incentives to advocate for preserving and expanding renewable tax credits to meet massive energy demands through solar, geothermal, and battery storage solutions.

    • 2026 market conditions favor buyers due to supply-demand imbalance鈥擨ncreased supply of tax credits (particularly Section 45Z clean fuel production credits) combined with reduced buyer competition from provisions like Section 174 and bonus depreciation has created advantageous pricing.

At the start of the current Trump administration, green energy tax credits were expected to be slashed or disappear altogether. In reality, significant changes emerged instead of ceasing to exist. More specifically, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), passed in July 2025, kept the transferability rules around green energy tax credits intact.

As a result, the market for these credits remains robust in 2026 and 2027, says , an energy tax authority and principal at accounting firm CliftonLarsonAllen (CLA). In addition, multiple credits still have runway, and near-term dynamics in 2026 may favor buyers.

OBBBA鈥檚 changes result in shifts in marketplace conditions

When the OBBBA bill passed, the specifics revealed a more optimistic picture than many understand. According to Hill, specific examples include:

• • Wind and solar projects 鈥� Developers that begin construction by July 4, 2026, still have a four-year window to complete their projects and still claim credits. Even projects that miss this construction deadline can qualify if they’re placed in service by December 31, 2027.
  • Clean fuel production credits 鈥� Clean fuel production credits, detailed in OBBBA鈥檚 Section 45Z, received an extended runway through 2029.
  • Tax credit transferability 鈥� The tax credit transferability aspect under Section 6418 remained whole, despite previous versions of the bill proposing either a sunset date or outright repeal of transferability. This fact provides a level of marketplace certainty that can act as critical liquidity for developers that typically lack the tax liability to use credits themselves.

In addition, the legislation altered the buyer and seller environment. Provisions including OBBBA鈥檚 Section 174 and bonus depreciation generated additional deductions for certain companies, and as a result, reduced those companies鈥� 2025 corporate tax liability. Simultaneously, Section 45Z clean fuel production tax credits came into force and created a supply-demand imbalance that favors buyers.

Overall, in the latter half of 2025, Hill describes the marketplace as favorable for buyers because of an increased supply of tax credits that were for sale previously with fewer buyers. Into 2026 and beyond, both developers and corporate buyers still have significant opportunities to participate in the tax credit marketplace, explains Hill.

AI-related data center demand may spur new proposals for renewables tax credits

The explosive proliferation of data centers because of the growing AI demand across the United States may become the unexpected champion for renewable energy tax credits. Hundreds of facilities are currently under construction, and the energy demand implications are staggering. In fact, the projects that by 2028, data centers will consume 12% of all US energy.

Renewable energy technologies are emerging as essential solutions to meet these demands. Solar power, as a tried-and-true technology, offers ideal supplementation for data center operations; and geothermal heating and cooling systems directly address the massive temperature control challenges these facilities face. Perhaps most significantly, battery storage is rapidly becoming standard operating procedure, with both grid-based and solar-array-tied battery systems providing critical backup power.

These developments carry substantial policy implications. In fact, large data center operators have incentives to become vocal advocates for preserving and expanding renewable tax credits, says , a leader in federal tax strategies at CLA. “We want our AI, we want our cloud-based services. To do that鈥� we need massive data centers and massive computing demands,鈥� DePrima explains. 鈥淎nd that in turn requires massive amounts of energy consumption, which renewables can certainly supplement.鈥� This, in turn, creates the potential for a renewable energy tax credit “comeback” within two to three years, he adds.

Guidance for buyers and sellers

Looking ahead to 2026 and beyond, both buyers and sellers of renewable energy tax credits should recognize that significant opportunities remain despite regulatory changes. More specifically:

For buyers 鈥� Buyers should act now to capitalize on favorable market conditions. With increased credit supply and reduced buyer competition due to provisions like Section 174 and bonus depreciation, pricing has become more advantageous. Buyers of renewable energy tax credits should consider structuring 2026 transactions to directly offset estimated tax payments throughout the year, thereby improving cash flow by making payments to sellers rather than the IRS. Financial institutions remain particularly well-positioned as buyers, as many have explored tax credit carryback opportunities to increase their tax savings even further.

For sellers and developers 鈥� Renewable energy tax credits sellers and energy project developers can use tax-credit monetization as a critical component of project financing because the ability to convert credits into immediate cash proceeds is essential for paying down debt and funding new projects. Despite initial concerns, substantial opportunities remain with credits outlined in Sections 45Z, 45X, 48E, and 45Y which are transferable and viable through 2029 and beyond.

In either case, tax credit transferability under Section 6418 offers key opportunities in the marketplace. Whether buyers are looking to reduce their corporate tax burden while supporting clean energy goals, or developers are seeking to monetize renewable projects 鈥� tax credits offer incentives to move forward.

The information contained herein is general in nature and is not intended, and should not be construed, as legal, accounting, or tax advice or opinion provided by CliftonLarsonAllen LLP to the reader. The reader also is cautioned that this material may not be applicable to, or suitable for, the reader鈥檚 specific circumstances or needs, and may require consideration of nontax and other tax factors if any action is to be contemplated. The reader should contact his or her CliftonLarsonAllen LLP or other tax professional prior to taking any action based upon this information. CliftonLarsonAllen LLP assumes no obligation to inform the reader of any changes in tax laws or other factors that could affect the information contained herein.

You can find out more about renewable energy tax credits here

Key insights:

• • • Geopolitical crises fuel financial volatility and illicit activity 鈥� Conflicts have traditionally accelerated capital shifts and flows, creating cover for bad actors.

    • Predictable patterns emerge 鈥� Financial institutions should watch for sudden cross-border activity, unusual cash deposits, and transactions from border areas.

    • Conflict zones enable black market expansion 鈥� They also should adapt their compliance systems to detect more sophisticated methods used by criminals, tightening screening and enhancing staff training.

While business and international politics may appear cold and calculating, these things are often driven by emotion, especially fear 鈥� and fear of instability often drives market volatility.

So it goes as the United States attacks one of the world’s largest militaries and supporters of regional terror groups, causing deepening instability in a Middle East already beset by violence. It is certain that there is already a surge of money flowing in and out of the region for different reasons. Legitimate and illegitimate actors alike will seek to both run away from the crisis and profit from it. However, there are some anti-money laundering specific thoughts that financial institutions need to consider during a time of global uncertainty.

The bottom line 鈥� lots of money is on the move. Funding will send aid groups towards the crisis; it will also send logistical supplies, war material, and other necessities. All of these cost money, and defense sectors in multiple countries will be pumping out munitions to refill stockpiles in any country that is related to or in the neighborhood of the conflict.

Not every large transaction is an unusual, reportable event, but financial institutions now need to look one or two layers below the surface. What does not seem related on the surface is always a red flag. Look at beneficial ownership of companies and vessels, look at relations of the owners, not just the 听(OFAC) results of those people themselves. The financial system will, and should, allow the legitimate funds to flow. However, financial investigators must remain diligent to catch bad actors that take advantage of the surge in non-profit activity or the urgency with which legitimate businesses operate in a conflict zone.

Risk Factor 1: Capital flight from regime change

Just as the fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria caused family funds to flow to as regime members fled the country, you will see the same with politically exposed persons (PEPs) who are inevitably fleeing regime change in Iran. A political crackdown will come. Whether the victors are on the side of the West or not remains to be seen, but some factions are going to flee the country and take family wealth with them.

Banks and other financial services should watch for anyone connected to people moving money through neighboring countries in which they may have literally hiked or driven before depositing cash into a financial institution. There are stories of refugees leaving places with gold bands on their arms, cash and false bottom purses, and diamonds in the lining of sweaters. These things will be converted to cash in neighboring countries and put into financial systems less affected by the conflict. An influx of cash throughout the region, therefore, could indicate this type of capital flight.

Risk Factor 2: Illicit finance and black markets

Since the fall of Syria, we have also become aware of that helps fuel addiction and armed conflict. There are certainly other substances and drug trafficking networks about which we know very little on this side of the secrecy veil.

Therefore, this instability will be seen as a time of opportunity for criminal groups. Indeed, with Assad鈥檚 security forces no longer controlling middle eastern captagon and other narcotics trade and various armed groups looking for funding sources, this is an illicit business opportunity.

Financial institutions can expect rapid movement of money between unrelated shell corporations, new corporations, and shadow vessels. They also should expect the black market to boom with drugs, contraband Iranian oil, and funds tied to narcotics that they have only yet to discover. Illegal arms will also generate funding, so all of the methods, both formal and informal, used to transfer value will become active.

In fact, large portions of such funding will flow through financial institutions; and peer to peer payment providers, FinTechs, and money transmitters should be especially wary of funds moving rapidly through their platforms. A burst in conflict means a burst in activity from illicit sources; therefore, enhanced, targeted monitoring is a must.

How financial institutions鈥� risk & compliance teams should respond

First, all financial institutions鈥� risk & compliance departments need to assess their institutions鈥� OFAC and sanctions screening search parameters. This is a good time to dial up fuzzy logic capability and reduce match percentage thresholds. In other words, risk tolerance should go down while the metaphorical dragnet gets wider. Surge the department鈥檚 personnel capability to compensate if you have to, because that is better than a strict-liability OFAC fine. Remember, OFAC sanctions are closely tied to national security, especially when it comes to Iran. This is not an arena in which leniency can be expected. Compliance teams should look at monitoring systems and thresholds immediately, create geographical targeting models to cover the conflict zone, and consider a command center approach to deal with the fluidity of the situation until things settle.

If your institution has not already taken the hint from regulators, this also is an opportunity to double down on Customer Due Diligence and identity verification. Front line staff and embedded business compliance personnel should receive updated training and job aids to increase awareness and hone internal reporting. Indeed, it is an advanced business skill to understand complex corporate beneficial ownership, much less to detect when it may be tied to illicit activity or corrupt regimes. Now is the time to increase that level of knowledge and thereby make the culture of compliance more robust.

In every crisis there is opportunity as well as risk: Managing the risk allows every company to take advantage of the opportunity, shore up its mission, and strengthen the institution.

You can find out more about听the geopolitical and economic outlook for 2026听here

Key takeaways:

• • • Companies should act fast on refunds 鈥� Companies that paid IEEPA-based duties have potential refund claims, but statutory deadlines are ticking. Business leaders should map exposure, quantify opportunities, and file protective claims now.

    • Remember, other tariffs still apply 鈥� This decision only invalidated IEEPA-based tariffs. Tariffs based on Sections 232, 301, and 122 of the 1974 Trade Act听remain in force, and the administration is already signaling plans for new global tariffs.

    • Businesses should update their financial models 鈥� Tariff refunds flow through cost of goods sold, which affects taxable income and effective tax rates. Business leaders should review their transfer pricing models and contracts to determine which parties receive refund proceeds.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling striking down the tariffs that the Trump Administration based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) creates immediate refund opportunities for businesses that paid billions of dollars in now-invalidated duties. However, the administration’s pivot to alternative tariff authorities means the trade policy landscape is shifting rather than settling.

Now, corporate tax and trade leaders must move quickly to preserve refund claims while building resilient strategies for the next wave of tariff changes that are already fully in motion.

What actually happened

In , the Supreme Court said last month that President Donald J. Trump went too far by using the IEEPA 鈥� a statute designed for genuine national emergencies 鈥� to impose broad, peacetime tariffs. The Court’s message was blunt: If you want sweeping tariff authority, get the U.S. Congress to give it to you explicitly 鈥� IEEPA doesn’t cut it.

This ruling invalidated the tariffs that relied solely on IEEPA, including certain reciprocal global duties and some measures targeting Canada, Mexico, and China. However, here’s the catch: Other tariff regimes 鈥� such as those outlined in Sections 232, 301, and 122 of the Trade听Act听of听1974听鈥� are still standing. Those weren’t touched by this decision, and they’re not going away.

Check out听听for more on the Supreme Court鈥檚 tariff decision here

Further, the administration isn’t sitting still either. There’s already talk of pivoting to Section 122 to impose a new 10% global tariff. So, while one door closed, another may be opening, which means the legal landscape is shifting, not settling.

Why this matters right now

There are several important factors to consider in the wake of this decision, including:

Start with the money 鈥� If your company paid IEEPA-based duties, your effective tariff rate on many imports just dropped. That , changes your margin picture, and could shift pricing dynamics across the retail, consumer goods, manufacturing, and automotive sectors.

Then there’s the refund potential 鈥� Billions of dollars were collected under tariffs that are now unlawful. The government won’t write checks automatically 鈥� indeed, the administration has already signaled it will fight broad refund claims 鈥� but for individual companies, the cash at stake could be significant.

Don’t overlook your contracts 鈥� Many commercial agreements include tariff pass-through clauses, price adjustments, and indemnities. Those provisions will determine which parties actually gets the money: the importer of record, the customer, or someone else in the chain. If you restructured your supply chain around the old tariff regime, you may need to rethink those decisions, too.

What businesses should do first

There are several steps business leaders should undertake to move forward in this new environment, including:

Map your exposure 鈥� Tax and trade teams need to pull multi-year import data by Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code, country of origin, and legal authority. Figure out which entries were hit specifically by IEEPA-based tariffs, as opposed to Section 232 or 301 duties, which again, are still in effect.

Quantify the opportunity 鈥� Calculate total IEEPA duties paid by entity, jurisdiction, and period. Include a rough estimate of interest, prioritize the highest-value lanes, and flag any statutory deadlines for protests or post-summary corrections. Missing a deadline isn’t something you can easily fix later.

Preserve your rights 鈥� If you’ve already filed test cases or joined class actions, revisit your strategy with counsel. If you haven’t, evaluate quickly whether to file protests, post-summary corrections, or other protective claims with the U.S. Customs & Border Protection. These procedures will evolve, of course, but the clock already is ticking.

Get the right people in the room 鈥� This isn’t just a tax problem or a trade compliance problem. Stand up a cross-functional working group that includes tax, customs, legal, finance, supply chain, and investor relations. Agree on who owns what, how you’ll share data, and how you’ll communicate, especially if the refund could move the needle on earnings or liquidity.

Financial reporting and tax implications

Most importantly, you need to reassess your tariff-related balances and disclosures. If refunds are probable and you can estimate them, that may affect liabilities, expense recognition, and reserves. Even if the accounting is murky, material claims may need to be discussed in your report鈥檚 Management鈥檚 Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) section or in footnotes.

On the tax side, tariff refunds and lower ongoing duties flow through cost of goods sold (COGS), which changes taxable income and your business鈥檚 effective tax rate. Timing matters: When you recognize a refund for book purposes may not match when it hits for tax, creating temporary differences that need Accounting Standards Codification 740 analysis.

And don’t forget transfer pricing. Many intercompany pricing models were built during the high-tariff period and may embed those costs in tested party margins. If tariffs fall or refunds materialize, those models and the supporting documentation may need updates. Review intercompany agreements that allocate customs and tariff costs to make sure they align with both the economics and the legal entitlement to possible refunds.

Think beyond the refund

Yes, the immediate focus is on getting your company鈥檚 money back and staying compliant 鈥� but this is also a moment in which more strategic thinking is required, including:

Run scenarios 鈥� Business show run their models to see what happens if IEEPA tariffs disappear and aren’t fully replaced. Model what happens if a broad 10% global tariff lands under Section 122. Model what happens if country- or sector-specific measures expand. For each scenario, stress-test your gross margin, cash flow, and key supply chain nodes.

Revisit your sourcing strategy 鈥� Some nearshoring or supplier diversification moves you made under the old tariff structure may no longer make sense. Others may still be smart as a hedge against renewed trade tensions. The tax team needs to be part of these conversations 鈥� not just because tariffs affect cost, but because new structures reshape your effective global tax rate, foreign tax credit position, and your base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) exposure.

Fix your data and governance 鈥� Trade policies can move fast and unpredictably. If you can’t quickly pull clean import data, run classification reviews, or model your exposure across scenarios, then you’re simply flying blind. Now is a good time to fix that.

The bottom line

The Supreme Court’s decision closed one chapter of the president鈥檚 tariff story, but it didn鈥檛 end it. For corporate tax and trade leaders, the message is straightforward: Grab the refund opportunity, protect your position, and use this moment to build a more resilient strategy for whatever comes next.

Because if there’s one thing we’ve learned, it’s that the next round of tariff changes is already on its way.

For more on the impact of tariffs on global trade, you can download a full copy of the 成人VR视频 Institute鈥檚 recent 2026 Global Trade Report听here

Key takeaways:

• • • The Strait of Hormuz crisis threatens a global recession 鈥� The effective closure of the Strait, which is being driven more by insurance withdrawal and risk perception than a physical blockade, has effectively halted roughly 20% of global petroleum flow. If this disruptions persist beyond 30 days, economic modeling points to overwhelming recession risk for major importing economies, with oil potentially reaching $100 to $200 per barrel depending on severity.

    • The world is facing an unprecedented dual-chokepoint shipping crisis 鈥� With the Strait of Hormuz effectively shut and the Houthis resuming attacks on the Suez/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, roughly one-third of global seaborne crude trade is compromised simultaneously. All five major container lines have suspended Hormuz transits, and the cascading delays will hit supply chains far beyond the Middle East, including those companies with no direct Gulf exposure.

    • Companies that act now will fare far better than those that wait 鈥� Supply chain disruptions propagate on a lag of two to four weeks, meaning that the pain from today’s anchored tankers hasn’t arrived yet. Businesses should immediately audit their Gulf supply chain exposure, secure alternative freight capacity before it disappears, and prepare for a significant escalation in cyber threats from Iran and its allies.

Just days into the largest military operation undertaken by the United States since the 2003 Iraq invasion, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered the most severe energy supply disruption since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The conflict with Iran has removed roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude from global markets and sent oil prices to above $80 as of press time. The conflict’s trajectory over the coming weeks will determine whether the world faces a manageable price shock or a full-blown recession.

How we got here

The February 28 strikes order by President Donald J. Trump followed weeks of negotiations around Iran鈥檚 nuclear program that ended without a deal just two days before the strikes began. Administration officials have since acknowledged that the timing was driven in part by Israel’s plans to strike Iran independently.

Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, age 86, along with his defense minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and approximately 5 to 10 senior Iranian officials, died in the opening salvo of the operation.

Even after the destruction of a large segment of Iran鈥檚 senior leadership, the war continues on. Hezbollah launched a rocket strike on March 3 with Israel initiating a ground invasion of Lebanon in response. Iran’s retaliation has extended across the region as drone and missile strikes have hit targets across Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Bahrain, while the US Embassy compounds in both Kuwait and Riyadh have been struck directly. Six American service members have been killed thus far.

Indeed, the regional escalation has given Iran the context to play one of the most feared cards in its arsenal 鈥� and one with the potential to throw an already fragile global economy into recession.

On March 2, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, vowing to attack any ship trying to pass through the strait. An European Union official said that began receiving VHF radio transmissions from the IRGC stating that no ships would be permitted to pass.

Ship-tracking data based on the MarineTraffic platform showed at least 150 tankers 鈥� crude oil and LNG vessels (those specifically built to transport liquefied natural gas 鈥� anchored in open Gulf waters. At least five tankers have been struck near the Strait, including one off Oman that was set ablaze, while the US-flagged tanker Stena Imperative was hit by two projectiles near Bahrain. On March 2, Marine insurers Gard, Skuld, and NorthStandard stated publicly they would effective March 5. One day later, four more of the 12 global insurance groups joined them, with London P&I Club, American Club, Steamship Mutual, and Swedish Club announcing similar moves.

Energy markets absorb the most severe supply shock in years

In light of 20 million barrels per day of crude being frozen out of the global markets, brent crude surged as much as 13% before settling at $83 per barrel, while WTI crude jumped to $76 at press time 鈥� both at their highest levels since the June 2025 conflict. Further, that several major oil companies and trading houses suspended shipments through the Strait as soon as strikes began.

“Unless de-escalation signals emerge swiftly, we expect a significant upward repricing of oil,” said , head of the company鈥檚 geopolitical analysis, citing the immediate impact of halting of traffic through Hormuz. UBS analysts warned clients that a material disruption scenario could send brent crude above $120 per barrel, while Barclays projected $100 per barrel as increasingly plausible. Just twenty-four hours later, that range has widened considerably. Goldman Sachs now models $120 to $150 per barrel in a prolonged war, JPMorgan sees $120 if the war lasts beyond three weeks, and Deutsche Bank’s worst-case approaches $200 if Iran mines the Strait.

OPEC+ announced a modest 206,000 barrel per day output increase for April, but as Le贸n told Reuters, markets are now more concerned with whether barrels can physically move than with spare capacity on paper. If Gulf export routes remain constrained, additional production provides limited immediate relief.

Global shipping faces an unprecedented dual-chokepoint crisis

While the energy supply shock is severe, it is only one dimension of a broader shipping disruption that has no modern precedent. For the first time in history, two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints are simultaneously compromised 鈥� the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, the latter under renewed threat after the Houthis announced they would resume attacks. Together, these two passages that connect Asia to Europe handle roughly one-third of the global seaborne crude oil trade and a significant share of containerized cargo. All five major container lines 鈥� Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and COSCO 鈥� have suspended or halted transits through Hormuz and are rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyage times.

The practical consequences for businesses extend well beyond higher shipping costs. The rerouting absorbs vessel capacity that was already stretched thin, meaning delays will cascade across trade lanes that have no direct connection to the Middle East. Companies that source components from Asia, ship finished goods to Europe, or depend on just-in-time inventory models should expect weeks 鈥� not days 鈥� of compounding delays.

Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi 鈥� three of the world’s busiest air cargo hubs 鈥� are also facing disruptions, meaning the usual fallback of shifting urgent shipments to air freight is itself constrained. For affected companies, the window to secure alternative routing and lock in freight capacity is closing fast; those companies that wait for the March 5 insurance deadline to pass before acting will find themselves competing for scarce logistics options in a market where scarcity is already the defining feature.

3 scenarios and their divergent economic consequences

There are three most likely scenarios as this conflict unfolds, each with their own challenges and potential outcomes:

Scenario 1: Rapid regime collapse and quick normalization

Credible but unlikely in the near term, this scenario banks on the fact that Iran’s opposition is real 鈥� the protest movement of the last year or so has been the largest since 1979, and the regime’s legitimacy has been severely eroded by economic collapse and violent crackdowns. If internal collapse occurs, energy markets would normalize rapidly.

Brent crude would likely retreat to the $70 to $75 range within weeks as the primary disruption drivers 鈥� fear and insurance withdrawal, not physical blockade 鈥� dissipates. Tanker traffic would resume once insurers restore war-risk coverage.

Scenario 2: Prolonged conflict, Strait mostly reopened

This is the most likely outcome based on available analysis. Energy Aspects founder Amrita Sen said she expects oil prices to , noting it is unlikely Iran could maintain a complete closure. She assessed that the US and Israel possess the military capability to neutralize Iran’s ability to fully shut down the Strait but acknowledged that sporadic attacks on individual vessels are far harder to prevent.

This is the critical distinction: A full blockade is unsustainable against US naval superiority, but one-off tanker strikes create an insurance and risk environment that chills commercial traffic almost as effectively. In this scenario, oil prices remain very high before gradually declining as the U.S. Navy establishes escort operations and mine clearance, with an open question revolving around insurance companies鈥� willingness to insure floating barrels of flammable liquid sailing into an open warzone, even under escort. Asian refiners face weeks of constrained supply access.

Scenario 3: Sustained Strait closure for weeks or months

This is the catastrophic tail risk. Roughly 20% of global petroleum consumption and significant LNG volumes moves through the Strait daily, representing an estimated $500 billion in annual energy trade. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Fujairah pipeline offer bypass capacity, but these routes can absorb only a fraction of the 15 million barrels per day now stranded.

Capital Economics estimated that a sustained $100 crude price could add to global inflation. And UBS warned that if disruptions extend beyond three weeks, Gulf producers could exhaust storage capacity and be forced to shut in output, pushing brent crude into the $100 to $120 range if not substantially higher if a significant blockade is held for a long duration.

The economic modeling is unambiguous, however, showing that disruption beyond 30 days carries overwhelming recession risk for major importing economies.

What companies should be doing right now

Of course, the economic impact of this conflict will not arrive all at once. Supply chain disruptions propagate on a lag 鈥� the tankers anchored outside Hormuz today represent goods and energy that won’t arrive at their destinations in two to four weeks. Companies that wait until these shortages materialize before they develop contingency plans will find themselves competing for scarce alternatives alongside everyone else. The window to act is now, not when the pain becomes visible.

Audit your supply chain exposure immediately

Any inputs, components, or raw materials that originate from or move through the Persian Gulf are at risk 鈥� and that extends well beyond oil. For example, one-third of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning agricultural and chemical supply chains face disruption as well.

Business leaders should identify their companies鈥� Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers that have Gulf exposure, assess existing inventory buffers, and begin conversations with alternative suppliers before demand for those alternatives spikes. And companies with operations dependent on Middle Eastern air hubs 鈥� such as Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi 鈥� should assume they鈥檒l face weeks of disruption to business travel and cargo routing and therefore plan accordingly.

Prepare for a serious escalation in cyber threats

Iran and its allies 鈥� including Russia, which has condemned the strikes and has well-documented cyberwarfare capabilities 鈥� have historically used cyber operations as an asymmetric response to kinetic military action. Indeed, there are signs already emerging that such actions are already taking place.

US critical infrastructure, financial services, and professional services firms are all plausible targets. The steps to prevent this are straightforward but urgent: Companies need to ensure that multi-factor authentication is enforced across all systems, verify that endpoint detection and backup protocols are current, brief employees on heightened phishing and social engineering risks, and confirm that incident response plans are not just documented but actually ready to be exercised.

The cost of preparation is negligible; the cost of a ransomware attack or data breach during a period of global economic stress is not.

Peering through the fog of war

As the conflict鈥檚 economic aftershocks move from risk to reality, the companies that act decisively now by diversifying supply chains, securing logistics, and hardening defenses will not just weather the disruption, but emerge more resilient whatever the outcome.

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